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CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW
IN THE ERA OF EFFICIENCY
CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS*

In this Article, ProfessorWilliams identifies and criticizes a theory
of law (the "law-as-price theory") that suggests a corporationcan
either conform to the law or violate it while accepting the known
consequences (risking payingpenalties), and that either choice is
an acceptable means for a corporationto fulfill its obligationsas a
citizen, particularly with respect to regulatory law. Professor
Williams identifies the growing influence of the law-as-price
theory of law in legal writing, corporate law reform efforts and
judicialdecisions,including a decision by the Supreme Court,and
criticizes its underlying assumptions and practical implications.
The Article connects this criticism of the law-as-price theory of
corporate law compliance to the corporate social responsibility
debate, concluding that the theory is premised upon a view of the
corporationthat fails adequately to consider the public obligations
and responsibilitiesof public corporationsin today's society and
economy.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Fifteen years ago, Professor (now Judge) Frank Easterbrook and
Professor Daniel Fischel set out the following proposition about
corporate law compliance: "Managers have no general obligation to
avoid violating regulatory laws, when violations are profitable to the
firm ....We put to one side laws concerning violence or other acts

thought to be malum in se."'
That statement, asserted in a footnote, was elaborated upon only
briefly, again in a footnote:
[M]anagers do not have an ethical duty to obey economic
regulatory laws just because the laws exist. They must
1. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender
Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1168 n.36 (1982) (citations omitted).
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The penalties

Congress names for disobedience are a measure of how

much it wants firms to sacrifice in order to adhere to the
rules; the idea of optimal sanctions is based on the

also should
supposition that managers not only may but
2

violate the rules when it is profitable to do so.
Easterbrook and Fischel's view of corporate compliance with the

law, which I call the "efficient breach" view, has obvious intellectual
connections to some aspects of law and economics and to the theory

of efficient breach of contract, expanded to include efficient breach
of public law.3 While many people might view Easterbrook and
Fischel's theory of "efficient breach of public law" as lacking a sound
legal and political foundation, a more plausible view (but one that is
also flawed) is that of "efficient investment in compliance." That
view suggests the maximum amount of money a firm should invest in
order to comply with the law is determined by the maximum penalty

for violations of a particular law, since it would be economically
inefficient to invest more in compliance than one risks in fines.4

In this Article, I argue that the conception of law underlying
"efficient breach" is similar to the conception underlying "efficient
compliance," and that both understate the significance of law in a
similar way, treating vast realms of law as simply a pricing scheme or
set of tariffs on behavior. I call the underlying conception of law,
which I am criticizing in this Article, the "law-as-price" view of law,
2. Id. at 1177 n.57.
3. A rudimentary definition of the "efficient breach of contract" theory is that one
party should breach a contract and pay damages if that party finds another economic
opportunity so profitable that she will still profit after breaching, paying damages to the
first promisee, and entering into a contract with the second promisee. See, e.g., Patton v.
Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) ("Even if the
breach is deliberate, it is not necessarily blameworthy. The promisor may simply have
discovered that his performance is worth more to someone else. If so, efficiency is
promoted by allowing him to break his promise, provided he makes good the promisee's
actual losses."); RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 118-20 (4th ed.
1992) (explaining that efficient breach of contract occurs when the breaching party will
still profit after compensating the other party for its expectation interest).
4. See David L. Engel, An Approach to CorporateSocial Responsibility, 32 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 43-45 (1979). The efficient-compliance view sounds much more plausible than
the efficient-breach view because corporate managers do need to make investment
decisions about corporate law compliance, and one would expect them to be affected by
the penalties risked by non-compliance in making these decisions. Still, I argue below,
this notion of "efficient investment in compliance," while perhaps correct at the margins,
is problematic over the vast range of regulatory law because in many instances such an
approach may lead to substantial under-investment in compliance (as judged by the social
costs of law violations when penalties are too low). See infra notes 380-87 and
accompanying text.
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and I assert that both efficient breach and efficient compliance
theories of corporate law compliance derive in important (yet
different) ways from the law-as-price conception of law. Under this
penalty-driven approach to law, what is of paramount importance
about law are the penalties, either because the penalties form the
basis for determining whether to obey the law or not (efficient
breach), or because they form the basis for determining the law's
importance and how much money a corporation should spend on
compliance efforts (efficient compliance). Moreover, under the
efficient breach theory a corporation may purchase the "right" to
violate the law by simply risking paying the penalty.' As was pointed
out almost fifteen years ago by Professor Robert Cooter, however,
this "perspective is blind to the distinctly normative aspect of law,
viewing a sanction for doing what is forbidden merely as the price of
doing what is permitted. ' 6 Cooter's point seems relatively
underappreciated in the literature, though.7 If anything, the tendency
5. For instance, the recently proposed settlement of states' claims against the
tobacco industry contains penalties of up to $2 billion a year if the rates of teenage
smoking do not decline by specified percentages (30% in five years and 60% in ten
years). See Robert Langreth, Accord Is No Match for Power of Nicotine, WALL ST. J.,
June 23, 1997, at B10. Some critics are concerned that "the industry, which racks up sales
of more than $45 billion annually in the U.S. alone, might simply settle for paying $2
billion a year in fines as a cost of doing business." Id. (citing John Garrison, Managing
Director of the American Lung Association).
6. Robert Cooter, Pricesand Sanctions,84 COLUM. L. REv. 1523, 1523 (1984).
7. Cooter made his statement as part of a larger point about the distinction between
prices and sanctions. He maintained that the legal perspective had missed some of the
power of the economic perspective by failing to recognize that some sorts of legal
instruments should price rather than sanction behavior when the underlying behavior is
productive but is nonetheless imposing social costs (such as manufacturing industries that
also produce pollution), just as the economic perspective had missed some of the power of
the legal perspective by failing to understand the normative basis of law. See id. passim.
This fuller notion of the price/sanction distinction has been developed more recently in
writings by Professor John Coffee, who argues that tort law generally prices behavior
while criminal law sanctions it, and that criminal sanctions ought not to be overextended
(as he believes they have been) into vast realms of regulatory law where the underlying
behavior is socially productive. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawfid" Mean
"Criminal"?: Reflections on the DisappearingTort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71
B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991) [hereinafter Coffee, Reflections]; John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms
Lost: The Blurringof the Criminal and Civil Law Models-and What Can Be Done About
It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875 (1992) [hereinafter Coffee, ParadigmsLost]. Yet neither Coffee
nor Cooter is saying that once statutes or regulations exist that establish standards of
behavior and that include penalties for non-compliance, individuals and corporations can
treat the penalties as prices and purchase the "right" not to comply. See John C. Coffee,
Jr., Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between Schylla and
Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L.REV. 789, 794 n.11 (1984) [hereinafter Coffee, Litigation
and Corporate Governance] (stating that the legislative intent of most regulatory law is
not to establish a tariff but to prohibit certain behavior); Cooter, supra note 6, at 1523.
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to equate sanctions with prices has become more pronounced since
Cooter's article was published.'
A corollary of the tendency to treat sanctions as prices is a
distinctly voluntaristic approach to law: a theory that posits one
realm of true "mandatory" law, establishing limits on behavior, and a
separate realm of "voluntary" law, setting out suggestions of desired
behavior and a pricing scheme for the "right" not to meet those
suggestions. This theory was succinctly described by Professor
Stephen Pepper in a recent article in the Yale Law Journal:
The malum in se/malum prohibitum distinction appears, in
older garb, to formulate the difference between law as true
prohibition (that is, the identification of conduct not to be
tolerated) and law as cost (that is, the identification of
conduct to be penalized in some legal fashion, but which the
citizen is still free to choose to do). 9
Examples of conduct Pepper identified as within the realm of "law as
cost" that a citizen is "still free to choose to do" included violating
Environmental Protection Agency regulations that established
standards for industrial discharges of chemicals."
A voluntaristic approach to law is not confined to these (and
other) academic discussions in the pages of the nation's law reviews,
however. Consider the following language from a recent opinion by
Judge Douglas Ginsburg for the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit concerning Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA") sanctions for violations of air traffic control regulations:
The purpose of [making FAA sanctions publicly available]
is obviously to give the public notice of what the law is so
that each individual can act accordingly. Usually that means
conforming to the law, but sometimes it means violating the
law (or coming close and risking a violation) and accepting
the known consequences of doing so-especially where a
regulatory rather than a moral or criminal norm is
concerned."

The particular regulation at issue in that case was an air traffic safety
regulation, indicating this is not a theory that proponents would
8. See infra notes 125-226 and accompanying text.
9. Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the
Jurisprudenceand Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1576-77 (1995). Pepper
ultimately concludes that most regulatory law is within the realm of law as cost. See infra
text accompanying notes 106-24.
10. See Pepper, supra note 9, at 1576.
11. Smith v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 981 F.2d 1326, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(emphasis added).
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confine to record-keeping violations or to speeding on a deserted
road in Nevada.
In this Article, I explore and criticize the "law-as-price" view of
civil regulatory law. I argue that regulatory law should not be viewed
as voluntary-not as something citizens are free to choose to ignore
by accepting or risking the known consequences. As an aspirational
theory about law, and about what we as members of society can
expect from each other, the law-as-price theory is decidedly too thin.
It both expects too little from its citizens, including its corporate
citizens, and provides too much leeway for violations of the law
under the rubric of important societal values such as "efficiency,"
"autonomy," or "the rule of law." 1 Law is functionally voluntary in
the sense that each decision to follow the law is undertaken
voluntarily, most often in private, and without the oversight of a
personal police person requiring compliance and backing up that
requirement with immediate state compulsion. But law is not
voluntary in the sense advocated by the law-as-price view, at least not
in any serious philosophical way. As members of society, we do not
have the right to opt out of generally applicable laws or regulations
by risking paying penalties, although we clearly have that power.
At the outset, though, it is important to ask whether the law-asprice view is even worth bothering to criticize. Easterbrook and
Fischel's views, and those of Judge Ginsburg, are clearly extreme;
surely few people would agree with the theory of efficient breach of
public law. Moreover, at the time Easterbrook and Fischel first
articulated their view, leading academics 3 and practitioners soundly
rejected it under the auspices of the American Law Institute's
4
Principles of Corporate Governance project (the "ALl Principles").1
12. I will criticize this view in the specific context of corporate law compliance
because that is the most interesting and important case to examine, particularly because it
has long been recognized that corporate regulation essentially relies upon "corporate
profit seeking under external legal constraints." Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate
Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 857 (1984). If the
costs of violations of those external legal constraints can be treated as just one among
many "factor" costs in the production of goods and services, then whether there is any
effective corporate regulation is open to question.
13. See Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance, supra note 7, at 794 n.11
(stating that Easterbrook and Fischel's view misreads the legislative intent of most
regulatory law, which is not to establish a tariff but to prohibit certain behavior); see also
Cooter, supra note 6, at 1523 (criticizing scholars of the economics perspective for being
blind to the normative value of law and suggesting a more balanced theory).
14. The American Law Institute (the "ALI") began its Corporate Governance
Project in 1978. The project was intended to restate the law of corporate governance and
provide recommendations for its future development See Herbert Wechsler, Foreword

to AMERICAN

LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
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In1982, section 2.01 of Tentative Draft No. 1, entitled "the Objective
and Conduct of the Business Corporation," provided that "even if

corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the
corporation, in the conduct of its business[,] ...is obliged, to the

same extent as a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by
law."' 5 Mel Eisenberg, Chief Reporter for the ALI Principlessince
1984 and Reporter for section 2.01, directly took issue with the
Easterbrook/Fischel thesis in the commentary to section 2.01:
It is sometimes maintained that whether a corporation
should adhere to a given legal rule may properly depend on
a kind of cost-benefit analysis, in which probable corporate
gains are weighed against either probable social costs,
measured by the dollar liability imposed for engaging in
such conduct, or probable corporate losses, measured by
potential dollar liability discounted for likelihood of
detection. This argument is premised on a false view of the
citizen's duty in a democratic state. With few exceptions,
dollar liability is not a "price" that can ethically be paid for
STRUCrURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS at vii, viii (Tentative Draft No.

1, 1982) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 1]. The final work product was not completed
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
for 14 years.
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1994) (as adopted and
GOVERNANCE:
promulgated in 1992) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. The Corporate Governance Project
became both politically and doctrinally controversial, which is one reason the process was
so protracted. See CHARLES HANSEN, A GUIDE TO THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT 1 (1995) (noting that after "fifteen years of effort
and the production of seemingly countless drafts," the "final product is a mixed
blessing"); Douglas M. Branson, Recent Changes to the Model Business CorporationAct
Death Knells for Main Street Corporation Law, 72 NEB. L. REV. 258, 262 n.10 (1993)
(describing the "welter of controversy" surrounding the ALI project as "centered on the
[political] right and captained by large law firm and in-house corporate counsel of Fortune
500 corporations"); William J. Carney, Section 4.01 of the American Law Institute's
Corporate GovernanceProject Restatement or Misstatement?, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 239, 239
(1988) ("The American Law Institute's ...corporate governance project has generated
the most heated debate in the history of that distinguished institution."); Lawrence E.
Mitchell, Private Law, Public Interest?: The ALl Principlesof CorporateGovernance, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 871, 872-73 (1993) ("The Principles lack a clear and coherent
theory of the corporation. As a consequence of this failure, the Principles cannot, and do
not, satisfy anyone.").
15. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 14, § 2.01. There were no significant changes in
the language of section 2.01 between Tentative Draft No. 1 (1982) and Tentative Draft
No. 2 (1984), unlike many other sections that were substantially revised between those
two drafts. See infra text accompanying notes 129-82. Section 2.01 of the ALI Principles
was adopted by the ALI in 1984. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES OF
AND
RESTATEMENT
STRUCTURE:
AND
GOVERNANCE
CORPORATE
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1984) [hereinafter Tentative Draft

No. 2]; Proceedings: 61st Annual Meeting, 61 A.L.I. PROC. 511 (1984) (adopting section
2.01 of Tentative Draft No. 2, with technical amendments as discussed in the Proceedings,
and subject to further consideration as necessary at a later date).
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the privilege of engaging in legally wrongful conduct.1
Given that flat rejection, it may seem the theory has been fully
repudiated in favor of a more encompassing vision of civic obligation
and corporate social responsibility. That conclusion ought not be
reached in haste. While few people would state the point as starkly
as Easterbrook and Fischel have, nor even purport to agree with it as
so stated, a diminished view of the moral compulsion of law seems
endemic in recent legal writing and thinking, particularly in many
"rational actor" accounts of law compliance, 7 and in various
"positivist" or "libertarian" accounts of lawyers' ethical
responsibilities." Thus, for instance, in the Yale Law Journal article
16. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 14, § 2.01 cmt. f. Section 2.01(b)(1), as finally
promulgated by the ALI in 1992, contains the same black-letter language quoted above
and very similar commentary. See infra text accompanying notes 49-67.
17. See Pepper, supra note 9, at 1600-01; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge,
IncorporatingState Law FiduciaryDuties into the FederalInsider Trading Prohibition,52
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1262 (1995) ("A rational actor will be deterred [from insider
trading] only when the expected sanction associated with an offense exceeds the expected
benefit."). In developing their model of the social value of disseminating knowledge
about the actual likelihood of legal sanctions being applied, Bundy and Elhauge assume
that legal actors are sanctions optimizers: "In deciding whether to engage in regulated
conduct, the sanction optimizer is a Holmesian 'bad man' who considers only the actual
level of expected legal sanctions and gives no independent weight to the fact that the
conduct is legally prohibited or required." Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Elhauge,
Knowledge About Legal Sanctions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 261, 274 (1993). While Bundy and
Elhauge recognize that some actors, whom they "characterize as 'law abiding,' tend to
comply with what they understand to be their legal obligations regardless of the level of
expected sanctions," the existence of this population does not enter into their model
concerning when dissemination of truthful information about the law and probabilities of
enforcement is a good thing. Id. at 275. For further discussion of rational actor accounts
of law compliance, see infra notes 73-74.
18. Professor William Simon identified different models of lawyering in his article
The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and ProfessionalEthics, 1978 Wis. L. REV.
29, which he then modified in EthicalDiscretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1083
(1988).
As modified, Simon's typology draws a distinction between the
"positivist/libertarian" approach and the "regulatory" approach to lawyering, with the
libertarian lawyer seeking primarily to advance the client's individual goals, while the
regulatory lawyer is more concerned with effectuating the substantive social ends of law.
See Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, supra, at 1085-86. Advocates of the
positivist/libertarian approach include Pepper and Joel Newman. See, e.g., Joel S.
Newman, Legal Advice Toward Illegal Ends, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 287 (1994) (arguing
that lawyers providing accurate advice that helps a client violate the law ought not be
prosecuted under canons of professional ethics, but prosecuted only if such advice could
be interpreted as aiding and abetting the underlying violations); Pepper, supra note 9
(considering the multifaceted problem created for lawyers in providing accurate advice to
clients that may lead the client to violate the law). Advocates of the regulatory approach
include Robert W. Gordon and Richard W. Painter. See Robert W. Gordon, Corporate
Law as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255 (1990) [hereinafter Gordon, Corporate
Law]; Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1988)
[hereinafter Gordon, Independence]; Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of
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quoted above, Pepper provided a sophisticated and nuanced analysis
for practicing attorneys to use to determine how, and in which

situations, to counsel clients about violating the law (while
recognizing that this type of counsel vastly complicates the social
structuring of behavior through law).'

In his article, Pepper asserted that three jurisprudential
influences comprise the dominant American perspective on law

today, and the perspective emphasized in American law schools.
Those influences are: 1) a positivist separation of law and morality;
2) the notion that "law is at least as much a prediction of what
officials with state power will do as it is verbal formulations that
provide objectively determinable limits on conduct"; and 3) the
process jurisprudence view, "emphasizing law as an instrument of2
private planning and structuring and deemphasizing law as limit.
Pepper recognizes that these jurisprudential influences are troubling
in combination with a perception of the law as "merely indicating a
potential cost, a penalty that one is free to incur and to discount by
the probability of its enforcement."'

And, he asserted, the reduction

of law to a pricing scheme-the conflation of law as norm with law as
potential cost-is substantially reinforced by law and economics,
which perceives "legal limits and rules as just another 'cost' and
clients as 'profit maximizers,' simply Holmes's 'bad man' dressed in
modern clothes."' Pepper's analysis of the dominant jurisprudential
conception of law, although perhaps overstated, describes a
Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 507 (1994). For a middle
position, see Jamie G. Heller, Note, Legal Counselingin the Administrative State: How to
Let the Client Decide, 103 YALE L.J. 2503, 2504 n.7 (1994) (elaborating upon Simon's
work and suggesting "full-picture" legal counseling to try to incorporate advantages of
both libertarian and regulatory models). This Article is not directly concerned with the
question of lawyers' professional responsibilities, but it does examine certain views of
lawyers' professional responsibilities, particularly the "positivist/libertarian" approach, to
explore the underlying conception of law inherent in those views. See infra text
accompanying notes 105-24.
19. See Pepper, supra note 9, at 1599. Pepper does not necessarily embrace the
Easterbrook/Fischel view of the law as a normative matter, but seemingly accepts it as a
realistic description of the way people think about the meaning of law today. See id. at
1550-54; infratext accompanying notes 106-24.
20. Pepper, supra note 9, at 1552.
21. Id. at 1553.
22. Id. at 1553-54; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 459 (1897) ("You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a
good one for wishing to avoid an encounter with the public force, and therefore you can
see the practical importance of the distinction between morality and law. A man who
cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practised [sic] by his neighbors is
likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want
to keep out of jail if he can.").
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conception that is much closer to the Easterbrook/Fischel position
than it is to the ALI position.23
There is reason for interpretive caution with respect to the ALI
position as well. As originally drafted, the exhortatory power of the
general law compliance obligation of section 2.01 was complemented
by other black-letter provisions that would have imposed specific,
proactive fiduciary duties on the board of directors (and senior
executive officers) to ensure that the corporation had a functioning
law compliance structure, and to ensure that the corporation was
being managed in accordance with its obligations under section 2.01
to obey the law.24 Those specific fiduciary duties were immediately
controversial, and were deleted or diluted in later drafts.25 As
ultimately adopted, the board's now-reactive law compliance
obligations are relegated to comments to the black-letter law.26
Other portions of the commentary on the ALl Principlessuggest that
the board can knowingly permit the corporation to violate some laws
without causing much concern and without subjecting board
members to full personal liability for damages to the corporation
from those violations.27 Thus, the ALI's ultimate seriousness about
corporate law compliance bears further examination.
Moreover, in 1990, the American Bar Association Committee on
23. I suggest this description is perhaps overstated because there may be no
"dominant jurisprudential conception," but rather competing conceptions and various
cross-currents of thought, such as critical legal studies, "new legal process" thinking,
feminist jurisprudence, civic republicanism, liberal perfectionism, and the like, to name
only a few candidates for potentially competing jurisprudential conceptions. Even within
the realm of law and economics, which is the foundational theory in Pepper's description
of the "dominant jurisprudential conception," there are current debates concerning
expansions of and challenges to the rationality paradigm, see, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER,
THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIc LIFE (1992), and
renewed attention being paid to the role of social norms in enforcement and deterrence,
see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
See generally Gregory S. Crespi, Teaching the New Law and Economics, 25 U. TOL. L.
REV. 713, 713 n.5 (1994) (reviewing recent articles that combine "classical" law and
economics with more searching criticisms of the underlying normative assumptions of
microeconomics). Yet it is undeniable that the paradigm Pepper describes is important, if
not dominant, in how law is taught, and that law and economics has had a profound effect
on the law and how we think about it. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST
LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 230-40 (1993) (arguing that law
and economics has had a dominant and deleterious effect on how law is taught); Thomas
S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of Law, 1997 WIs. L. REV. 433, 434
("Law and economics has been one of the most successful innovations in the legal
academy in the last century.").
24. See infra note 129.
25. See infra notes 129-48 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 129-48 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 149-82 and accompanying text.
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Corporate Laws (the "ABA Committee") revised the Model
Business Corporation Act. I argue below that in its revisions the
ABA Committee went even further than the ALI in undermining the
notion that corporate compliance with the law is important.' Thus,
in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act ("RMBCA"), the
ABA Committee provided that corporations may fully exculpate
members of their boards of directors for the costs to the corporation
of even intentional violations of civil law.29 In those revisions, and
specifically in the "legislative history" thereto, the ABA Committee
relied upon a central premise of the law-as-price theory: that
criminal law is the only important mandatory law, and that
intentional violations of civil law may not be problematic and may
even be of social benefit in some instances. 0
There is a more important reason, however, to examine the
premises of the law-as-price theory of law: Both the "efficient
breach" and the "efficient compliance" variants have started to have
an effect on decided cases. This statement should not be interpreted
to overstate the point. There are still very few decisions explicitly
incorporating this normative view of what law is and what we can
expect with respect to compliance. Almost all of them are authored
by judges most influential in, or influenced by, conservative law and
economics (such as Judges Richard Posner,3 1 Frank Easterbrook,32
Patrick I-Igginbotham,33 and Douglas Ginsburg4), and so are
unsurprising. Still, the potential of this jurisprudential approach to
undermine society's ability to establish mandatory legal boundaries is
profound, and therefore it is worthy of careful consideration.
Moreover, in Landgrafv. United Film Products,35 the Supreme Court
was influenced by a variant of the law-as-price understanding of law,

28. See infra notes 183-94 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 183-94 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225,229 (7th Cir. 1992); cf
Reyes-Hernandez v. INS, 89 F.3d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 1996) (suggesting people rely on the
level of sanctions in planning and conducting their lives).
32. Cf. United States v. Shaw, 26 F.3d 700, 701 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting reliance
claim by deported, recidivist alien to 24 months jail time, versus 46 months, on the facts,
while recognizing that Ex Post Facto Clause generally implies that "one may 'rely' on the
maximum penalty when deciding whether to commit an offense").
33. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427,433 (5th Cir. 1992), affd, 511
U.S. 244 (1994).
34. See, e.g., Branton v. FCC, 993 F.2d 906, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Smith v. National
Transp. Safety Bd., 981 F.2d 1326,1328 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
35. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
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while rejecting a more normative understanding of legal obligation. 36

The jurisprudential underpinnings of that decision reveal a great deal
about the way we think about law today and about the growing
influence of law-as-price thinking.
For these reasons, then, it is important to examine this concept
of law carefully, and map its influence to date. It is particularly
important to examine it in the corporate context, in light of current
public attention focused on at least some issues of corporate
responsibility. If we cannot expect corporations to comply with the
minimum standards of responsible behavior set forth in positive law
when violations would be profitable,37 nor expect them to orient their
law compliance programs towards the substantive standards of the
law notwithstanding penalties that are low or even trivial, then more
refined discussions of corporate responsibility seem relatively
pointless.38
36. See infra notes 339-56 and accompanying text.
37. I refer to the law, as setting forth "minimum standards" of corporate
responsibility since many corporate actions that have potentially negative effects on
society, communities, consumers, and employees are entirely legal. For instance, public
attention has recently focused on the negative implications of cigarette companies heavily
promoting smoking among teenagers, given that there is a 50% chance that the
adolescent who takes up cigarette smoking permanently will die prematurely from
smoking-induced diseases. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of
Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed.
Reg. 41,314, 41,318 (1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 897) (proposed Aug. 11, 1995)
(describing Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") findings of fact concerning
restrictions on adolescent smoking). Until recent regulations promulgated by the FDA
with respect to cigarette advertising, this promotional activity was legal. Indeed, it was
required by the profit-maximizing norm: Because 82% of long-term smokers make the
decision to smoke before age 18, see id. at 41,314, cigarette companies must appeal to
these potential customers before age 18 to maintain their markets. Arguably, though,
those actions are irresponsible from the perspective of society as a whole, or unethical
from the perspective of the teenagers who became addicted to nicotine. See infra notes
426-30 and accompanying text.
38. See Christopher D. Stone, CorporateSocial Responsibility: What It Might Mean,
If It Were Really to Matter, 71 IOWA L. REv. 557, 559 (1986). In defining corporate
responsibility, Stone concludes that at a minimum "it involves a prima facie obligation to
obey the laws," and, beyond that, some institutional structure that provides the capacity
for the organization to identify and reflect upon moral dilemmas. See id. One point that
bears emphasis here, however, is that I am not suggesting that corporations in general do
not make serious efforts towards law compliance; many, and perhaps most, do, depending
in large measure on the corporate ethos of the individual corporation. See infra note 51
(listing sources). I am not even suggesting that the law-as-price theory actually plays an
important role in the way decisions are made about obeying the law or instituting lawcompliance systems in the real world. See infra note 396 (listing sources). Rather, the
law-as-price theory is important as a theory about law compliance, even if it is incorrect
about how these decisions are actually made, both because it has started to have an effect
on decided cases and because it is illuminating how we as a society (or certain law
professors within that society) think about law.
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This Article proceeds as follows in examining these issues. In
Part II and Part III, the Article describes some evidence of the lawas-price view in two different areas of legal concern: writing about
law and corporate law reform efforts. Thus, in Part II, the Article
describes a continuum of views about the meaning of civil statutes
and regulations. First the Article describes the view of law held by
the ALI Corporate Governance Project, at least as described in
section 2.01, which actuates a "law-as-limit" view of law: that all law,
including regulatory law, is to be understood as setting out
mandatory standards of behavior, not a system of prices for the right
to violate the law. Then the Article takes up the law-as-price view of
Easterbrook and Fischel in more detail, which suggests a very narrow
realm of truly mandatory law, coupled with a predominant realm of
law-as-price, and advocates for deliberate, "efficient" breach of
public law where it is profitable. Finally, the Article describes
Pepper's intermediate view, which suggests that much of regulatory
law can be understood as a pricing mechanism, rather than as
establishing mandatory limits on behavior. In Part III, the Article
describes actions of the ALI Corporate Governance Project and the
ABA Committee on Corporate Laws that suggest a significant
tempering of the law-as-limit view of section 2.01, and that, in some
instances, suggest a view of law much closer to the intermediate view
described above.
Having set forth some indication of the influence of these views
of law on current thinking about law, this Article then turns to
identifying its influence in the case law. Thus, in Part IV, this Article
describes a number of decided opinions that reflect Easterbrook and
Fischel's "efficient breach" theory. Part IV concludes with a criticism
of the most extreme articulation of the "efficient breach" view of law,
Easterbrook and Fischel's assertion that "managers not only may but
also should violate the rules when it is profitable to do so," a view
that also is strongly suggested in a number of Judge Ginsburg's
opinions. 39 This criticism is in service of a larger point: that the
"efficient breach" view of law undermines the social-structuring
function of law in the realm of civil regulatory law, where we, in fact,
need law most, and where we most need law to be understood as
mandatory and as establishing behavioral limits.
Part V describes the Supreme Court's opinion in Landgraf v.
39. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 1177 n.57. Judge Douglas Ginsburg relies
upon a deliberate, "efficient breach" view of law in a number of his opinions for the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, particularly with respect to regulatory
law. Those decisions are described in Part IV of this Article as well.
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4" and its antecedents. In particular, this Article
United Film Products
asserts that Landgraf incorporates the seemingly more plausible
"efficient compliance" view of law that suggests the amount of
money a corporation should invest in compliance with the law will be
determined by the penalties for violations, rather than being
determined by the level of investment necessary to meet the
substantive standards the law sets forth. Section V concludes with an
examination and critique of the implications of Landgraf and the
notion of efficient compliance, and argues, in effect, for "inefficient"
investment in corporate law compliance.
Finally, in Part VI, this Article connects these issues to the newly
invigorated corporate social responsibility debate. 41 The work of
both the ALI and the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws evidences
the views of leading academics and practicing lawyers on the
obligations of the corporation as a citizen and social actor, as
exemplified by the seriousness with which those bodies treat the
obligation of corporate boards and officers to ensure compliance with
the law. Looking at the actions of those bodies from a critical
perspective, one sees that law compliance is treated as a relatively
unimportant part of the corporate governance equation. While this
approach may make sense if one construes the corporation as wholly
a matter of private concern for the purpose of generating private
wealth, the concluding section of this Article suggests that this
theoretical construction of the corporation does not comport with the
realities of modern corporate power and concomitant
responsibilities.42
Before beginning, though, one important caveat is in order. This
Article is not an argument for why individuals or corporations have a
prima facie obligation to obey the law, nor is it an analysis of the
conditions under which legal systems command such obedience.43

40. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
41. See infra note 79 (describing the corporate social responsibility debate).
42. See Mitchell, supra note 14, at 872 (arguing that the ALl Principles failed to
address whether the corporation is "the private domain of the stockholders or the subject
of broader public concern").
43. Following the convention described by M.B.E. Smith, I refer to a prima facie
obligation to obey the law, which Smith defines as follows: "[A] person S has a prima
facie obligation to do an act X if, and only if, there is a moral reason for S to do X which is
such that, unless he has a moral reason not to do X at least as strong as his reasons to do
X, S's failure to do X is wrong." M.B.E. Smith, Is There a PrimaFacie Obligationto Obey
the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1973). The prima facie obligation to obey the law is not
an absolute obligation, since it is well-recognized that the "right of the individual to
dissent, to conclude that the obligation to obey is outweighed by other obligations, is the
irreducible core of autonomy which authority can never invade." PHILIP SOPER, A

1998]

CORPORATE COMPLIANCE

1279

Those subjects have been developed in serious and thoughtful books
by leading philosophers and students of jurisprudence. 44 Clearly
those philosophical works provide the background assumption
against which the law-as-price theory is being criticized: the law
ought to be understood to impose a prima facie obligation to comply,
even when unprofitable. But ultimately this Article has a more
modest aim: to identify a way of thinking about the law that has been
developed in the past fifteen years, to suggest evidence of the
influence of that view in current thinking about the law and in the
case law, and to criticize that view in the specific case of the
corporation. It is inevitable that in writing about these subjects I
brush up against the larger questions of political obligation, and it is
also inevitable that the treatment of them here is cursory at best.
Hopefully, the underlying project is important enough such that the
inevitable simplifications of political theory will be forgiven.
As for nomenclature, the theory criticized here suggests that
firms have a choice between meeting the standards of the law or
deliberately violating the law and paying the penalties.45 Yet this
Article uses the phrase risking paying the penalties. There is
probably not a single example in modern history in which a firm
decided to discharge pollutants over regulated levels, for instance,
and then immediately wrote a polite letter to the Environmental
Protection Agency (the "EPA") enclosing a check for the penalties
due; or churned securities accounts and then promptly "remitted the
balance due and owing on all penalties thereby accumulated" to the
affected securities owners' accounts and/or the government. These
things do not happen,46 in part because there are no clear and socially
acceptable mechanisms for "paying the price" (since these are not, in
fact, prices). Rather, part of the calculation to violate the law
includes a calculation of the probability that the violation will go
undetected; or if detected, that it will go unprosecuted for any one of
THEORY OF LAW 77 (1984). I argue below that profit-maximizing does not suffice as a
sufficient "other obligation" that may permissibly outweigh the prima facie obligation to
obey the law. See infra text accompanying notes 227-93.
44. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (2d ed. 1969); H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994); DAVID HUME, HUME'S MORAL AND POLITIcAL
PHILOSOPHY (Henry Aiken ed., 1948); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTicE (1971);
SOPER, supra note 43.

45. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 1177 n.57; Engel, supra note 4, at
9; Daniel R. Fischel, The CorporateGovernanceMovement, 35 VAND. L. REV.1259, 1271
(1982); Pepper, supra note 9, at 1576-77.
46. Indeed, such consciousness of wrongdoing, and evidence of deliberate
wrongdoing, would in many instances be the basis for imposing punitive damages in
addition to compensatory damages and statutory penalties.
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a plethora of reasons; or if prosecuted, that liability will not be
established; or if liability is established, that the penalty will be lower
than the profits obtained; or that the penalty will not be upheld on
appeal in any event. Moreover, the probabilities at each of these
stages can be, and in many cases will be, driven downward by actions
by the corporation and the corporation's lawyers. So, although the
theory may treat the question as one of "violat[ing] a law deliberately
and pay[ing] the penalty,"'47 the reality is that of risking paying a
penalty at best.
II. THEORIES ABOUT THE MEANING OF LAW
A. Law-as-Limit
One of the first debates engendered by the ALI Corporate
Governance Project was with respect to section 2.01, "The Objective
and Conduct of the Corporation." Crudely put, this was a debate
between those who envisioned the corporation simply as an economic
actor and those who envisioned it as both an economic and social
actor. 48 The latter camp prevailed (at least in 1984), and in so doing
articulated what I will call the traditional view of law-as-limit.
Thus, while subsection (a) of section 2.01 adopts wealthenhancement as the primary object of the corporation, subsection (b)
recognizes certain constraints on wealth-enhancement, including a
mandatory obligation to comply with the law, a permissive power to
take ethical considerations appropriate to the responsible conduct of
the business into account, and a permissive power to make charitable
contributions. 49 The law-compliance obligation of section 2.01(b)(1),
47. Fischel, supra note 45, at 1271.
48. See 61 A.L.I. PROC. 421, 431 (1984) (statement of Dean David Ruder) (arguing
against conception of the corporation as a social entity); id. at 454 (statement of Judge
Jack Weinstein) (proposing that corporations ought to have social as well as economic
responsibilities); id. at 454-55 (statement of Professor Melvin Eisenberg) (arguing that the
purpose of the corporation is to make profits while acting "decently" towards employees
and the community).
49. In its entirety, section 2.01 reads as follows:
Section 2.01 The Objective and Conduct of the Corporation
(a) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (b) and section 6.02 (Action of
Directors That Has the Foreseeable Effect of Blocking Unsolicited Tender
Offers), a corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.
(b) Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced,
the corporation, in the conduct of its business:
(1) Is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the
boundaries set by law;
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which is imposed on the corporation itself in favor of the
shareholders, is distinct from any fiduciary duties owed by the

officers or directors to the shareholders or the corporation, or duties
owed by the corporation to the state or other third parties."

Rather,

section 2.01(b)(1) imposes a new, specifically corporate law
obligation on the corporation
to obey the law, whether profits are
51
enhanced thereby or not.
(2) May take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably
regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business; and
(3) May devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare,
humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 2.01. Section 6.02 permits corporate directors to
consider other constituents than shareholders (employees, consumers, the community) in
deciding how to respond to unsolicited tender offers. See id. § 6.02.
50. See id. § 2.01 cmt. j (explaining that § 2.01 imposes obligations on the corporation
itself, not its officers or directors); Patrick J. Ryan, Strange Bedfellows: Corporate
Fiduciaries and the General Law Compliance Obligation in Section 2.01(a) of the
American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, 66 WASH. L. REV. 413,
471 (1991) (noting that under Tentative Draft No. 2, "[s]ection 2.01(a) imposes an
obligation on the corporation itself, as distinct from a fiduciary obligation owed by
corporate officers and directors" (footnote omitted)).
51. This invocation of an obligation placed on the corporation qua corporation, and
not on the corporate agents, is interesting in its own right, and (to quote a Cravath
litigator) "passing strange indeed." On one level, it may be an astute recognition that the
corporation as an entity is more than just the sum of its parts, and that law compliance in
the corporate entity requires organizational systems that act upon, and interact with, the
individual corporate agents in a positive way to value, encourage, and reward following
the law. On this view, corporate employees can be expected to respond to the corporate
ethos and the law compliance systems that have been put into effect, so that the law
compliance record of the corporate entity as a whole should be the focus of inquiry, not
the law compliance record of individual employees, individual officers, or board
members. See generally JAY S. ALBANESE, WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN AMERICA 82-84,
187-88 (1995) (examining enforcement and sentencing outcomes of regulatory offenses);
MARSHALL B. CLNARD, CORPORATE ETHICS AND CRIME 91 (1983) (discussing middlemanagement's perspective on corporate ethics and crime); Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate
Ethos: A Standardfor Imposing CorporateCriminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095,
1124-25 (1991) (discussing studies of the "corporate ethos" of an organization and how
that ethos affects law compliance within the corporation); Richard S. Gruner & Louis M.
Brown, Organizational Justice: Recognizing and Rewarding the Good Citizen
Corporation, 21 J. CORP. L. 731, 738 (1996) (discussing the impact of corporate
compliance programs on law compliance and on firm performance). Indeed, the United
States Sentencing Guidelines takes this approach in sentencing organizations. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 introductory commentary (1995) ("Culpability
generally will be determined by the steps taken by the organization prior to the offense to
prevent and detect criminal conduct, the level and extent of involvement in or tolerance
of the offense by certain personnel, and the organization's actions after an offense has
been committed."). Conversely, this emphasis on the corporation qua corporation
seemingly personifies the corporation apart from the individuals comprising it in a way
that is quite inconsistent with much of modern corporate law scholarship. Compare
William H. Simon, ContractVersus Politics in CorporationDoctrine, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 387, 389 (David Kairys ed., 1990) ("Much of the
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obligation,

the

commentary and illustrations to the ALl Principlesexplicitly rejected
the law-as-price theory of law." The commentary suggests that while

cost/benefit analysis may be proper when used by the legislature to
make determinations about what the law should be, once that
determination is made, "cost-benefit analysis [about] whether to
One example illustrating this
obey the rule is out of place.""

antipathy to cost/benefit thinking about law compliance is a public
trucking company with annual revenues of approximately $5-7
million, which instructs its drivers to drive at seventy-five miles per
hour (at a time when the speed limits were fifty-five miles per hour)
because the relevant corporate decision-maker determines that this
will increase the company's net earnings by $400,000-$500,000
annually.'
The Reporter concludes, not surprisingly, that this
decision represents a violation of section 2.01(b)(1).55 Another
illustration posits a manufacturing firm that is attempting to forestall
unionization of its workforce, both by refusing to bargain with a
newly elected union in some of its plants and by harassing supporters
of the union in others.5 6 The Reporter suggests that the corporate

decision-maker knows that the conduct violates the National Labor
Relations Act, but believes that a long time will pass before sanctions
are imposed, and that the profits from operating a non-union shop
will outweigh the ultimate sanctions. Again, not surprisingly, the
Reporter concludes that this conduct involves a departure from the
corporation's law compliance obligations. 7
modem history of corporation law has been preoccupied with a war against the naive
view [personifying the corporation]."), with Fischel, supra note 45, at 1273 ("A
corporation ... is nothing more than a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a mass of
contracts which various individuals have voluntarily entered into for their mutual
benefit."). One very practical implication of section 2.01's concept of corporate
personality is that there is no possibility of corporate liability to the shareholders for a
failure to meet the general obligation to comply with the law because the corporation
cannot sue itself. Rather, an action for injunctive or other equitable relief is the only
remedy for a violation of section 2.01. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 2.01 cmt. j.
It is unlikely that shareholders will have incentives to bring actions for purely equitable
relief, since there would be no damages out of which to pay their attorneys.
52. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 2.01 cmt. g ("With few exceptions, dollar
liability is not a "price" that can properly be paid for the privilege of engaging in legally
wrongful conduct."); supra notes 15-16.
53. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 2.01 cmt. g.
54. See id. illus. 10.
55. See id.
56. See id. illus. 8.
57. See id. Although this illustration is not surprising given the law compliance
obligation of section 2.01, it probably sets a higher standard for corporate behavior than is
generally observed in the marketplace, at least in some industries. The phenomenon of
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Since the general law compliance obligation is comparable to the

obligation of any individual to comply with the law, the commentary
to section 2.01(b)(1) recognizes that there are certain limited

instances in which compliance is not required, such as under the
doctrines of necessity or desuetude.5 8 But the commentary also
shows that these concepts are to be construed narrowly. For

instance, the commentary gives the example of a public utility that,
despite diligent efforts, is unable to complete a modification of its
plant in time to meet an air quality standard, where non-compliance
would not threaten the health or safety of the community, and the
only alternative to continuing to operate while the modifications are
being made is a shut-down that would black out the community.59
This example of necessity posits attempted compliance and assumes

that ultimately the plant will be successful in meeting the air quality
standards; it does not contemplate profit-maximizing calculations by
a rational actor as the basis for non-compliance. Similarly, in
describing the doctrine of desuetude, the commentary uses the

illustrations of a retail clothing store in a major city that is open on
Sundays, notwithstanding a local ordinance that prohibits stores from
staying open on Sundays. 60 The illustration provides that "[t]he
ordinance has fallen into disuse: it has not been enforced for many
years; many retail businesses ... follow a practice of staying open on

Sunday; and community opinion favors the practice. ' ' 61 The
commentary concludes that this is not a departure from the
"union busting" by engaging in just the kind of cost/benefit analysis the ALI decries is
well known. As Pepper described it:
In labor law, lawyers specializing in the representation of management
commonly suggest to employers wishing to fight a unionization effort or those
attempting to "bust" an existing union that they violate provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).... Adjudication by the National Labor
Relations Board of allegations of unfair labor practices typically takes years, and
the remedies are limited to back pay and reinstatement for specified workers
who were the victims of the conduct. Once these facts about the law and its
enforcement are laid before the employer, a simple cost/benefit analysis
(frequently supplemented by the lawyer's explicit recommendation) often leads
the employer intentionally to violate the provisions of the NLRA.
Pepper, supra note 9, at 1592; see also Gordon, Corporate Law, supra note 18, at 260
("[S]ince the late 1960s, company lawyers have helped managements break union
organizing campaigns by such tactics as firing active organizers, stalling Labor Board
action on complaints until the organizing drive is over, and then paying small fines, thus
effectively nullifying the Wagner Act's purposes of promoting fair elections and good
faith bargaining.").
58. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 2.01 cmt. g.
59. See id.
60. See id. cmt. f, illus. 9.
61. Id.
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Standards of section 2.01(b)(1).
As was remarked above 62 and has been extensively discussed
elsewhere, 63 the ALI Corporate Governance Project was highly
controversial, and early drafts were severely criticized by both the
business community and academics within the law and economics
movement. 64 As a result, there were dramatic changes between the
black-letter law proposed in earlier drafts and that in the ALI

Principles as ultimately adopted by the ALI membership in 1992.
Section 2.01 emerged virtually unscathed in this process, though, as
did its concept of the law-as-limit. 65 What changed dramatically,
62. See supra note 14.
63. See, e.g., Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance, supra note 7, at 789-95
(describing different, conflicting strains of criticism of the ALI's initial drafts of the
corporate governance project); Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation of the American
Law Institute, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1212, 1212-14 (1993) (variously describing the 14year process of the corporate governance project as "bitter," a "battle," and an "epic
struggle," and describing why ALI proposals that initially "reflected a deep hostility to
the judgment and motives of corporate managers" were ultimately "modified significantly
to reflect a somewhat more market-oriented point of view"); Mitchell, supra note 14, at
872 (asserting that during the 14 years that the ALl Principles were being written,
corporate law debate evolved to question whether a publicly held corporation was the
"private domain of the stockholders or the subject of broader public concern"; ALI failed
to appreciate this change or reflect a coherent theory of the corporation). See generally
Symposium, American Law Institute's CorporateGovernance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 871 (1993) (presenting various arguments for the position that the ALI lost sight of
the transformation of the law in doctrinal details); Symposium, American Law Institute's
CorporateGovernanceProject,52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 495,495-871 (1984) (providing an
overview of the Project).
64. In general, the earlier drafts were perceived by critics to have adopted more of an
interventionist, lawyer-dominated model of corporate governance, mandating specific
responsibilities for the board of directors, reducing the protection of the business
judgment rule, and easing some of the burdens on plaintiffs and their attorneys bringing
derivative actions and making those actions more difficult to dismiss. See HANSEN, supra
note 14; THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOvERNANCE AND STRUCrURE:
RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS" (1983)
[hereinafter BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT]. The Business Roundtable is an
organization composed of corporate officers of major Fortune 500 companies that
promotes American business interests. See Macey, supra note 63, at 1213 n.5. Other
observers disagreed with this assessment of the first draft: "[W]hen the substance of the
ALI Principles of Corporate Governance is examined in detail, the criticisms appear
thoroughly disproportionate to the modest, incremental changes proposed."
Joel
Seligman, A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of
CorporateGovernanceProject,55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 325,327 (1987).
65. The commentary rejecting the law-as-price view of the law was softened slightly
between Tentative Drafts No. 1 and 2, however. Thus, Tentative Draft No. 2 has the
following language added as compared to Tentative Draft No. 1:
These exceptions [to the norm of obedience to law, including necessity,
desuetude, and breach of contract] are not exhaustive: for example, the de
minimis principle applies here as elsewhere in the law, and there may be isolated
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however, were the board's fiduciary duties and the enforcement
mechanisms, including the potential for derivative liability, adopted

to effect this concept of law and corporate responsibility. 66 At least in
theory, though, the ALI concept of the law is a frankly normative

one, rejecting the notion that the penalties for violating even the
quintessentially regulatory, malum prohibitum laws, such as those
establishing speed limits, can be treated simply as a cost of doing

business.67
B.

Law-as-Price
Two of the most explicit academic proponents of the law-as-

price view of law have been Judge Frank Easterbrook (formerly a
law professor at The University of Chicago and now a judge on the

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals) and Professor Daniel Fischel.
Easterbrook and Fischel recognize a narrow subset of laws that truly
prohibit certain actions, a subset they would confine to violence and
actions that are mala in se;68 beyond that, their concept of the law is
as a pricing mechanism, or tax upon various activities. Their concept
of law incorporates the theory of "optimal sanctions," which assumes
that "[t]he principal task in designing remedies is to establish the
optimal level of violations. '69 Thus, "[t]he law establishes a price for
the violation, and people then must decide how to respond to the
schedule of penalties."7 0

The major structural elements of their

cases in which it is widely understood that liability is properly viewed as a price
of noncompliance.
Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 15, § 2.01 cmt. g. There is no elaboration upon, or
examples of, those "isolated cases" in which liability is best understood as a price of
noncompliance, nor was there any discussion of that language by the ALI membership.
66. See Part III.A, infra text accompanying notes 126-82 (discussing the change in
fiduciary duties and enforcement mechanisms).
67. In addition to the ALI, there are a number of writers who rely upon a concept of
law similar to the ALI's concept in their work on the ethical responsibilities of lawyers,
and in particular who convey a normative sense of the meaning of law. See DAVID
LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE (1988); Gordon, CorporateLaw, supra note 18; Gordon,
Independence, supra note 18; Painter, supra note 18.
68. See Easterbrook & Fischel,supranote 1, at 1168 n.36.
69. Id. at 1156.
70. Id. at 1157. It is this view of penalties that was criticized so aptly by Cooter in
Pricesand Sanctions:
[A] sanction is a detriment imposed for doing what is forbidden, such as failing
to perform an obligation. For example, a defendant in a tort dispute may be
ordered to pay compensatory damages for an injury caused by his negligence, or
a convicted criminal may be sentenced to jail.
In contrast, a price is payment of money which is required in order to do
what is permitted. For example, a company may buy goods in the marketplace,
but it must pay the seller's price. Similarly, individuals are permitted to earn
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theory are those of conservative law and economics,71 built upon a
positivist jurisprudential foundation laid down by Oliver Wendell
Holmes.72
One central tenet of Easterbrook and Fischel's view is that of
rational-choice theory, which is also a central tenet of law and
economics. Rational-choice theory is a general theory of decisionmaking.73 It posits that people are rational, self-interested, utility
maximizers using cost/benefit analysis to make decisions; it has been
applied to numerous types of decisions, including decisions about
obeying the law. Further, rational-choice theory, as applied to law
compliance, asserts that the costs of legal sanctions can be treated
like prices in a theory of supply and demand affecting law
compliance.7 5 The law-as-price view of law is, in essence, rationalincome, but obliged to pay taxes on their earnings.
These definitions of sanction and price are not always consistent with
ordinary speech. Tax evasion is forbidden, but in casual speech people often say
a fine is the price of tax evasion, when by these definitions it is a sanction.
Cooter, supra note 6, at 1524-25.
71. Thus, for instance, Easterbrook and Fischel are explicit about equating breaches
of public law to "efficient" breaches of contract, a view of contract law developed by law
and economics advocates: "Some antitrust violations are efficient, just as some breaches
of contract are efficient." See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 1157.
72. See Holmes, supra note 22, at 458 ("But, as I shall try to show, a legal duty so
called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be
made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court;--and so of a legal right.").
73. See Ulen, supra note 23, at 436. Rational-choice theory is a theory of decisionmaking that takes as its central premise the "economic man" of economic theory,
"assuming that people behave as if they were purely rational calculators of their own
gains and losses from alternative courses of action." JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS
AND GOVERNANCE 3 (1997). Rational-choice theory has been used to examine a number
of disparate types of human behavior: for instance, a quite-prevalent political theory
today is called "public choice theory," which combines "mathematical deduction with
some of the basic behavioral assumptions of micro-economics to produce theories of the
behavior of voters, or representatives assemblies, or bureaucracies, and even of courts."
Id at 10.
74. See Ulen, supra note 23, at 442. Applying rational-choice theory to law
compliance, Ulen asserts that rational, utility-maximizing criminals compare the costs and
benefits of legal and illegal action by computing the expected benefits of illegal activity
and the expected costs of the illegal activity (the probability of detection multiplied by the
monetary value of the sanction that will be imposed, and the loss in reputation). If the
expected benefits of illegal activity outweigh the expected costs, "the rationally selfinterested criminal commits the crime ... and refrains if the reverse is true." Id. This
theory was first propounded in Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
75. As Judge Richard Posner has put this last point:
The Law of Demand doesn't operate just on goods with explicit prices.... The
convicted criminal who has served his sentence is said to have "paid his debt to
society," and an economist would find the metaphor apt. Punishment is, at least
from the criminal's standpoint (why not from society's, unless the punishment is
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choice theory interpreted not simply as a descriptive claim about how
people respond to legal sanctions/i but as two, distinct normative
claims.
The first normative claim is the one Cooter identified: that the

sanctions for violating the law can be treated as the price to be paid
for the "right" to violate the law. 77 Inherent in this view of law is the

legal voluntarism claim: that particularly with respect to regulatory
law, a person can either conform to the law or violate it while
accepting the known consequences, and that either choice is an
acceptable means for an individual or corporation to fulfill its
obligations as a citizen. The second normative claim is that since
people and corporations will, and possibly should, make decisions
about compliance with law based on a "rational actor's" calculations
of costs and benefits, their expectations about the likely outcome of
violating the law or investing a certain amount in compliance ought
to be recognized as settled expectations upon which they may
legitimately rely.
Professor Daniel Fischel provided some greater amplification
about the intellectual derivation of the law-as-price theory in an
article in the Vanderbilt Law Review. 8 The article was published in

1982, at a time when there was a collision between the "Reagan
in the form of a fine?), the price that society charges for a criminal offense. The
economist is led to predict that an increase in either the severity of the
punishment or the likelihood of its imposition will raise the price of crime and
therefore reduce its incidence.
POSNER, supra note 3, at 5 (emphasis added). The normative equivalence Judge Posner is
willing to draw between a punishment in the form of a fine and a price is a major
component of the theory of law that is being criticized in this Article.
76. Even as a purely descriptive claim, rational-choice theory is open to question.
While Judge Posner asserts that the expected severity of a penalty has a determinative
bearing on criminals' decisions to violate the law, see id., even if that assertion is true we
ought not develop models of corporate behavior on the a priori assumption that people
within corporations will act like criminals. Nor ought our models of law-compliance
assume that adult actors, alone or within a corporation, necessarily demonstrate the most
elementary moral thinking in making decisions about the law, being primarily concerned
with expected punishments and being relatively unconcerned with more abstract ideas of
fairness or duty or political obligation. See LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY
OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE

According to Kohlberg's theory, children
development, the pre-conventional stage,
punishments when deciding how to act. At
people are concerned with abstract notions
imperatives, or issues of distributive justice.
therein.
77. See Cooter, supra note 6, at 1524-25.
78. See Fischel, supranote 45.

17-22 (1981).

at the least advanced stage of moral
are primarily concerned with expected
more adult states of moral development,
of fairness, right and wrong, categorical
See id.; infra note 395 and sources cited
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revolution" of deregulation and free-market theory and the previous
decade's vigorous academic and social debate over corporate social
responsibility. 79 In the Vanderbilt Law Review article, Fischel
79. During the 1970s, there was a vigorous academic discussion about corporate
social responsibility. The discussion began in 1973 as an outgrowth of the Watergate
investigation when the Office of the Special Prosecutor charged several prominent
corporations and senior executives with violations of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act,
18 U.S.C. § 610 (1976) (repealed 1976), for illegal campaign contributions and improper
use of corporate funds to influence government officials, both in the United States and
abroad. See SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en bane);
George S. Branch & James A. Rubright, Integrity of Management Disclosures Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 1447, 1462 (1982). At the same time, the
Securities and Exchange Commission began extensive investigations of bribes to foreign
officials, referred to as "sensitive payments," and the corresponding falsification of
corporate books and records. See Branch & Rubright, supra, at 1462; see also Marc I.
Steinberg, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Administrative, Enforcement, and
Legislative Programs and Policies-Their Influence on Corporate Internal Affairs, 58
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173, 221 & n.223 (1982) (discussing the SEC's program to
encourage voluntary disclosure of bribes and false books and records). The number of
companies that were involved is staggering. In 1977, the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs reported that "[r]ecent investigations by the SEC have
revealed corrupt foreign payments by over 300 U.S. companies involving hundreds of
millions of dollars." S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3 (1977), reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098,
4101. By 1981, in response to a SEC amnesty program, "close to 400 firms voluntarily
admitted having bribed foreign or American political or commercial officials or making
illegal American campaign contributions." Seligman, supra note 64, at 335. At the same
time, the environmental and consumer-safety movements fueled discussions about how to
reconcile corporate profit-maximizing with social welfare more generally. See RALPH
NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); CHRISTOPHER STONE,
WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975). These post-Watergate events, and concomitant concerns
about corporate accountability and/or corruption, gave rise to the ALI Corporate
Governance Project and to a vigorous discussion of corporate social responsibility, both
within the academy and among the public at large. See Fischel, supra note 45, at 1259 n.1
(listing corporate social responsibility literature of the late 1970s and early 1980s). This
debate was, in turn, part of the episodic discussion of corporate social responsibility and
the corporate purpose that has reverberated among legal thinkers and writers since at
least the 1930s when E. Merrick Dodd and Adolf A. Berle began discussing the scope of
corporations' public responsibilities. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1162 (1932) ("Business-which is the
economic organization of society-is private property only in a qualified sense, and
society may properly demand that it be carried on in such a way as to safeguard the
interests of those who deal with it either as employees or consumers even if the
proprietary rights of its owners are thereby curtailed."); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom
Are Corporate Managers Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (1932)
("Nothing is accomplished, either as a matter of law or of economics, merely by saying
that the claim of [shareholders] ought not to be 'emphasized.' Either you have a system
based on individual ownership of property or you do not."). Today's corporate social
responsibility debate occurs in the context of globalization of the economy and the
increasing mobility of both labor and capital in that global, information-based economy.
The current debate focuses on the question of whether corporations should be managed
solely to maximize shareholder wealth, or whether they should recognize greater
obligations to their communities, employees, consumers, and other business partners. See
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defended the shareholder wealth-maximizing norm against the claim
that "managements' single-minded dedication to profit maximization
is inconsistent with social welfare.""0 So, for instance, he pointed out
that profitable enterprises provide jobs and produce needed goods
and services; that profitable firms are more likely to be able to
provide safe working conditions or dispose of waste products
properly than are unprofitable firms; and that while firms that
relocate plants may cause dislocations in one area, there are
presumably greater benefits that will accrue to workers and the
community in the new locale.8 '
Fischel recognized, however, that there will be situations
involving negative externalities, such as pollution, in which firms
"may impose costs on others without providing compensation," or
involving types of behavior, such as "sensitive foreign payments," in
which some would argue that profit-maximizing was inconsistent with
social welfare." According to Fischel, these types of situations were
best addressed by changing the laws, rather than by re-evaluating the
corporate purpose to de-emphasize profit-maximizing, because when
laws restricting pollution or prohibiting foreign payments or
anticompetitive behavior are violated, "an argument could be made
that a breakdown in accountability has occurred."' 3 But, he
suggested, "even here the situation is more complicated than may
first appear," and he argued that:
Because many laws can be violated inadvertently or by
subordinates, the costs of preventing violations may far
exceed the gains from avoiding violations. A firm may also
find it advantageous to violate a law deliberately and pay
the penalty for the same reason that an individual in some
generally PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)
(compilation of essays that explore various aspects of corporate social responsibility
debate).
80. Fischel, supranote 45, at 1260, 1265.
81. See id. at 1269. Fischel made no attempt to provide evidence for these assertions.
While it is undoubtedly true that some profitable firms dispose of waste products better
than some unprofitable firms, and likewise treat their employees better, some profitable
firms may do neither thing well, and evidence concerning the relative proportion of
companies exhibiting various approaches to these and other serious social issues would be
illuminating. Similarly, Fischel made no attempt to catalogue, let alone quantify, either
the economic or social costs to communities from plant closings, the economic or social
benefits to communities to which the plants relocated, or how one compares costs and
benefits across communities or countries or generations. In his defense, it is fair to say
that providing either type of evidence would be extremely complicated, and that both
Easterbrook and Fischel are theoreticians, not empiricists.
82. See id. at 1270.
83. Id at 1271.
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cases may prefer to breach a contract and pay damages.
Because the gains from breach or violation presumably
exceed the social costs (as reflected in the penalty),
compliance with the statute or contract is undesirable from
a personal as well as a social perspective. 84
Easterbrook and Fischel made a similar argument more recently
in their 1991 book on corporate law, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law.' In the first chapter of the book, Easterbrook and
86
Fischel set out the "nexus of contracts" vision of the corporation,
and then developed the implications for questions of corporate social
responsibility,87 ultimately sounding many of the same themes that
Fischel had in the Vanderbilt Law Review article.
Again,
Easterbrook and Fischel are explicit in equating penalties assessed
M
for violating the law with prices."

84. Id (citations omitted). It is clear from this quote that there are two distinct
scenarios that Fischel is addressing: the question of how much corporate time, effort, and
money needs to be invested in compliance systems generally to ensure that employees
obey the law (i.e., "efficient compliance"), versus situations involving more deliberate law
violations in which the board, chief executive officers, or high corporate employees make
decisions to violate the law or permit employees to violate it in order to boost profits (i.e.,
"efficient breach"). As noted in the introduction, this Article addresses each scenario
separately below. See infra notes 294-394 and accompanying text (discussing efficient
compliance), and notes 195-293 and accompanying text (discussing efficient breach).
85. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 37-39 (1991).
86. See id. at 12 (stating that a corporation has many actors with whom it interacts,
including equity investors, bondholders, employees, managers, creditors, and consumers,
and is best thought of as a "nexus of contracts," or set of explicit and implicit contracts
among these actors, rather than as an artificial or legal entity).
87. Specifically, Easterbrook and Fischel argue that the nexus-of-contracts view
"removes from the field of interesting questions one that has plagued many writers:
[Wihat is the goal of the corporation?" Id. at 35. Their view is that the terms of the
contract between the corporation and the equity holders implicitly includes a promise of
profit-maximizing. Particular corporations may choose to emphasize different goals (they
use the example of the New York Times, which may choose to publish a newspaper first
and make a profit second) so long as the goals are clearly established when the firm is
incorporated and do not change, given the shareholders' legitimate expectations of profitmaximizing. If the goals do change from maximizing profit-making to some greater
balancing of other constituents' claims on the corporation, then shareholders would have
a claim of breach of contract. See id. at 36.
88. See id. at 37-38. Thus, they state:
Given wealth as a maximand, society may change corporate conduct by
imposing monetary penalties. These reduce the venturers' wealth, so managers
will attempt to avoid them. A pollution tax, for example, would induce the firm
to emit less. It would behave as if it had the interests of others at heart. Society
thus takes advantage of the wealth-maximizing incentives built into the firm in
order to alter its behavior at least cost. Nothing in our approach asks whether
political society should attempt to make firms behave as if they have the welfare
of nonparticipants in mind. We do not address optimal ways to deal with
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Another aspect of the law-as-price view of law that is directly

derived from rational-choice theory is the tendency to determine
whether to obey the law by reference to the likelihood of actually
having to pay a penalty for noncompliance, and so discounting
penalties by the likelihood of detection and successful enforcement
of violations. One articulation of this idea is found in David Engel's
article An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility.89 In that
article, Engel defines "corporate voluntarism" or "corporate
altruism" (and with it "corporate social responsibility") as instances
when corporations "pursue social ends where this pursuit conflicts
with the presumptive shareholder desire to maximize profit." 90
Engel's premise is that public corporations should pursue only those
goals supported by a broad and clearly signaled social consensus, and
that while pursuing profit-maximizing is supported by such a
consensus,91 pursuing other social goals is not.'

Among the social

pollution, bribery, plant closings, and other decisions that have effects on people
who may not participate in the corporate contract. Society must choose whether
to conscript the firm's strength (its tendency to maximize wealth) by changing
the prices it confronts or by changing its structure so that it is less apt to
maximize wealth. The latter choice will yield less of both good ends than the
former.
Id. (emphasis added).
In 1990, in amendments to the Clean Air Act, Congress created a limited market-like
mechanism establishing trading rights for one pollutant, sulphur dioxide, and establishing
a permit system for the right to emit specified levels of sulphur dioxide. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7651b, 7651g (1994). That those amendments explicitly establish a price for sulphur
dioxide emissions strengthens the argument that the Easterbrook and Fischel
interpretation of most regulatory law as a pricing system is incorrect as a matter of
statutory construction. That is, when Congress wants to create a pricing system, it does so
explicitly, at the same time creating routinized mechanisms for entities to pay the price.
89. Engel, supra note 4.
90. Id.at 3.
91. See id. at 34. This point may be less true now than in 1979 when Engel wrote it,
though. In a 1996 study of public attitudes towards corporate America by Ethel Klein
and Peter Hart, there was a broad consensus (between 70% and 80% of the public, across
racial, income, and political lines) that there are "'serious problems' in the way
corporations put the interests of their executives and shareholders ahead of their
employees and society." THE PREAMBLE CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY, CORPORATE
IRRESPONSIBILITY: THERE OUGHT TO BE SOME LAWS: A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD CORPORATE AMERICA 1

(1996) (on file with the North CarolinaLaw Review) (providing results based on a public
opinion survey of 800 randomly selected registered voters nationwide, and discussions in
six "focus-groups"; the margin of error for the poll is 3.5%, and all percentage differences
analyzed in the report were statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval).
While it is undoubtedly true that profit-making is supported as an important object of
management decision-making, there is far less consensus about how profits ought to be
sought and what ethical constraints management ought to exercise in the pursuit of
profits. So, for instance, numerous commentators have disagreed on the use of corporate
downsizing as a management technique to bolster quarterly profits. See, e.g., ALAN
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goals that Engel considers for which corporations might forego
profit-making is "altruistic" corporate obedience to the law, or
complying with the substantive standards of the law even when the
corporation can escape a liability rule because of non-detection or
non-prosecution. 93 The way Engel poses the question is to ask
whether a corporation, having determined that it is profitable to
violate a given law (given the potential penalty, as discounted by the
risks of detection and successful prosecution), should nonetheless act
to forbear violating that law based on a cost/benefit calculation using
the non-discounted penalty, which Engel assumes equals the full
social costs that the corporation's behavior would impose. 94
Note, however, the narrowness of Engel's position: What is
defined as altruism is not even "voluntary" obedience to the
substantive standards of the law, but rather the corporation's use of a
non-discounted penalty in its cost/benefit analysis. 95 Even posed this
DOWNS, CORPORATE EXECuTIONS (1995); NEW YORK TIMES, THE DOWNSIZING OF

(1996); Clay Chandler, U.S. Corporations: Good Citizens or Bad?, WASH.
POST (Weekly Edition), May 20-26, 1996, at 16; Robert B. Reich, How to Avoid These
Layoffs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1996, at A13. Indeed, there may be far more consensus that
people and corporations ought to obey the law as a general matter (notwithstanding the
consequences on profits) than there is consensus on the proper ethical constraints on
corporate profit-making. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 168 (1990)
(noting that social science research has found a strong consensus among Americans about
what constitutes a fair procedure, what constitutes a legitimate system of law-giving, and
that people and institutions ought to obey the law).
92. See Engel, supra note 4, at 4-5. Engel examined three types of "voluntarism" to
see if any was supported by a broad and clearly signaled social consensus: (1) voluntary
obedience to the law; (2) voluntary sacrifice of operating profits in an emergency
situation when the gain to third parties would far exceed the loss of profits to the
corporation; and (3) certain kinds of voluntary corporate disclosure or forbearance from
interfering with the legislative and governmental processes. See id. Engel ultimately
concluded that there might be a limited case for arguing that there is a social consensus
about the last category of corporate voluntarism, but not for the first two. See id.
93. See id. at 55. Engel described changes in the substantive standards the law
imposes in explicit law-as-price terms. Thus, he contended that:
a public decision through the political process to modify the likely long run
consequences to the corporation of some action or inaction that management
may be considering-as, for example, by making it illegal, so that management's
calculus must include at least the odds and long run detriment of getting
caught-cannot be viewed as a political determination that we want 'more'
corporate social responsibility. It is merely a decision (whether wise or unwise)
to enlist the profit motive in the service of a modified set of social goals.
Id. at 9.
94. See id. at 38.
95. Engel looked at both the deliberate violation case (the extent to which society
wants corporations to meet the substantive standards of the law beyond the point dictated
by profit-maximization) and the efficient compliance case (the extent to which society
wants corporations to spend money on compliance, beyond the dictates of profitmaximizing, to keep lower-echelon employees from violating the law). See id. at 36-58.
AMERICA
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narrowly, Engel finds no persuasive evidence that society clearly
signals that it wants corporations to act "altruistically" in this
manner.9 6 So, he concludes, while we may want corporations "at least
some times-to obey, for example, substantive criminal laws-or to
spend money to keep lower echelon employees within the lawsbeyond the point dictated by profit-maximization," there is no way
97
for society to signal when it wants such "corporate voluntarism."
Engel's article also sets out the argument for the "efficient
investment in compliance" paradigm. Looking at the particular
context of crime, Engel first argues that it is not true that "we
criminalize only those acts that we do not want performed in the
society at all-regardless of cost.""8 Rather, "[i]n an emergency, or
where the costs of law-obedience are otherwise high enough, we do
not view the laws against trespass or larceny or burglary or even
homicide as absolutes." 99

So instead of enumerating all of the

justifiable "violations," the legislature allows discretion with respect
to the penalty; the penalty indicates how much society cares about
certain categories of violations."° Engel then applies this principle to
the corporate context and asserts that "the argument that the socially
optimal level of crime is zero seems particularly infirm in the
corporate context."''1
This is because reducing corporate crime
involves the special costs of corporate law-compliance expenditures,
except in the rare instances in which the board actively conducts or
condones a pattern of criminal activity.' °2 And, with respect to lawcompliance expenditures,
[I]t is not plausible to argue that every substantive crime
represents a legislative judgment that every corporation
should spend an infinite amount on an internal auditing
system to ensure that none of its employees engages in the
96. See iLat 44. Engel's argument here is somewhat nihilistic. He argued that there
are substantial ambiguities involved in arguing that by setting the penalty at $X, the
legislature "sanctions an altruistic decision by corporate management always to deem $X
a cost of the relevant conduct [in its cost/benefit analysis]--even if the conduct might well
escape detection or prosecution." Id. at 41. These ambiguities arise because, using the
economic model of criminal law, the legislature has also estimated the probabilities of
detection and conviction, and has presumably set $X above the true social costs to
account for those probabilities (of non-detection or non-prosecution). See id. Thus,
according to Engel, "[m]anagement's knowledge of the level of X, without also knowing
the legislature's estimate of this probability, tells the corporation nothing." Id.
97. Id. at 44.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 45.
100. See id.

101. Id.
102- See id.
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prohibited conduct. And yet as soon as the argument is
diluted at all from this proposition, a moralistic approach to
the meaning of substantive criminal law gives no guidance
as to how much a corporation should spend to reduce lowerechelon crime."l0
The additional guidance on how much a corporation should
spend on law compliance, according to Engel, is found in the penalty
levels:
This is not in itself to suggest ...that it is necessarily

appropriate or desirable for corporate management to
shape its conduct entirely with a calculated view to
legislative penalty levels.... But it is meant to say that not
all violations are socially undesirable; and that if some are
undesirable without being clearly signaled to the
corporation by the penalty level, then they must be clearly
signaled in some other way or the corporation will not know
it should avoid them. 1°4
In Easterbrook and Fischel's writing, and in Engel's, one thus
sees articulated a number of the premises of the law-as-price view of
law, including (1) equating breaches of mechanisms of public-law
ordering (statutes and regulations) with breaches of mechanisms of
private-law ordering (contract); (2) explicit interpretation of the
penalties for violation of the law as prices or as taxes on behavior; (3)
an assumption that the penalties for violating the law equal the social
costs of the harm thereby imposed; (4) development of the concept of
efficient investment in law compliance; (5) reduction of the concept
of the law as a system of limiting individual freedom and structuring
103. Id. The histrionics of Engel's suggestion that every corporation would have to
spend an infinite amount of money to ensure that none of its employees violate the law if
one adopts a "moralistic approach to the meaning of substantive law" is reminiscent of
the comment of one faculty participant in an informal presentation of this Article, who
ended up convinced that by suggesting that corporations guide their compliance efforts by
the substantive standards of the law, rather than the penalties, I was suggesting that
"corporations should spend a million bucks to keep some guy in the copy room from
sexually harassing a co-worker." I submit that there are numerous, more tailored
approaches that a corporation can take to law compliance if one posits a "moralistic
approach to the meaning of substantive law" that would require spending far less than an
infinite amount of money or spending $1 million to reduce sexual harassment in the
duplicating department. Moreover, I submit that structuring law-compliance programs to
make a good-faith effort to meet the substantive standards of law (recognizing that there
will always be rogue employees notwithstanding the most diligent efforts) actually
provides a clearer and more definite standard for what the corporation should do than
does "efficient investment in compliance" guided by the penalties for violations. See infra
text accompanying notes 388-94.
104. Engel, supra note 4, at 47 n.155.
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behavior; and (6) elevation of the values of efficiency and individual

self-interest over the values of democratic authority, community, and
social cohesion.
C. Intermediate Theories

The ALI law-as-limit position and the Easterbrook/Fischel lawas-price position define the ends of a spectrum of views about the
meaning of penalties attached to violations of statutes and
administrative regulations, and ultimately about the meaning of law.
Between those two extremes is an important intermediate position.
The major

premise

of the

intermediate

position,

and

the

characteristic I take to be definitive of it, is the view that, as a
descriptive matter, some law prices behavior and some law limits it,
and that most regulatory law, and laws penalizing behaviors that are
"merely" malum prohibitum, prices, rather than limits, behavior. 15
For these latter laws, compliance is voluntary for corporations (and
individuals) willing to risk paying the price.
Pepper's article in the Yale Law Journal, Counseling Clients at

the Limits of the Law, 10 6 provides a cogent illustration of the
intermediate approach. The issue he addresses is when a lawyer

ought to give information to clients on the likely consequences of
violating a law or administrative rule and when a lawyer should not

provide such information, given the recognition that this information
may lead some clients to conclude that it is worthwhile to violate the

law and given the recognition that some law violations may cause
serious harm to other people.1°7 Pepper assumes that "our
democratic constitutional order presumes that persons do have
105. Coffee's work includes this same demarcation between prices (civil law) and
sanctions (criminal law), but he does not advocate for a right to deliberately violate civil
law and "pay the price." See Coffee, Litigationand CorporateGovernance, supra note 7,
at 794 n.11. Another characteristic of the intermediate position is a lack of normative
zeal for the law-as-price understanding of law, and indeed, in some cases, misgivings
about it. See Pepper, supra note 9, at 1553 ("If the law becomes generally perceived as
merely indicating a potential cost, a penalty that one is free to incur and to discount by
the probability of its enforcement, then structuring our common life together through law
becomes vastly more difficult and requires vastly more resources.").
106. Pepper, supra note 9.
107. See id.at 1549.
Pepper's article focuses on an attorney's professional
responsibilities in advising clients and giving them access to information about the law
and enforcement, rather than focusing on the client's compliance obligations under the
law. Thus Pepper's article focuses on the obligations of a different agent (the attorney)
than does the ALI (which looks at directors), and there may be considerations unique to
the attorney/client relationship (such as fostering client autonomy) that affect Pepper's
analysis. Yet what is interesting for this Article is the view of the nature of law inherent
in his analysis.

1296

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

something approaching a 'right' to know 'the law' that purports to
govern them,"'' 0 and considers facts concerning the enforcement of
law as part of "the law" to which people have a right of access.0 9 Yet
he recognizes that advice about enforcement patterns in conjunction
with the "modern lawyer's legal realist (and law-and-economics) view
of the law may lead the client to respect the law less; to choose to
violate the law and chance the consequences."" 0
In addressing this moral and legal dilemma, Pepper explores

seven different distinctions in determining when lawyers ought to
provide clients with information about enforcement-related aspects

of law, including the potential consequences of violating the law.'
The distinctions he examines are (1) criminal violations ("law as

prohibition") versus civil violations ("law as cost"); (2) conduct
malum in se versus conduct that is malum prohibitum; (3) enforced
law versus rarely enforced law versus unenforced law; (4)
information on enforcement of law versus procedural law versus
substantive legal rules; (5) private information versus public
information; (6) lawyer-initiated discussions versus client-initiated
108. Id. at 1599.

109. See id. at 1547. Pepper's view of the rule of law is derived from Lon Fuller's work
and from Pepper's sense that information about enforcement patterns and the way the
legal system would work to process a claim is part of the "promulgation" of law. See id.
(citing FULLER, supra note 44, at 49-51). Yet by including facts concerning the
enforcement of law in what constitutes "the law" (including the probability of detection of
violations, the probability of prosecution, the burdens and delays of civil litigation, and
patterns of administrative enforcement), Pepper expands the notion of the rule of law in
an extremely ironic way, ultimately ending up undermining the "rule of law" as
traditionally understood (the promulgation of rules meant to apply generally to constrain
and shape individual behavior). It is not clear that Fuller would have agreed that the
norm of promulgation requires advising clients about the likely enforcement
consequences of violating the law, when that advice would be an important factor in a
decision to violate the law and risk the consequences, even though Fuller was not
absolutely consistent on that point. In The Morality of Law, Fuller suggests that how the
law is applied is considered by lawyers to be an important part of the rule of law. See
FULLER, supra note 44, at 49-51. But in previous writing Fuller had rejected the notion
that lawyers should advise clients in courses of action the lawyer found morally
problematic or close to the line of illegality. See Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall,
Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161

(1958) (urging that lawyers not "participate as legal advisor in a line of conduct that is
immoral, unfair, or of doubtful legality"). This expansion of Fuller's concept of the rule
of law is not unique to Pepper, however. See Newman, supra note 18, at 288. Newman
argued that lawyers' ethical codes ought not penalize lawyers for giving clients truthful
information that assists them in violating the law, unless the lawyer's assistance could be
prosecuted as participating in the substantive law violation. After all, "[d]id not Lon
Fuller say that it is a matter of the law's internal morality that it be promulgated in such a
way that people know what it is?" Id.
110. Pepper, supranote 9, at 1554.
111. See iLat 1554-84.
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discussions; and (7) whether it is likely or unlikely that the
information will be used to assist unlawful conduct." 2 His discussion
of these distinctions says much about the current, academic concept
of law and the intermediate law-as-price view.
Thus, Pepper discusses the distinction between giving advice
concerning violations of criminal law and violations of civil law,
which he suggests is a distinction between conduct that is
traditionally understood as truly prohibited (criminal law) versus
conduct "to which the law only attaches a cost or penalty" (civil
So, using this distinction, a lawyer would not give
law)." 3
information to the client when it would facilitate a criminal violation,
but would be free to give advice about a civil violation." 4 But this
distinction does not ultimately prove satisfying to Pepper because it is
both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive because
the reach of the criminal sanction, "which is supposed to mean that
conduct is truly prohibited," has been expanded dramatically,
extending to violations of major areas of regulatory law that Pepper
believes cannot be worthy of true prohibition."5 It is under-inclusive
because some violations of civil tort law, otherwise an area Pepper
regards as law as cost, can cause serious injury to other people."6 A
much more important distinction, in Pepper's view, is the malum in
se/malum prohibitum distinction." 7
In discussing that distinction, Pepper uses the example of
communicating information from a police bulletin board about the
frequency of police patrols in given neighborhoods (information that
could be quite useful to someone planning a burglary) versus
communicating information on the EPA's frequency of testing rural
water effluent for compliance with standards for discharging
ammonia into the water (information that could be quite useful to a
company seeking to discharge ammonia at levels higher than those
permitted in the regulations)."" Using that example, he suggests that
"our intuition" that it is wrong to communicate the former to a client
but not the latter is based on the malum in se/malum prohibitum
distinction:
The discharge may be a technical legal violation, but it may
112. See id.

113. Id. at 1559.
114. See id.

115. See id. at 1561.
116. See id. at 1562-63.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 1576.
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not be wrongful in any other significant sense.... The
difference between burglary and this instance of regulatory
violation seems to be that the former is clearly wrong in its
very nature in addition to being unlawful, and the latter is
unlawful, but may or may not be otherwise wrongful.
That difference corresponds to the old distinction
between crimes mala in se, wrong in their very nature, and
crimes mala prohibita, crimes wrong only because
prohibited by positive law. This distinction also helps in
understanding our intuitions concerning the criminal/civil
dichotomy.... A prohibition on giving the client legal
information that might assist in the commission of a crime
rings the right chord when the conduct is something we
perceive as "really criminal," but strikes quite another note
with vast areas of regulatory law. The malum in selmalum
prohibitum distinction appears, in older garb, to formulate
the difference between law as true prohibition (that is, the
identification of conduct not to be tolerated) and law as cost
(that is, the identification of conduct to be penalized in
some legal fashion, but which the citizen is still free to choose
to do).119
Based, then, on the concept of law as distinguishing between
law-as-limit and law-as-price (which for Pepper essentially tracks the
malum in se/malum prohibitum distinction), Pepper proposes the
following general standard for guiding lawyers' conduct:
[W]hen it appears more probable than not that the client
will use legal information or advice to facilitate conduct that
(1) is clearly prohibited by law and (2) involves what is by
clear societal consensus a serious and substantial moral
wrong, the lawyer shall not provide the client with the legal
advice or information. 20
In counseling clients using the above standard, the lawyer would be
guided by the distinctions Pepper discussed:
Is the legal provision really "law," or has it been eroded by
119. Id. at 1576-77 (emphasis added). Judge John Noonan and Professor Richard
Painter suggest that this approach to law is similar to that of Elihu Root, who is reported
to have said in discussing some trust arrangements he advised upon that were "technical
legal violations," that "[e]verybody knows that some rules for the conduct of life are
matters of right and wrong, substantial, essential, and that other rules for the conduct of
life are matters of convenience, of form, of method, desirable but not essential." JOHN T.
NOONAN, JR. & RICHARD W. PAINTER, PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 515 (1997) (citing PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT
(1937)).
120. Pepper, supra note 9, at 1578 (emphasis added).
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desuetude or enforcement policy into something society
appears not to be very concerned about? Is the conduct
really prohibited, or just freighted with a legal cost or
penalty? Is the conduct really wrongful, or just legally
prohibited?'
In other words, that a particular behavior (such as dumping
ammonia in the water at levels beyond that set by the Environmental
Protection Agency) is legally prohibited is relevant in determining
how a client should be advised, but not determinative. What is
determinative is the lawyer's individual assessment of whether the
that is, whether it
underlying behavior "is really wrongful,"''
"involves what is by clear societal consensus a serious and substantial

121. Id. at 1581 (emphasis added). Pepper's concept of desuetude and of unenforced
or rarely enforced law is much broader than the AL concept of desuetude, see supra text
accompanying notes 58, 60-61, and provides the lawyer with far more latitude to
determine that a given law or regulation is not really law. Thus, Pepper is willing to
include a disparity between a water pollution law as written and as enforced as a situation
of partial desuetude, see Pepper, supra note 9, at 1558, and if it is a situation that is
generally known in the industry (no doubt because lawyers have communicated it to
industry participants) Pepper will draw a stronger conclusion:
[qf the industry knows, then the government must know that the industry knows,
and continuation of the .075 [enforcement] gram limit [when the written limit is
.05 grams] and infrequent rural inspections then takes on the characteristics of a
conscious "legal" decision by the agency, a policy it knows the regulated use as a
guide. In other words, if the lawmaker knows its conduct is known by and
guiding the regulated, that conduct looks and sounds like "law" to a
contemporary lawyer.
I&. at 1572. While this may look and sound like "law" to a contemporary lawyer, and
certainly does to the dominant legal realist/law and economics influenced lawyer, that the
client complied with the law-as-typically-enforced-but-not-as-written is unlikely to be
persuasive as a defense in an enforcement action (as Pepper recognizes, see id. at 1554).
This indicates that the standard as written means something more than the standard as
enforced even given our modern concept of law. On one cynical interpretation, then,
counseling clients about the gap between typical enforcement and the standards of the
regulation is no more than counseling them on how much they can "get away with,"
rather than being, as Pepper interprets it, a sophisticated exercise in the applied
jurisprudence of "what is law." See id. at 1554-58. Of more concern, this kind of counsel
can produce a vicious cycle that accelerates the inefficacy of law: as more industry
participants adjust their behavior to the law-as-enforced rather than as written, the ability
of regulators to enforce the written standards will be undermined, given budget and time
constraints, leading more attorneys to determine that the agency is not serious about that
particular law, and thus giving advice that further undermines it. Ultimately Pepper's
analysis of desuetude gives too much play to "under-enforcement" as "desuetude,"
particularly with respect to modern laws and enforcement decisions that are due in large
measure to regulatory agency constraints and reactions to industry resistance. See
Gordon, CorporateLaw, supra note 18, at 263-64. Moreover, the legal advice Pepper
suggests, if routinely and uniformly proffered to industry participants, produces and then
exploits that "desuetude."
122. Pepper, supra note 9, at 1578.
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Only when a violation involves what is by clear

societal consensus a serious and substantial moral wrong should the
client be denied the information necessary to assess accurately the
risks associated with violating the law, even when the lawyer is the
one who initiates the discussion about possibly violating the law.124
From Pepper's article, one sees a number of the premises of the
"intermediate law-as-price" view of law: (1) some laws prohibit
actions (predominantly criminal law) and some laws price actions
(predominantly civil law); (2) regulatory law is properly understood
as a pricing scheme, even when it includes criminal sanctions for
violations; (3) the concept of law includes a sophisticated analysis of
the likelihood of detection of violations, and of enforcement, and of
various barriers to aggrieved parties asserting their rights in
determining if obeying the law is worthwhile; (4) enforcementrelated facts will (and perhaps should) figure prominently in a
rational actor's calculus about complying with the standards the law
sets forth; and (5) except where legal violations are also serious moral
wrongs (mala in se), compliance with the standards of behavior that
statutes or administrative regulations set forth is philosophically
voluntary: one has the "right" to violate the law by risking paying the
penalties (and thus lawyers have the duty to provide information
necessary for clients to be able to exercise that right).

123. Id. One problem with this view is that we live in a large, heterogeneous,
pluralistic society that values toleration and respect for individual moral differences (at
least in theory). The instances in which there is likely to be a "clear societal consensus"
that an action involves "a serious and substantial moral wrong" are likely to be few as
compared to the instances in which there is either no societal consensus or widely
divergent moral views. Thus, Pepper's proposed standard would dramatically shrink the
realm of law that is understood to be mandatory. In contrast, the existence of legislation
and/or administrative regulations establishing standards of behavior can be taken, at the
least, as strong evidence of the existence of a social consensus, albeit perhaps splintered,
wavering, or in need of reconsideration, notwithstanding the existence of differing moral
views within the population. Professor Jules Coleman makes the point that one reason
markets are useful is because large, heterogeneous groups can exchange goods and
services without having to agree on underlying social values or on a conception of the
good. See JuLEs COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 62 (1992). Similarly, one importance
of law is that it can produce a structure for social behavior under the same conditions,
without making agreement necessary on either the underlying moral questions or a
conception of "the good." By interjecting into the definition of law a requirement for a
clear societal consensus that something is a serious moral wrong in addition to being
legally prohibited, Pepper's theory would rob law of one of its primary advantages in a
heterogeneous society.
124. See Pepper, supra note 9, at 1578.
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III. EVIDENCE OF LAW-AS-PRICE THEORIES IN THE ALl
PRINCIPLES AND IN THE REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION

ACT
These voluntaristic, law-as-price theories of law do not exist only
in academic discourse. In both the ALl Principles,as they ultimately
evolved over fourteen contentious years, and in the ABA's actions

revising the Model Business Corporations Act, one sees intimations
of similar views."z Thus, one sees in these bodies' actions a distinct
endorsement of the voluntaristic view that some kinds of intentional
law violations are unimportant and non-culpable, and that the
penalties for violating some laws can be treated as prices-or simply
the cost of doing business.
A.

The ALI Principles

As described above, in section 2.01 of the ALl Principles, the
ALI adopted a normative concept of law-as-limit and explicitly
rejected the idea that compliance with the law is properly subject to a
cost-benefit analysis. 6 Yet the ALI stopped short of imposing
explicit, proactive law compliance obligations on the board of
directors as specific aspects of the board's fiduciary duty of care,2

7

and took other actions that are inconsistent with a fully normative
view of law.' s It is to those actions that this discussion now turns.

125. See infranotes 126-94.
126. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 2.01 cmt. g; supra text accompanying notes
48-67.
127. Corporate directors have a fiduciary duty of care to their shareholders that
essentially protects shareholders from gross negligence. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985). Courts very rarely evaluate the substance of corporate
directors' decisions in evaluating whether a Board has met its fiduciary duty of care,
however. Rather, if the decision was made with reasonable deliberation about the
relevant facts, the board is entitled to the presumption of the business judgment rule that
the decision was rational, lawful, and well-informed, and the court will not evaluate the
underlying wisdom of the decision. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982).
In this way, the board is protected from judicial second-guessing, freeing it to engage in
economically productive, informed risk-taking. See icL at 886.
128. These actions by the ALI are more interesting for what they potentially say about
the ALI's view of the importance of law compliance than for their practical significance,
since there is so little successful enforcement of the duty of care generally (at least not by
way of litigation) given the business judgment rule. See supra note 127; infra note 149.
For a comprehensive analysis of the practical effects of the ALI's enforcement provisions
on the law compliance obligation of section 2.01 (including the directors' power to dismiss
derivative suits), focused not on the underlying view of law inherent in those actions but
rather on the likely effects of those provisions (and of section 2.01) on corporate law
compliance going forward, see Ryan, supra note 50, at 492-99.
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1. Section 4.01: The Duty of Care
The first draft of the ALI Principles contained two specific
fiduciary obligations concerning law compliance as part of the
Board's duty of care: section 4.01(b), under which a corporate
director or officer would be required "to be reasonably concerned
with the existence and effectiveness of monitoring programs,
including law compliance programs," and section 4.01(c), under
which each director and officer was required to "make reasonable
efforts to cause [their] corporation to perform its duty under § 2.01 to
obey the law."129 The redundancy of these provisions alone shows the
importance given to law compliance in the first draft.
The emphasis on law compliance makes sense given the political
context in which the first drafts were written. That four hundred
major corporations admitted to making bribes to foreign officials and
maintaining false books and records without the outside directors'
knowledge was seen as evidence that outside directors were not
involved enough or informed enough to be playing a useful
monitoring role with respect to corporate activities, including law
compliance (and other aspects of a firm's business, such as strategic
development, or evaluating top management). 130 The first drafts
129. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 14, § 4.01(b), (c). Section 4.01 of Tentative
Draft No. 1 included the following proposed black-letter law describing the corporate
director's duty of care:
Corporate law should provide that:
(a) A corporate director or officer has a duty to his corporation to perform
his functions in good faith, in a manner that he reasonably believes to be in
the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily
prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position
and under similar circumstances.
(b) The duty of care set forth in subsection (a) encompasses the obligation
of a director or officer to make reasonable inquiry when acting upon
corporate transactions or otherwise performing his functions and also
encompasses the obligation of a corporate director to be reasonably
concerned with the existence and effectiveness of monitoring programs,
including law compliance programs.
(c) The duty of care set forth in subsections (a) and (b) encompasses the
obligation of a director or officer to make reasonable efforts to cause his
corporation to perform its duty under § 2.01 to obey the law.
Id. § 4.01(a)-(c).
130. As noted above, the ALI Principles were undertaken in 1978 in light of postWatergate investigations of hundreds of major corporations for having bribed foreign
officers to get business, with corresponding falsification of the accounting records, in a
period of general criticism of American corporations. See Carney, supra note 14, at 24348; Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-InterestProxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM,
69 MIcH. L. REv. 419, 421-23 (1971); Seligman, supra note 64, at 333-43. Advocates of
law reform, including those advocating for federal chartering of corporations, had argued
that the widespread allegations of foreign bribery were indicative of a breakdown in
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sought to change this pattern by enhancing the monitoring role of
outside directors as a part of their duty of care in a number of areas,
including law compliance. 3
The political context in which the ALl Principles were being
written also helps to explain why the first drafts became so
controversial. Professor Joel Seligman has described that context as
follows:
[W]hen the ALI project began in 1978, it was widely viewed
as likely to produce a "rational, dispassionate analysis" of
the principles of corporate governance, more moderate in
its recommendations than several more far-reaching
proposals then before Congress. With the election of
Ronald Reagan in 1980, the political backdrop of the ALI
project abruptly changed. With no federal corporate
legislation likely to be enacted in the foreseeable future, the
ALI Principles endured as the sole significant source of any
proposed reforms. It was this change in the political
backdrop of the project, not the project itself, that inspired
most of the brutal criticisms of the early 1980s.132
The law compliance obligations of sections 4.01(b) and (c) were
controversial, then, partly because they were part of a reform effort,
partly because that reform effort proposed an expanded role for the
board (the so-called "mandatory monitoring model"), and partly
because the law compliance obligations were thought to create the

corporate accountability and that enhancing the board's role with respect to law
compliance was one way of fostering greater accountability. See Seligman, supra note 64,

at 336-40.
131. See supra note 129.
132. Seligman, supra note 64, at 327-28; see also Victor Brudney, The Role of the
Board of Directors: The ALI and Its Critics, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 223, 228 (1983)
(describing a 1982 letter from the Chairman of the Business Roundtable Task Force on
Corporate Responsibility indicating that the "ALI 'project had its roots in the '70s as part
of the effort to meet federal incorporation and similar proposals' "). Seligman's article is
a comprehensive account of the political events that ultimately gave rise to the Corporate
Governance Project, and in particular contains a history of the foreign "sensitive
payments" and accounting records falsification issues and federal legislative proposals to
reform corporate governance that grew out of those events. See Seligman, supra note 64,
at 328-40. The legislative proposals to which Seligman refers in the above quote included
proposals to enact federal "minimum standards" for corporate law, growing out of
Professor William Cary's theory about a corporate law "race to the bottom," as states
sought incorporation fees by enacting laws favorable to corporate management at the
expense of shareholders and society; Ralph Nader, Mark Green, and Joel Seligman's
proposal for a federal chartering statute, including employee and community
"constituency" directors; and Professor Harvey Goldschmid's proposal to restructure
boards of directors so that they would be more independent of senior management. See
id. at 336-40.
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potential for expanded board liability and for increased intervention
by the courts into corporate affairs.133 For instance, the Business
Roundtable Task Force on Corporate Responsibility ("Business

Roundtable")"'

asserted that "[a] free-floating concern with law

compliance in the abstract would not be productive, would

unnecessarily detract from other more immediate concerns, and
would open directors to unfair liability for acts committed by others
of which they had neither knowledge nor notice.' ' 35 Nor did the
Business Roundtable think that law compliance deserved "special
mention in two separate provisions.' 1 36 Moreover, it thought that to
impose a general law compliance obligation on the board, absent a
particular event giving rise to suspicions of illegality, was an "unfair
and radical" departure from existing law. 37
133. See Seligman, supra note 64, at 361-62. The ALI's proposals about an enhanced
role for the board included a number of mandatory aspects for the boards of large,
publicly held corporations, including that there be a majority of outside directors, and that
such corporations have audit committees and nominating committees with certain core
responsibilities. See Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 14, §§ 3.02,3.03, 3.05,3.06.
134. For a description of the Business Roundtable, see supra note 64.
135. BUSuIESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT, supra note 64, at 45. This latter argument
does not come to terms with the point that the first ALI Tentative Draft only required
board members to be concerned with the existence of'compliance mechanisms in the
corporation, which was a task that could easily be accomplished at a fairly high level of
generality. Exercising such concern would also constitute "mak[ing] reasonable efforts to
cause his corporation to perform its duty under § 2.01(a) to obey the law." Tentative
Draft No. 1, supra note 14, § 4.01(c).
136. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT, supranote 64, at 46.
137. Id. at 45. Whether this departure from the existing case law was "unfair and
radical" is debatable, but it was unquestionably a departure. The controlling Delaware
decision concerning the board's obligations for law compliance at the time of the initial
ALI debates was (and still is) Graham v. Allis-Chalmers ManufacturingCo., 188 A.2d 125
(Del. 1963), under which directors have no responsibility to take affirmative steps to
ensure that the corporation has effective law compliance systems "absent a cause for
suspicion." Id. at 130. In In re Caremark InternationalInc. Derivative Litigation, 698
A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), Chancellor Allen predicted that the Delaware Supreme Court
would no longer approve such a passive role for the board, particularly given the
increasing social tendency to employ the criminal law to assure corporate compliance with
the law and the substantial incentives under the United States Sentencing Guidelines for
corporations to have well-functioning compliance programs in effect. See id. at 969-70;
see also supra note 51 (discussing the Sentencing Guidelines). Chancellor Allen held that
in order to satisfy their duties of care, corporate managers must
assur[e] themselves that information and reporting systems exist in the
organization that are reasonably designed to provide to senior management and
to the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management
and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning
both the corporation's compliance with law and its business performance.
In re Caremark,698 A.2d at 970. In substance, then, Chancellor Allen has articulated a
standard that is quite similar to the earliest drafts of the ALl Principles,requiring an
active role for the board in law compliance.
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During the 1982 ALI proceedings, one member asserted that
there was an overemphasis on law compliance and that
"[c]orporations and their officers should not be required to act as
though they were public prosecutors."'13 8 An other member suggested
that the excessive breadth of the law compliance obligation could be
demonstrated by considering a
hypothetical that is very real in many corporations to
officers and their directors, and that is where a corporation
is violating the requirements of the Clean Air Act or the
Water Pollution Control Act and is unable to cease the
noncompliance without shutting down.... [T]he discussion
suggests that the director may be exposed to liability for
countenancing a violation of the law even though the
of
violation of the law meets all of the requirements
139
judgment.
business
normal
and
reasonable prudence
The Reporter at the time, Professor Harvey Goldschmid,
strongly defended including law compliance as a separate aspect of
the board's fiduciary duty of care and indicated that the fundamental
question was "[w]hat kind of guidance [on law compliance] will we
140
give the world when speaking as The American Law Institute?'
Aside from the narrow examples of desuetude, breach of contract, or
open violation of a law to challenge its validity, he asserted that,
according to the draft, "if you violate the law knowingly, we are
saying you are liable. There is no business judgment protection for
that; ... that is the trend in the law, and that is wise public policy. At

some point, we will have a chance to vote on the issue."'14
In fact, the members did not have a chance to vote on the issue;
no votes were taken in 1982 on Tentative Draft No. 1,142 and by the
time section 4.01 was brought back before the members in 1985,
specific reference to law compliance as part of a director's duty of
care had been deleted in the black-letter law (although law
compliance was discussed in the commentary).' 43 Similarly, the final
138. Proceedingsof the 59th Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute, 59 A.L.I.
PROC. 511, 513 (1982) [hereinafter 59th Proceedings](statement of Milton V. Freeman).
139. Id. at 522-23 (statement of Thomas W. Houghton). The speaker did not
elaborate upon whether, in this hypothetical, the board authorized the expenditure of at
least some funds to start to bring the factory into compliance over time, or whether it had
essentially adopted an all-or-nothing approach to environmental compliance. See id.
(statement of Thomas W. Houghton).
140. Id. at 512 (statement of Professor Harvey Goldschmid).
141. Id. at 523 (statement of Professor Harvey Goldschmid).
142. See id. at 408 (comments by the President of the ALI, Roswell B. Perkins).
AND
ANALYSIS
143. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GovERNANCE:
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1985) [hereinafter Tentative Draft
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version of the director's duty of care, as adopted by the members in
1992, contains no specific articulation of a law compliance obligation
(although, again, compliance with the law is discussed in the
commentary).144
These changes were greeted as important improvements by some
participants in the ALI debates. As one writer stated:
Part IV of the Principlesis a vastly improved work product
when compared to Part IV of Tentative Draft No. 1, both in
substance and in tone. Gone, for example, are the rules
which would have created new duties of law compliance and
director inquiry, and established legal requirements for

No. 4]. The revised language that was discussed by the membership in the 1985 annual
meeting was in part as follows:
Section 4.01: Duty of Care of Directors and Officers; the Business Judgment
Rule
(a) A director or officer has a duty to his corporation to perform his
functions in good faith, in a manner that he reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily
prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position
and under similar circumstances.
(1) This duty includes the obligation to make, or cause to be made, such
inquiry as the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate
under the circumstances.
L The commentary to section 4.01 in Tentative Draft No. 4 continued to recognize that
the obligations of the directors and officers to perform their functions in good faith
includes compliance with section 2.01. See id. § 4.01 cmt. d.
144. The version of section 4.01 that was actually adopted provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
(a) A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director's
or officer's functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an
ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like
position and under similar circumstances....
(1) The duty in Subsection (a) includes the obligation to make, or cause to
be made, an inquiry when, but only when, the circumstances would alert a
reasonable director or officer to the need therefor. The extent of such
inquiry shall be such as the director or officer reasonably believes to be
necessary.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 4.01. While the language of section 4.01(a)(1)
seemingly tracks Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 188 A.2d 125 (1963),
permitting a quite passive role for the directors unless specific information comes to their
attention suggesting violations of law, the ALI commentary suggests it was not fully
endorsing Allis-Chalmers. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 4.01 cmt. c ("The AllisChalmers case was decided 30 years ago, and a basic theme of the commentary in Part IV
has been that the 'obligation' component of duty of care provisions is a flexible and
dynamic concept. Today, an ordinarily prudent person serving as the director of a
corporation of any significant scale or complexity should recognize the need to be
reasonably concerned with the existence and effectiveness of procedures, programs, and
other techniques to assist the board in its oversight role.").
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compliance programs. 14
Other analysts believe the ALI did not go far enough in limiting
section 4.01's specification of fiduciary duties.146 And yet if this
provision is the ALI's "guidance to the world" on corporate law
compliance, 47 it is hardly a beacon on the hill, particularly when
construed in conjunction with the provisions on derivative liability
and exculpation in the ALl Principles.48
2. Section 7.18: Derivative Liability
The procedural device used to impose liability on corporate
directors and officers for breaches of their fiduciary duties is the
shareholders acting in the name of the
derivative lawsuit:
corporation sue the directors and/or executive officers whose
wrongdoing has injured the firm. If such a derivative lawsuit is
successful (which is extremely rare in duty of care cases, as opposed
to duty of loyalty cases), the directors or officers are personally liable
for damages to the corporation. 49 The ALl Principles treat the
question of derivative recovery for violations of section 4.01 (and
other sections) in section 7.18.110 Under section 7.18(c), though,
directors and officers may seek an offset for the profits from law
145. HANSEN, supra note 14, at 37.
146. See, e.g., William J. Carney, The ALI's CorporateGovernance Project: The Death
of Property Rights?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 898, 899 (1993) (criticizing the Corporate
Governance Project because it "can be characterized as expanding the role of fiduciary
duties of various participants in firms and as expanding the number of open terms in the
corporate contract that only courts can clarify").
147. See 59th Proceedings, supra note 138, at 512 (statement of Professor Harvey
Goldschmid). In contrast to the ALI's reluctance to impose specific law compliance
duties on the board, some other countries specify that compliance with the law is an
enforceable obligation under the country's corporations law. For instance, in Japan,
compliance with the law is the first obligation of the members of the board of directors.
See Tasuku Matsuo, The Commercial Laws of Japan, in 4 DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL
LAWS OF THE WORLD 1, 28 (Lester Nelson ed., 1992). Article 254-3 of the Commercial
Code of Japan provides that "[a] director shall comply with the provisions of any law or
ordinance and the Articles of Incorporation as well as any resolution of a general
meeting, and shall be under an obligation to perform his duties faithfully for the
company." BASIC JAPANESE LAWS 280 (Hiroshi Oda ed., 1997) (translating SHOHO art.
254(3)). In Japan, shareholders can bring injunctive actions to require the directors to
comply with the law, see id. (translating SHOHO art. 272), and the directors are jointly and
severally liable for any damage to the corporation from failure to comply with the law, see
id. (translating SHOHO art. 266). This liability can be released only by the unanimous
consent of all the shareholders. See id. (translating SHOHO art. 266(5)).
148. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, §§ 7.18,7.19.
149. See CHARLES R. O'KELLEY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 347 (2d ed. 1996) ("There are relatively few examples
of directors' liability founded on lack of substantive due care.").
150. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 7.18.
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violations in calculating the damages for which they are liable in a
derivative action.' 5 ' In essence, this provision permits the directors or
officers to show that "crime did pay."'' 5 There is a limitation on
these potential offsets: recognizing an offset for the profits from law
violation must not be "contrary to public policy.' ' 5 3 Yet it is
interesting that the ALI refused to adopt a per se rule that it is
contrary to public policy to permit offsets for illegal profits.15 4
That agnosticism about whether law violations are contrary to
public policy as a general matter, while flatly inconsistent with the
strong rhetoric about law compliance in section 2.01, is carried
forward in an illustration to section 7.18(c):
A derivative action is brought to require a corporate official
of XYZ Corporation to account to the corporation for
$200,000 in legally questionable overseas political
contributions. The defendant admits the payments, but
151. See id. Section 7.18(c) provides that:
A plaintiff bears the burden of proving causation and the amount of damages
suffered by, or other recovery due to, the corporation or the shareholders as the
result of a defendant's violation of a standard of conduct set forth in Part IV
[duty of care], Part V [duty of fair dealing], or Part VI [role of directors and
shareholders in transactions in control]. The court may permit a defendant to
offset against such liability any gains to the corporation that the defendant can
establish arose out of the same transaction and whose recognition in this manner
is not contrary to public policy.
Id. § 7.18(c).
152- See Ryan, supra note 50, at 452-53; see also Norwood P. Beveridge, Does the
CorporateDirectorHave a Duty Always to Obey the Law?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 729, 73233 (1996) (drawing same conclusion). In adopting this approach, the ALI followed the
lead of a number of courts that require plaintiffs to show a "net loss" from illegal activity
before a derivative action will lie, that is, that there is a loss after the profits from
illegality are subtracted. See Ryan, supra note 50, at 453-56 (discussing various cases).
The premise of such cases is that derivative liability serves a compensatory function,
because the corporation itself receives any recovery, less attorneys' fees. Thus, to permit
derivative recovery for the director or officer's illegal but profitable activities would be a
windfall to the corporation, because it would get both the profits from the illegality and
the derivative recovery. See id. Ryan argues that this rationale for the net loss rule may
have been undermined in Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969), which
recognized a deterrence function for derivative actions as well. See Ryan, supra note 50,
at 456-57 (citing Diamond, 248 N.E.2d at 912). The ALI could have adopted other
solutions than the one it did to try to address this problem, though, if articulating an
unmitigated message concerning the importance of law compliance was thought
important. The ALI could have suggested requiring the corporation to put any derivative
recovery that constitutes a double recovery into a segregated fund for enhanced law
compliance, for instance, or could have suggested adding the derivative recovery to any
public fund established for those injured by law violations. Either approach would have
communicated a stronger message about the importance of law compliance than the
approach the ALI took.
153. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 7.18(c).
154. See id.
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seeks to defend on the basis that in prior years other such
payments had produced profitable contracts. The court
should reject this defense, and any offsets the defendant
seeks to prove thereunder, because the alleged profits do
not arise out of the same transaction. Even if the offsets
arise out of the same transaction, the court should decline to
permit offsets that it determines are contrary to an
establishedpublicpolicy. 55
That the contributions are "legally questionable" is not enough for
the ALI to counsel rejecting offsets for profitable illegality in the
final draft; a court must determine that recognizing these offsets
would be contrary to an established public policy as well.
How the ALI's views on the importance of law compliance
changed over the time the ALI Principleswere being drafted is also
evidenced by comparing the above illustration in the final version
with an almost identical one in the first draft, in which the drafters
articulated a strong position against offsets for profitable illegality:
A derivative action is brought to require a corporate official
of XYZ Corporation to account to the corporation for
$200,000 in illegal domestic political contributions. The
defendant admits the payments, but seeks to defend on the
basis that in prior years other such payments had produced
profitable contracts. The court should reject this defense,
and any offsets the defendant seeks to prove thereunder,
both because such alleged profits do not arise out of the
same transaction and because in this case of knowing
misconduct the allowance of such56offsets would frustrate a
clearpublicpolicy againstbribery.1
155. Id. § 7.18(c) cmt. e, illus. 4 (emphasis added).
156. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 14, § 7.06 cmt. c, illus. 1 (emphasis added).
While the language of these illustrations indicates a softening of the law compliance
position between Tentative Draft No. 1 and the completed version, the black-letter
language of Tentative Draft No. 1 also left to the courts the determination of whether
recognizing an offset for profitable illegality "would frustrate an authoritatively
established public policy." Id. § 7.06(b). That choice in the first draft was related to a
distinction between offsetting if the law violations were knowing versus negligent. Thus,
the commentary in the first draft stated that
"knowing" misconduct seems the strongest case for a per se rule [not permitting
offsets] since the ancient maxim that an individual should not profit from his
own wrong has it [sic] clearest applicability here. Negligent conduct which
results in a violation of law presents a different issue: was the statutory policy
one which clearly sought to impose liability on the individual official because of
a concern with the consequences of directorial inattention?
Id. § 7.06(b) cmt. c. This distinction between potentially permitting offsets for a negligent
violation versus not permitting them for a knowing violation was not included in the final
version, as the discussion of illustration two will indicate. See infra text accompanying
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The trajectory of a second illustration from the first draft to the
final draft also shows the ALI's back-pedaling on law compliance and
its ultimate refusal to adopt all of the logical implications of
Goldschmid's view that "if you violate the law knowingly, we are
saying you are liable."1 57 The second illustration posits an insurance
company making an impermissible loan (based on legal lending
limits) to an ineligible borrower. 158 In the first draft the loan is
negligently made, that is, as the result of board inattention." 9 The
loan was made well in excess of the prime rate and required
repayment in five installments, but the borrower was unable to make
the final payment. The defendants wish to offset the "excess"
interest paid on the impermissible loan against their liability.160 The
commentary in the first draft suggests that public policy would not be
frustrated by allowing this offset for negligence, "both [because of]
the civil character of the prohibition and the absence of an individual
focus to the banking regulation," particularly if some individual
liability remained. 161 By the final draft, the illegal loan had been
made in knowing violation of the applicable legal limits, but the
commentary suggests that allowing an offset should still be
permissible, again because of the civil character of the prohibition
and the apparent absence of an intent in the statute "to create a
specific standard for directorial performance," particularly if some
residual liability remained. 62 Thus, while section 2.01 of the ALI
Principlesimposes a duty on the corporation to comply with the law,
in this example the ALI is also willing to allow directors a credit for
the profits from knowing illegality in calculating their personal
liability, a position that is at best inconsistent with section 2.01.
3. Section 7.19: Exculpatory Clauses
Another provision that suggests a significant tempering of the
ALI's concern with law compliance is section 7.19, which treats the
subject of "exculpatory clauses." 6 3 Exculpatory clauses are
notes 157-62.
157. 59th Proceedings, supra note 138, at 523 (statement of Professor Harvey

Goldschmid).
158. See Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 14, § 7.06 cmt. c, illus. 2.
159. See id.
160. See icL
161. Id.
162. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 7.18 cmt. e, illus. 5.
163. See iL § 7.19. Section 7.19 provides, in relevant part, that:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, if a failure by a director ... or an
officer ... to meet the standard of conduct specified in Part IV (Duty of Care

1998]

CORPORATE COMPLIANCE

1311

provisions in a corporation's articles of incorporation that limit

directors' and officers' personal liability to the corporation for
damages arising from certain types of breach of fiduciary duty,
including breach of the duty of care, which would include law
compliance. The first statute permitting exculpatory clauses was
section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporate Law,"6 which
was passed in 1986 in response to Smith v. Van Gorkom,65 one of the
very few cases successfully imposing personal liability on board
members for violations of the duty of care. 66 Although Van Gorkom
was based on egregious facts, it set off a maelstrom of controversy
and possibly exacerbated a directors' and officers' liability insurance
crisis. 6 7 In response, Delaware passed a law permitting corporations
to add "exculpatory clauses" to their articles of incorporation to limit
or eliminate directors' liability to the corporation for certain kinds of
breach of fiduciary duty.68 Delaware's statute does not allow
exculpation for breaches of a director's duty of loyalty (that is,
conflicts of interest) or for transactions in which the director receives
an improper personal benefit, but does permit exculpation for certain
Significantly, though, under
breaches of the duty of care. 69

and the Business Judgment Rule) did not either:
(1) Involve a knowing and culpable violation of law by the director or
officer;
(2) Show a conscious disregard for the duty of the director or officer to the
corporation under circumstances in which the director or officer was aware
that the conduct or omission created an unjustified risk of serious injury to
the corporation;...
and the director or officer, or an associate ... did not receive a benefit that was
improper under Part V (Duty of Fair Dealing), then a provision in a certificate
of incorporation that limits damages against an officer or a director for such
failure to an amount not less than such person's annual compensation from the
corporation should be given effect ....
Id.
164. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1993).
165. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
166. Van Gorkom imposed personal liability on the board of directors of the Trans
Union Corporation for what the court found was gross negligence for selling the entire
company on an expedited basis without having made a corporate decision to sell the
company, with no exigent circumstances requiring haste, without a valuation study of the
worth of the business, and without reading the agreement of sale. See idL at 874.
167. See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 149, at 367-70, 393-94. But see Roberta
Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors'and Officers' Liability Insurance?,14 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1, 24 (1989) (arguing that the directors' and officers' liability insurance crisis
was not linked to Van Gorkom).
168. See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 149, at 395. Approximately 40 states
currently have similar laws. See id.
169. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1996).
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Delaware's statute a corporation may not exculpate its directors for
"acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law."'170
The ALl Principles,by contrast, permit broader exculpation of
directors in section 7.19 (so long as the directors are at least required
to pay liability up to the amount of their annual compensation). 1
Thus, under the ALl Principles a corporation may not exculpate its
directors for "a knowing and culpable violation of law by the director
or officer."'7 Implicitly, then, the ALl Principlespermit companies
to exculpate their directors for liability above their annual
compensation, even for knowing and intentional violations of the law,
so long as these are not also "culpable" violations. 7 3 The
commentary goes to some length to define a culpable violation of
law, sounding like some law-as-price commentators in the process:
Section 7.19(1) covers cases involving "a knowing and
culpable violation of law." Because in theory it might be
arguable that even a breach of contract or an ordinary tort
could be described as a "violation of law," the key word in
§ 7.19(1) is "culpable," by which is meant conduct that is
morally reprehensible under generally prevailing
standards.... Although most knowing violations of the
penal law will be considered culpable, under § 7.19(1) there
are a limited number of circumstances when noncompliance
even with the criminal law may be justified. See Comment g
to § 2.01 [necessity, desuetude, civil disobedience]....
[E]ven a "knowing" violation of law need not necessarily be
considered "culpable." For example, noncompliance may
170. Id. § 102(b)(7)(ii).
171. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 7.19.
172. Id. (emphasis added). As might be expected given the evolution from the first
drafts to the completed work-product, this provision was changed from the first draft,
which would have permitted limitations on liability only so long as the conduct "did not
involve knowing misconduct, or recklessness, or otherwise surpass the level of ordinary
negligence." Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 14, § 7.06(d)(i).
173. Professor James Cox makes a quite thoughtful argument that this structure of
exculpation does a reasonable job of alleviating outside directors' legitimate concerns
about astronomical liability while not encouraging intentional violations of law by the
board: that liability for damages up to a full year's compensation for service on the board
or a full year's salary for officers will serve as an adequate deterrent against knowing
illegality. See James D. Cox, The ALl, Institutionalization,and Disclosure: The Quest for
the Outside Director'sSpine, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1233, 1253 (1993). This Article's
primary interest, of course, is in evaluating the underlying concept of law animating the
ALI, and from that perspective the ALI could have (and should have) gone further in
communicating the message that corporate compliance with the law matters. Cox agrees
that the ALI did not go far enough in imposing active responsibilities on the board with
respect to monitoring the law compliance of subordinates. See id. at 1253-54.
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be justified when a law's validity or scope is legitimately in
question.... In other cases, although the violation may have
been a "knowing" one in the strict sense of that term, the
statute violated may have been only a regulatory offense that
did not carry significantcriminalpenalties. Such a violation,
particularlyif the statute or regulation is highly technical or
susceptible to various interpretations, could often be
characterizedas non-culpable.74
Recall the illustration from section 2.01 of a publicly-held
trucking company that directs its drivers to exceed the speed limits
because the corporate decision-makers conclude that to do so will
increase earnings by $400,000-$500,000 annually. 7 Recall also the
conclusion in section 2.01 that "the trucking company's action
involves a departure from the principle stated in section
2.01(b)(1).' 1 76 Ironically, given section 7.19's definition of culpable

violations, the corporate decision-makers would probably not be fully
liable to the corporation for that breach of the duty of care
(exculpatory clauses would effectively shield them), since traffic
violations are generally considered the quintessential "regulatory
offenses that [do] not carry significant criminal penalties.' 77
The illustrations accompanying section 7.19 are even more
telling of the shift away from section 2.01's law-as-limit view of law.
Thus, in language strongly redolent of the equivalence Easterbrook
and Fischel draw between "penalties" and "taxes,"'7 8 an illustration

to section 7.19 provides as follows:
State A has a valid statute that imposes a "penalty" on the
sale of colored margarine. Although contained in State A's
penal law and described as an "offense," the provision is
essentially a tax, which favors the dairy industry at the
expense of producers of margarine. If Food Products Corp.
sells colored margarine in State A as the result of a decision
by its board to incur the liability, such conduct would not
amount to a "culpable violation of law" as used in § 7.19(1),
because the
legislation is chiefly intended to raise tax
179
revenues.

174. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 7.19 cmt. f (emphasis added).
175. See id. § 2.01 cmt. g, illus. 10; supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
176. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 7.19 cmt. g, illus. 10.
177. Id. § 7.19 cmt. f.
178. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 85, at 37-38. Judge Douglas Ginsburg
has drawn a similar equivalence between penalties and taxes. See infra notes 203-07 and
accompanying text.
179. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 7.19 cmt. f, illus. 1.
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While few people would go to the mat to argue for the critical
importance of a food additive law, the illustration raises a number of
questions: Why are we sure this is a "penalty," or that it is merely
"described as an 'offense?"' On whose authority has it been decided
that this is "essentially a tax" or that "the legislation is chiefly
intended to raise tax revenues?" Whose political analysis counts
when determining that the law is one that "favors the dairy industry
at the expense of producers of margarine?" Of what jurisprudential
relevance is this public choice view of the underlying legislation?80
And why should the political coalitions underlying different pieces of
legislation matter as to whether the law is worthy of a duty of civic
and political obligation (and therefore whether shareholders should
have full recourse to corporate decision-makers when those decisionmakers intentionally violate the law, necessitating payments of
penalties-cum-taxes)? 1 At the least, this illustration is indicative of
a very different view of law than that described in section 2.01-one
that permits board members to violate the law intentionally and not
even "pay the full price," particularly when regulatory law and other
"highly technical" statutes or regulations are concerned.
Looking, then, at the exhortatory statements of section 2.01 in
conjunction with the language of section 4.01 and the enforcement
provisions of sections 7.18 and 7.19 suggests a very different picture
of the importance of law compliance in the ALl Principlesthan that
of section 2.01 viewed in isolation, and suggests a decided
retrenchment from the importance of law compliance in the earliest
drafts.Y In particular, as adopted, the ALl Principles suggest that
some law violations are of little concern and non-culpable,
particularly violations of regulatory law, and that some penalties can
be understood as no more than taxes or tariffs on regulated behavior.
180. See MASHAW, supra note 73, at 20-21. Mashaw describes public choice theory as
a theory of the legislative process that interprets legislation as the outcome of selfinterested competition among interest groups for the best deal for their particular interest
group: As such, it is a theory that discounts the view that legislation generally will be
public-regarding or based on a fully-developed view of the public interest.
181. The ALI recognized that most exculpatory statutes apply only to directors, not
officers, but it was willing to extend exculpation to officers as well, given that the officers
could still potentially be liable for a year's salary. The ALI commentary indicated that
the potential liability for a year's salary would be a significant enough deterrent to
enforce the duty of care, while the potential for astronomical damages might make
corporate officers excessively risk-averse. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 7.19

cmt. c.
182 See Ryan, supra note 50, at 487 ("Section 2.01(a)'s clear obligation to comply with
general legal provisions is not carried through as an absolutely enforceable component of
fiduciary duty.").
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The Revised Model Business CorporationAct

During the same period of time that the ALl Principles were
being drafted, the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws promulgated
the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (the "RMBCA").18
The Committee's actions with respect to exculpation provisions are
directly relevant to the issue of the corporate bar's view of the
Here, too, we see
importance of corporate law compliance."

evidence of a view of law much closer to the law-as-price view of
Judges Easterbrook and Ginsburg and Professor Fischel than to the
law-as-limit view of section 2.01 of the ALI Principles.
In February of 1990, the Committee on Corporate Laws
proposed new exculpation provisions to permit corporations to
eliminate the liability of directors to the corporation or its
shareholders for violations of certain fiduciary duties.1s8 The impetus

for these revisions was the same as that which led to Delaware's
exculpation statute: the directors' and officers' liability insurance
crisis of the mid-1980s, which included both increased costs and
decreased availability, and the decision by the Delaware Supreme

Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom.186 Yet the Committee on Corporate
Laws went further than either Delaware or the ALI Principles in
permitting corporations to exculpate their board members from

personal liability for violations of the law. Thus, under the standard
of the RMBCA, a corporation can exculpate its directors for all
intentional violations of civil law, even those that would be defined as
"culpable" under the ALl Principles, and it can provide full
exculpation, rather than exculpation limited by the amount of the
director's salary, as in the ALI Principles."
183. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr (1984). See generally Branson, supra note 14, at 281-84
(discussing ABA revisions and the interaction between the ALI project and the ABA
project). The draft revisions for the RMBCA were published for comment in 1983. They
were formally promulgated for adoption in 1984. Further revisions to the duty of care,
including exculpation provisions, were promulgated in 1990. See id. at 260.
184. The Committee on Corporate Laws of the ABA is dominated by corporate
attorneys from large law firms. According to Branson, it is composed of 25 members who
are specifically invited to become members, and it is unique within the ABA in having the
authority to make final decisions without prior approval of either the Section of which it is
a part (the Section on Corporation, Banking, and Business Law) or the ABA's Board of
Governors. See Branson, supra note 14, at 260 n.5. As such, it is also good evidence of
the thinking of the corporate bar.
185. See ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Revised Model Business
CorporationAct-Amendment Pertainingto the Liability of Directors, 45 BUs. LAw. 695,
699-701 (1990) [hereinafter ABA Revisions].
186. See id. at 695 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 148 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)).
187. The exculpation provision of the RMBCA (section 2.02(b)(4)), as adopted,
provides as follows:
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The Committee on Corporate Laws never explained why
directors should be permitted to be exculpated for intentional
violations of civil law. Yet their explanation of why directors should
not be permitted to be exculpated for intentional violations of
criminal law is suggestive of the rationale behind permitting
exculpation for intentional civil law violations. The general theory
the Committee relied upon in developing the exculpation provisions
was that shareholders should be able to "allocate the economic risk
of the directors' conduct between the corporation and the directors,"
except when "important societal values are at stake."'" And yet the
Committee recognized that there needed to be some limits on the
corporation's exculpatory power, and defined that limit as improper
'
conduct that is "clearly without any societal benefit."189
The question arises, then, why intentional violations of civil law
are not within the category of conduct that is "so clearly without any
societal benefit that the law should not appear to endorse such
conduct."'
The specific rationale for not permitting exculpation of
intentional violations of the criminal law sheds some light on this
question:
Historically, the criminal law has represented society's
statement of the conduct that it most emphatically rejects.
Accordingly, even though a director committing a crime
may intend to benefit the corporation, the shareholders
should not be permitted to exculpate him for any harm
caused by his crime, including, for example, fines and legal
expenses of the corporation in defending a criminal
prosecution.'
The distinction the ABA drew, then, between intentional
§ 2.02. Articles of Incorporation
(b) The articles of incorporation may set forth:
(4) a provision eliminating or limiting the liability of a director to the
corporation or its shareholders for money damages for any action
taken, or any failure to take any action, as a director, except liability
for (A) the amount of a financial benefit received by a director to
which he is not entitled; (B) an intentional infliction of harm on the
corporation or the shareholders; (C) [approving an improper dividend];
or (D) an intentionalviolation of criminallaw;...
MODEL Bus. CORu'. ACr ANN.

188.
189.
190.
191.

§ 2.02(b) (1996) (emphasis added).
ABA Revisions, supra note 185, at 700.
IL at 701.
Id.
Id.at 703.
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violations of civil law and intentional violations of criminal law is
suggestive of portions of the law-as-price view of law, and in
particular the notion that only criminal law truly prohibits actions,
while civil law generally prices actions. 19 It is also suggestive of the
notion that sometimes violating the law and accepting the known
consequences of doing so is permissible as a normative concept of
law, and may even be of social benefit, particularly when a regulatory
rather than criminal norm is concerned. 193 At the least, the
Committee was unwilling to conclude that intentional violations of
benefit that the law should not
civil law "are so clearly without social
1 94
be willing to endorse such conduct.'
IV. A DEVELOPING JURISPRUDENCE I: EFFICIENT BREACH IN THE
LAW

It is an important conceptual development that writers and
corporate law thinkers have begun to adopt a view of law that
suggests that intentional violations of some categories of law,
particularly civil, regulatory law, are relatively unimportant-in fact,
so unimportant that they may be characterized as,non-culpable-and
that some types of penalties for violating the law can be treated as
prices or as an alternative system of taxation. Yet, it is far more
important that these and related ideas have begun to have an effect
on decided cases, suggesting either a right to break the law so long as
one is willing to risk the penalties ("efficient breach") or that the
amount of money a corporation should invest in compliance with a
particular law is a function of the penalty, which also determines the
importance of the law and whether the corporation should take it
This Article describes and
seriously ("efficient compliance").
to efficient breach.
first
turning
criticizes both views below,
A.

Discussionsin the Case Law

One of the first opinions explicitly incorporating the efficient
breach theory of law was Branton v. Federal Communications
Commission, 95 a 1993 decision authored by Judge Douglas Ginsburg
on behalf of a panel that included Judges James Buckley and Stephen
Williams. 96 Branton involved a petition for review of a letter ruling
192. See Pepper, supra note 9, at 1559.
193. See Smith v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 981 F.2d 1326, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(advancing that view in a decision by Judge Douglas Ginsburg).
194. ABA Revisions, supra note 185, at 701.
195. 993 F.2d 906 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
196. See id. at 907. Douglas Ginsburg is commonly recognized as a devotee of law and
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by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") refusing to
impose penalties on National Public Radio ("NPR") pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1464 for allegedly broadcasting material that was obscene or
indecent.' 7 Plaintiff Peter Branton, a citizen, complained to the FCC
about an NPR broadcast that included evidence from the trial of
John Gotti, an alleged leader of a crime syndicate in New York City.
The evidence included a tape recording that was heavily peppered
with "the f-word." As the court delicately put it, in the 110-word
passage, Gotti used "the f-word" to modify "virtually every noun and
19
in one instance even a verb ('I'll f-ing kill you').""

The Mass Media

Bureau of the FCC found that the broadcast was "not actionably
indecent" and refused to bring charges against NPR; the plaintiff
challenged this decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. Not surprisingly, the court dismissed
the plaintiff's petition for review of the FCC determination for lack
of standing.1 9
In dismissing the plaintiff's petition, the court first constructed
what it thought his argument for standing would be, since Branton
sought neither damages for the past offense to his sensibilities, nor an
injunction; rather, he sought the imposition of sanctions against NPR.
Thus, Judge Ginsburg suggested that "[ijf the petitioner suffers any
continuing injury, we suppose it is in the nature of the increased
probability that, should the NPR broadcast go unsanctioned, he will
be exposed in the future to similar indecencies over the airwaves. '20
But this argument foundered for lack of the immediacy of harm
necessary to establish standing, and from lack of causation and
redressability.
The court was particularly loathe to find
redressability, since any impact the plaintiff would view as favorable
from the sanctions (reducing programming of "indecent" material)
would depend entirely on the reactions of third parties-NPR and
other radio stations-to the FCC's imposing sanctions. The court
thought the reactions of NPR and other radio stations were not
predictable and, in particular, that it was not inevitable that the
economics, while Stephen Williams is one of a number of judges who has recently been
described by Professor Tom Ulen as particularly influenced by law and economics. See
Ulen, supra note 23, at 434 n.3.
197. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1984). At that time, § 1464 authorized fines of $10,000, or
imprisonment for two years, for radio broadcasts deemed obscene, indecent or containing
profane language. See id. The statute has since been amended, and no longer set out
specific monetary penalties. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994).
198. Branton, 993 F.2d at 908.
199. See id.

200. Id at 909.
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possibility of being fined would reduce the amount of "indecent"
programming. Judge Ginsburg wrote:
For example, radio stations might well decide that the
benefits of broadcasting indecent language of the sort
petitioner here challenges outweigh the costs of making
certain payments to the Government (here in the form of
fines rather than of taxes). Predicting the reaction of
"public" radio stations to a monetary fine is particularly
difficult because such stations are non-profit entities.... As
a result, the court can have no confidence that the FCC's
failure to impose a sanction upon NPR will lead it or any
other broadcaster to injure the petitioner in the future2 1
But the court was troubled by the apparent contradiction
between its rationale and the rational-choice view of law compliance.
Thus the court went on to reconcile the contradiction:
This holding ... may at first seem inconsistent with the

fundamental principle that increasing the price of an activity
(i.e., broadcasting indecency) will decrease the quantity of
that activity demanded in the market, or in the language of
economics, that demand curves are downward sloping. We
would hardly undertake to doubt this basic principle,
however. Rather, our concern is with the magnitude of its
effect in this particular case (i.e., with the elasticity of
demand for broadcast indecency).
Without some reason to believe that the level of
broadcast indecency is significantly affected by the
possibility of incurring an FCC sanction, we lack a sufficient
basis for the exercise of the federal judicial power.2
There are a number of interesting aspects about the Branton
opinion. First, Judge Ginsburg was apparently unconcerned about
radio stations intentionally deciding that the benefits of violating 18
U.S.C. § 1464 outweigh the costs of paying penalties to the
government. Thus, he suggested that "radio stations might well
decide" to make that trade-off, without interjecting any pejorative
comment on that decision.2 °3 Second, note also the apparent
201. Id. at 911-12 (citations omitted).
202- Id. at 912 (citations omitted).
203. Id. at 911 (emphasis added). One important qualification here is that in the real
world it may not always be obvious to a radio station when it is broadcasting material that
is "obscene or indecent," as those terms are defined in the statute. The statute sets out
standards of behavior ("do not broadcast obscene material"), rather than rules indicating
what behavior is or is not required ("do not include the following words in a broadcast or
descriptions of the following activities in a broadcast"). Clearly, reasonable people could
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equivalence Judge Ginsburg drew between fines for violating the law
and taxes: he described paying fines to the government as making
"certain payments to the Government (here in the form of fines
rather than of taxes),"2 "4 as if any distinction between fines and taxes
is only one of form and not of substance. Third, note the underlying
rational-choice assumption, which Judge Ginsburg "hardly
2 5 that the level of demand
under[took] to doubt,""
for illegal activity
will generally respond just like the level of demand for consumer
goods such as potatoes or jeans or computers, 206 so that when the
price goes up, the demand for that good goes down (although Judge
Ginsburg did indicate that he was not certain about the elasticity of
demand for this particular illegal activity in the context of a nonprofit entity). 27
That there might be fundamental differences
between deciding to violate the law and deciding to purchase
consumer goods was not apparently credible to Judge Ginsburg.
Indeed, Judge Ginsburg could "hardly undertake to doubt" the
rational-choice view of law compliance, since he had just six months
earlier authored another opinion, Smith v. National Transportation
Safety Board,28 that had even more explicitly relied on it and
developed its normative claims. Smith involved a challenge by Don
Smith, a small-plane pilot, to an order of the National Transportation
Safety Board (the "NTSB") affirming a decision of the Federal
Aviation Authority (the "FAA"). The FAA had suspended Smith's
commercial pilot's license for sixty days for entering the Dallas-Fort
Worth terminal control area (the "TCA") in a small plane without
differ about whether a broadcast met the standard for obscene or indecent material. (For
a general discussion of the import of the distinction between standards and rules, although
using different terms for the same distinction, see Christopher D. Stone, The Place of
Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1 (1980).) The
premise of Judge Ginsburg's discussion, though, is that of a radio station deciding to
broadcast indecent language on the theory that the benefits outweigh the costs of legal
sanctions, which implies that the radio station knows or at least thinks that the material is
indecent.
204. Branton, 993 F.2d at 911.
205. Id. at 912.
206. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism and Market Illusions: The Limits of
Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1309, 1313 (1986) ("Economics may explain why
a trip to the supermarket results in the purchase of one quantity of potatoes instead of
another, or why the price of wheat is higher this year than last. But, when the
supermarket shelves present choices labeled 'contract breach,' 'theft,' or 'rescue,' we have
no reason to believe that the same assumption is appropriate. These decisions are
extraordinarily complex. They are heavily influenced by social norms and notions of
right, duty, and fairness.").
207. See Branton, 993 F.2d at 912.
208. 981 F.2d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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authorization from the terminal's air traffic controllers. 2 9 After
Smith's TCA incursion, and prior to the FAA hearing on Smith's
violation, the FAA had issued a bulletin reevaluating its sanctions
policy for TCA violations (a policy the court described as somewhat
ad hoe), and specifying that in future cases suspensions should be for
not less than sixty days. Smith's license was suspended for sixty days
pursuant to that policy.2 10 In his petition to the District of Columbia
Circuit, Smith successfully argued that the FAA could not rely on its
bulletin in suspending his license because the bulletin was not
publicly available at the time of his underlying TCA violation.2 '
The argument in the court of appeals turned on whether the
bulletin needed to be made available to the public under the
Administrative Procedure Act (the "APA")2 2 prior to someone
being charged based on the revised sanctions policy. While the
substantive requirement to contact air traffic control prior to entering
a TCA was unchanged by the bulletin, the bulletin did indicate a
tougher, more mandatory, approach to sanctions for TCA
violations.213 The APA requires that each agency make public
"administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a
member of the public," 14 and further provides that an agency may
not rely on such a manual in an enforcement proceeding if it had not
been made publicly available. Thus, the first part of the argument in
the court of appeals turned on whether the level of sanctions for
violations was something that could "affect a member of the public,"
as that phrase of the APA had been interpreted, and thus whether
publicly available before sanctions
the manual needed to have been 215
could be levied in reliance upon it.
The NTSB argued that its sanctions policy should not be deemed
to affect members of the public, because "'the severity of a sanction
... is not a proper basis for deciding whether to commit unlawful

209. See id. at 1327. A terminal control area is "airspace within which all aircraft must
be under air traffic control." RALPH NADER & WESLEY SMITH, COLLISION COURSE:
THE TRUTH ABOUT AIRLINE SAFETY 245 (1994).
210. See Smith, 981 F.2d at 1327. While Smith's initial suspension was for 60 days,
imposed by the FAA in reliance upon the new sanctions policy, an administrative law
judge reduced the suspension to 45 days given Mr. Smith's prior record, which was
exemplary, his "candor and demeanor," and his lack of notice of the new sanctions policy.
On review, the NTSB reinstated the 60-day suspension. See id.
211. See id. at 1329.
212. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C) (1994).
213. See Smith, 981 F.2d at 1329.
214. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C), cited in Smith, 981 F.2d at 1327.
215. See Smith, 981 F.2d at 1327-28.
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conduct.' ,,216 In making this argument, the NTSB relied on Capuano
v. National Transportation Safety Board,217 a First Circuit opinion
written by then-Judge, now-Justice, Steven Breyer. Capuano also
involved an FAA enforcement proceeding and whether the
enforcement manual on which it was based needed to be published in
the Federal Register18 (versus merely being available for public
inspection and copying, as was at issue in Smith).219 In an explicit
rejection of law-as-price jurisprudence, Judge Breyer held that the
FAA enforcement manual need not be published in the Federal
Register (but would need to be available for public inspection and
copying) because the manual was
not intended to affect the rights, duties, obligations, or
conduct of pilots or any other member of the public. A
pilot's obligation, under the law, is to refrain from those
activities that call for a sanction, whether that sanction is
strict or lenient, and whether the agency devotes many, or
few, staff resources to the business of catching violators. 20
In Smith, though, Judge Ginsburg, writing for the court, rejected
the NTSB's argument that its sanctions policy for TCA violations
ought not to be deemed to affect the public on a similar rationale.
Initially Judge Ginsburg indicated that the court "need not decide
today the normative question whether one 'should' consider the
sdverity of the sanction when deciding whether to engage in conduct
prohibited by regulation."'" And yet ultimately Judge Ginsburg
could not resist the temptation to proclaim his views on precisely that
question, and respond to what he characterized as Judge Breyer's
"dictum" in Capuano. He wrote:
The purpose of the APA availability requirement is
obviously to give the public notice of what the law is so that
each individual can act accordingly. Usually that means
conforming to the law, but sometimes it means violating the
law (or coming close and risking a violation) and accepting
the known consequences of doing so-especially where a
216. Id.at 1328 (quoting Capuano v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 843 F.2d 56, 58 (1st

Cir. 1988)).
217. 843 F.2d 56 (1st Cir. 1988).
218. See id. at 57.
219. See Smith, 981 F.2d at 1327.
220. Capuano, 843 F.2d at 58. Judge Breyer based his decision upon a different
provision of the APA than was at issue in Smith.
221. Smith, 981 F.2d at 1328. Judge Ginsburg reasoned that the court need not enter
the normative debate because the language of the APA seemed clearly to require making
the manual public. See id.
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regulatory rather than a moral or criminal norm is
concerned.'
Judge Ginsburg then went on to describe the underlying rationalchoice premise of this view that the level of sanctions will affect
compliance with the law, relying upon Justice Holmes's "Bad Man"

and Judge Posner's theory that an increase in the severity or
likelihood of imposition of a sanction will decrease the incidence of

violations. 3
Again, what is striking about Judge Ginsburg's rationale is the
lack of importance he attaches to obeying the law. Thus, while
knowing what the law is will usually lead to conforming to law, Judge
Ginsburg suggests with total equanimity that it can also lead to
violating the law and accepting the known consequences, particularly
in the realm of regulatory law. But note that this law seeks to ensure

the safety of air travel by permitting air traffic controllers to control
the density of air traffic surrounding airports-a far-from-trivial
goal.' That regulatory goal does not seem to have influenced Judge
Ginsburg's views, however, because he seems indifferent between

someone complying with the law or violating it and risking the
penalty. Again, no pejorative commentary attaches to the latter
choice, and the language he uses for the law-violating choice

222. Id. (emphasis added).
223. See id. (citing POSNER, supra note 3, at 5 ("[A]n increase in either the severity of
the punishment or the likelihood of its being imposed will raise the price of crime and
therefore reduce its incidence."); Becker, supra note 74; Holmes, supra note 22, at 459
("A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practiced by his
neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money,
and will want to keep out of jail if he can.")). Each of the sources Judge Ginsburg cites is
a classic work in the pantheon of rational-choice writing on law compliance; indeed, Gary
Becker first set out the theory in the Journalof PoliticalEconomics article cited by Judge
Ginsburg. Justice Holmes's "bad man" who cares nothing for an ethical rule, but who
does care about expected punishments, is, of course, the central character in the rationalchoice theory of law compliance. Arguably, though, Justice Holmes's point has been
over-extended by rational-choice theorists whose "baseline account assumes that actors
are sanction optimizers," defined as "Holmesian 'bad [men].'" Bundy & Elhauge, supra
note 17, at 274. Justice Holmes was offering an argument for the legal positivist project
of separating law from morality since at least some (but not all) people are bad men who
cannot be relied upon to be swayed by ethical rules or moral argument, but who will be
swayed by the expected penalties for violating the law. Nothing in Holmes suggests that
the "bad man" is everyman, but that is precisely the interpretation of Holmes that
informs many rational-choice theories of law compliance.
224. Within the past 15 years, there have been two mid-air collisions between
commercial airliners and small planes that have occurred within TCA airspace. In one,
the pilot of the small plane had not complied with TCA rules. See NADER & SMITH,
supra note 209, at 245-47, 251-52.

1324

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

("accepting the known consequences")
connotes accepting
responsibility for one's actions, an approach that is normally
laudatory. For a judge to suggest that this approach to the law is
appropriate as a normative matter-that one can either choose to
comply with the law or risk penalties, that either choice fulfills a
citizen's political obligations, and that it is therefore a matter of
social indifference which choice is made---misunderstands the
normative import of even regulatory law, as discussed immediately
below.
B.

The Law-as-PriceConcept Inherentin Efficient Breach of Public
Law Is FundamentallyIronic

Recall Pepper's conclusion that facts concerning the
enforcement of law should be communicated to clients, even when
those facts may help the client violate the law, except when a
potential legal violation also constitutes a serious, morally
reprehensible action. 7 Recall also Easterbrook and Fischel's view
that managers should violate the law when it is profitable, except if
the law concerns violence or other acts that are mala in se.m Judge
Ginsburg recognized a similar line of demarcation, suggesting that
the obligations of law are equally met by either conformance with the
law or violating it and accepting the known consequences, except
when a moral or criminal norm is concernedP 9
These statements reveal a fundamental irony in the law-as-price
position. According to these views, there is a narrow realm of
positive law that truly commands obedience: law that prohibits mala
in se actions, such as those constituting violence (Easterbrook and
Fischel); actions that are deemed morally reprehensible by a clear
social consensus (Pepper); and actions that involve criminal or moral
norms (Ginsburg). Often these will be the same thing. All other law,
and in particular most regulatory law, is law as cost: "[C]onduct to be
penalized in some legal fashion, but which the citizen is still free to

225. Smith, 981 F.2d at 1328.
226. Actually, Judge Ginsburg might not be indifferent about which approach a
corporation chooses: When it costs more to meet the substantive standards of the law
than a firm risks in discounted penalties, he might agree with Easterbrook and Fischel
that the firm should choose violating the law. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at
1177 n.57.
227. See Pepper, supra note 9, at 1578; supra notes 106-24 and accompanying text.
228. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 1168 n.36; supra notes 68-76 and
accompanying text.
229. See Smith, 981 F.2d at 1328; supranotes 208-26 and accompanying text.

CORPORATE COMPLIANCE

1998]
choose to do."'

1325

0

In other words, the only law that is binding operates when law is
not actually necessary to set the necessary standards of behavior. If
the behaviors that are prohibited are wrongful in their very nature,
then we do not need law to establish the standards of behavior. We
do not need laws against murder to tell us that murder is wrong, nor,
in general, do we need laws against rape or kidnapping or child abuse
or arson or burglary to communicate the necessary standards of
behavior."' These things are obviously wrong whether we have laws
to define them as wrong or not because these are actions in which
there is a "clear societal consensus" that they involve "a serious and
substantial moral wrong."'
Where we need law most, though, given the highly complex,
sophisticated, and technological post-industrial nature of society
today, is where the law-as-price view of the law would make law
impossible: precisely within the broad ambit of regulatory law.
There, we definitely need binding law to structure interactions so that
there is a level playing field among competitive economic enterprises,
so that persons are treated fairly and with respect, and so that
industrial practices include considerations of human and
environmental health and safety. It is precisely because the issues
addressed by regulatory law are so technically complex-composed
of interrelated webs of harm, causation, and subtle externalities-and
not amenable to determination by reference to obvious moral
precepts, that regulatory law is criticalP 3 Should airlines maintain
230. Pepper, supra note 9, at 1577.
231. I am not at all suggesting that these laws concerning actions mala in se can be
done away with; I merely seek to emphasize the point that these are not the critical laws
for establishing appropriate and inappropriate behavior since there often is an underlying
moral consensus that will arrive at the same, or a similar, result as the law, as contrasted
with civil, regulatory law. Of course, even in the realm of laws concerning actions that are
mala in se there will be situations at the margin where laws are necessary to establish
what behaviors are and are not wrongful: kidnapping one's own child in a custody dispute
could be subject to significant moral disagreement within society, for instance.
232. This view is particularly ironic given the underlying Holmesian legal positivism of
the law-as-price view. That is, positing a sharp separation between law and morality
generally, and seeking to reduce law to a system of simple material detriments and
consequences for given behaviors, the argument ultimately concludes that the only real
law is that which has a moral basis.
233. Indeed, many of the actions that are typically understood to be mala in se can be
argued to derive from a simpler understanding of the concepts of harm and causation.
We know that murder is harmful, for instance, as is assault and battery, or burglary, and
our legal system has recognized these as harms since the late Middle Ages; the causal
connection between the action and the harmful reaction is easily observed and readily
understood. Thus, a moral understanding that this particular action is wrongful in its
nature can develop to parallel (or to precede) the legal understanding, based on a much
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their aircraft by a thorough operational review every twenty flights or
every one hundred flights? Who knows, but in our society we have
empowered a technically expert administrative agency, the FAA,
with at least a partial mandate to protect passenger safety, to make
that decision and to impose its decision on every industry participant.
Should industrial plants discharge ammonia at a level of .050 grams
per liter of effluent or at a level of .060 grams per liter?2
Who
knows, but we have empowered the EPA to study the issue, to
consider the economic and health effects of permitting discharges of
various levels of ammonia, and to make a binding decision. It is

precisely because "most of us would not have an immediate answer"
about "whether or not it is wrong to discharge .060 grams of
ammonia per liter of water effluent" 5 that we need a rule developed
by experts who are not self-interested, and we need that rule to be
recognized as binding by all industry participants. 6 Therefore, by
simpler causal paradigm and the much more obvious nature of harm. We now live in an
era when we know the kinds of actions that can cause harm may be invisible, may take
many years to be observable, or may be extremely difficult to identify; it is not surprising
that no moral consensus has yet developed about these types of actions. Perhaps in 100
years, when (presumably) we will have much more knowledge than we do now, there will
be a clear social consensus that dumping ammonia in levels greater than .050 grams per
liter is morally reprehensible, for instance, if (hypothetically) it is found to cause
leukemia at increased rates. Today we are far from that level of knowledge, so relying
upon moral concepts of "right" and "wrong" in distinguishing law-as-limit from law-asprice is certain to be under-protective.
234. As my colleague Professor Betsy Cavendish points out, the primary justification
for regulating pollution is that of market failure (i.e., the failure of the market to
internalize properly all the negative externalities associated with pollution), rather than
technical expertise; but expertise comes into play in setting the actual standards.
235. Pepper, supra note 9, at 1576 ("[W]hether or not it is wrong to discharge .060
grams of ammonia per liter of water effluent in a rural area [where the standard is .050
grams per liter] is a question to which most of us would not have an immediate answer.
For all we know, such a discharge could be quite harmless; or if kept up for a period of
five years, it may be likely to cause several additional cancer deaths in the next forty
years. Knowing that the discharge is unlawful adds relevant information, and makes the
conduct 'wrongful' in at least one sense, but not on a parallel with burglary. The
discharge may be a technical legal violation, but it may not be wrongful in any other
significant sense."). So, although Pepper cannot rule out that the advice one gives a client
about EPA enforcement could ultimately lead to several deaths (and few lawyers
presumably have the technical expertise to evaluate such a question), he still believes that
the "autonomous" client, who is potentially the least likely to make the decision in a way
that considers the public or is objective, and who has the most (economically) to gain
from violating the law, should be the ultimate decision-maker about what the proper
standard should be (that is, whether to treat the regulatory standard as binding law or
not). See id.at 1607.
236. Of course, administrative agencies are subject to political influences, "regulatory
capture," and human imperfections that will affect the quality of their decision-making
and the trade-offs they are willing to make in balancing safety or health or environmental
welfare against the economic burdens of regulation. See, e.g., STEPHEN J.BREYER,
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denying the mandatory nature of regulatory law, the law-as-price
view denies us law precisely where we need it most: in the regulatory

arena, where there is not a social consensus, where there is not an
obvious moral component to the standards the law sets, and where

humanistic concerns and economic self-interest collide most acutely.
C. Society Is Not Indifferent ConcerningWhether Firms Choose

Compliance with the Law Versus Risking Payingthe Penalty
In addition to that fundamental irony at the core of the law-as-

price theory, there is another serious problem with the theory: the
implicit (and in some cases explicit) premise that society is indifferent
concerning whether firms choose compliance with the law rather than
society is benefited by this
risking paying the penalty, or even that
27
approach to law, is demonstrably false.

The efficient breach concept of statutory and regulatory law,
which is based on an understanding of law as a series of prices
established for the "right" to violate the law, has evolved as a direct
extension of the efficient breach of contract theory. 8 Both
Easterbrook and Fischel, separately and writing together, make this
derivation explicit.2 9 Yet their argument fails to acknowledge the
significant differences between breach of contract and breach of
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF ToXIc

SUBSTANCE REGULATION 105-54 (1988); NADER & SMITH, supra note 209. Few, if any,
regulatory regimes could not be improved if the political will existed to improve them.
Yet, as between a standard established by a government regulator concerning the precise
requirements for aircraft maintenance, for instance, and the potentially self-interested
calculation of an industry participant concerning the same subject, the former has every
indication of being more objectively derived and protective of passenger safety (therefore
even more rational, in the sense of matching means with ends) than the latter. Moreover,
the existence of a regulation does not take away all degrees of freedom for an airline.
Any airline would be perfectly free to adopt more rigorous maintenance procedures than
those required by law; they are simply not permitted to adopt less onerous procedures.
237. There are other false premises inherent in the "efficient breach" view as well.
They include: (1) that the penalties for violations of statutory and regulatory law are an
accurate proxy for the social cost of the harm imposed for actions that violate those laws;
and (2) if a corporation determines that it is profitable to violate the law, based upon its
costlbenefit analysis, the corporation has the political and moral right to engage in willful
disobedience of the law. The first premise will be criticized in Part V, see infra notes 294399 and accompanying text, in conjunction with the "efficient investment in compliance"
view; the second premise is criticized implicitly throughout this Article.
238. See supra note 3.
239. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 1157 ("Some antitrust violations are
efficient, just as some breaches of contract are efficient."); Fischel, supra note 45, at 1271
("A firm may also find it advantageous to violate a law deliberately and pay the penalty
for the same reason that an individual in some cases may prefer to breach a contract and
pay damages.").
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understanding of contract law has become so descriptively accurate
that few would contest the notion of a 'right' to breach a contract, 240
this insight about private law, even if it were true, 41 says nothing
about whether one also has a "right" to breach public, statutory law
simply by assuming a similar Holmesian equivalence between
performance and paying damages. Admittedly, there is a surface
plausibility to the analogy, since a number of influential
jurisprudential traditions emphasize a contractarian understanding of
social and political relationships.24
Yet the analogy ultimately
240. Pepper, supra note 9, at 1559. Justice Holmes's theory of contract was that a
contract is simply a set of alternative promises either to perform or to pay damages for
nonperformance, and so a person is free to break a contract if he chooses. See OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 301 (1909) ("The only universal consequence of
a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised
event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference until the
time for fulfilment has gone by, and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses.").
As consistent with his intellectual project generally, Holmes wanted to drain any moral
implications from the fact of having made a promise.
241. There is a well-developed body of work criticizing the notion of efficient breach
of contract. For a comprehensive starting point, see Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient
Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 (1989) ("The efficient breach theory of contract
raises issues of both entitlement and efficiency and succeeds on neither, as either a
normative or a descriptive matter.") and Ian R. MacNeil, Efficient Breach of Contract:
Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947, 950 (1982) ("The simple-efficient-breach analysis
is fallacious."). For a thought-provoking critique of some of the assumptions underlying
law and economics more generally, including efficient breach, see Harrison, supra note
206, at 1313.
242. Most notably, of course, is the social contract view of John Locke and Jean
Jacques Rousseau, as extended by John Rawls. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1698), reprinted in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: READINGS FROM PLATO TO GANDHI 169 (John Somerville & Ronald E.
Santoni eds., 1963) [hereinafter SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY]; RAWLS, supra
note 44; JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL RIGHT (1762), reprinted in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 179
(G.D.H. Cole trans., 1990). Yet the contractarian philosophical tradition emphasizes the
notion of an obligation to follow the law that derives from the social contract, and so is
inconsistent with Easterbrook and Fischel's argument. Developing this point in any detail
is worthy of a separate law review article, but a few general points are in order. Locke, of
course, emphasized the contractual nature of social and political organization, and in
particular emphasized the obligations of the individual to conform to the will of the
majority, given the consent of the individual underlying the establishment of democratic
political society. He wrote:
[E]very man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one
government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society, to
submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else
this original compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one society,
would signify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free and under no other
ties than he was in before in the state of nature.
LOCKE, supra, at 179. The importance of social obligation to the operation of society
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underestimates the differences between breach of contract and

breach of statutory law; it also underestimates the extent to which
performance of statutory obligations is far superior, from a social
viewpoint, to risking paying penalties. 243
Thus, contract law is a species of private, voluntary law; absent

duress, no one is required to enter into most contracts. 244 These are
once created by the original compact can be seen in the fact that Locke concludes the
Second Treatise by reiterating the point again:
To conclude: The power that every individual gave the society when he entered
into it, can never revert to the individuals again as long as the society lasts, but
will always remain in the community, because without this there can be no
community, no commonwealth, which is contrary to the original agreement.
Id. at 204. This idea was relied upon by Rawls in his work as well:
[T]he intuitive idea here is that when a number of persons engage in a mutually
advantageous cooperative venture according to certain rules and thus
voluntarily restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions
have a right to a similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited
from their submission.
RAWLS, supra note 44, at 343. Rawls did not completely ground his theory of law
compliance on the contractarian idea of voluntary consent to the institutions of the
society. Rather, he distinguished between individual obligations, which arise from the
voluntary consent of the individual to an institution or position (such as mother or publicoffice holder), and natural duties (such as natural duties to help other people and not to
be cruel), which arise without regard to the individual's voluntary consent. For Rawls, the
most important natural duty was the duty of fairness, which
requires us to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to
us.... Thus if the basic structure of society is just, or as just as it is reasonable to
expect in the circumstances, everyone has natural duty to do his part in the
existing scheme. Each is bound to these institutions independent of his
voluntary acts .... Thus even though the principles of natural duty are derived
from a contractarian point of view, they do not presuppose an act of consent,
express or tacit, or indeed any voluntary act, in order to apply.
Id. at 115. In this way, Rawls addresses a point that can be very difficult for contractarian
theories: Given that we are born into a society and did not voluntarily agree to the
institutional arrangements of that society, why do we have duties to comply with the laws
issuing from that society?
243. This paragraph ought not to be interpreted as if I agree with efficient breach of
contract, and simply disagree with its extension to efficient breach of public law; rather,
one need not reach the efficient breach of contract question to evaluate its extension. In
fact, I do not agree with efficient breach of contract, for many of the reasons Friedman
and Harrison identify, see supra notes 206, 241, and I do not even agree with the
Holmesian project of undermining the moral obligations inherent in making a promise.
Instead, I agree with Philip Soper's comment on this point, which is that "to admit that
the obligation to obey the law is on par with the obligation to keep promises is to solve
the problem of political theory." SOPER, supra note 43, at 87.
244. This is not to deny that complex problems can arise about the voluntariness of the
terms of a contract in a number of important situations, particularly when inequalities in
bargaining power may ultimately undermine the concept of "voluntariness." For
instance, in the insurance context, in order to become insured one must "voluntarily"
agree to certain health tests, or in the securities industry, in order to invest funds or
become employed one must "voluntarily" agree to arbitrate claims arising out of the
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mechanisms of economic exchange. Even Holmes recognized that
the voluntary nature of contract law is important in our view of

breach of contract

45

Public law, on the contrary, is not voluntary in

this same sense: one takes on the obligations of citizenship (which
include following the law) simply by virtue of enjoying the benefits of
society; it is impossible to live in a society without enjoying those

benefits, and thereby being required to fulfill the correlative
obligations. 2 46

Indeed, following the law has traditionally been

relationship. See Rice v. Brown Bros. Harriman & Co., No. 96 Civ. 6326 (MBM), 1997
WL 129396 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1997) (involving a plaintiff's claim contesting the
voluntariness of arbitration agreement); Pilanski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 95
Civ. 10292 DC, 1996 WL 622024 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1996) (holding that involuntariness of
agreement to arbitrate must be shown by duress or coercion); Harris v. Shearson Hayden
Stone, Inc., 441 N.Y.S.2d 70, 76 (App. Div. 1981) (upholding "voluntary" agreement to
arbitrate securities claims), affd, 435 N.E.2d 1097 (1982). See generally 13 SAMUEL
WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACrS § 1601
(3d ed. 1970 & Supp. 1996) (describing early cases involving duress).
245. See HOLMES, supra note 240, at 237 ("As the relation of contractor and
contractee is voluntary, the consequences attaching to the relation must be voluntary.").
Of course, one can argue that a moral principle of fidelity should operate more strongly in
the contract situation because one did voluntarily choose to bind oneself to enter the
contract, and one did choose this particular contract over another and chose the terms of
the contract (subject to the caveat concerning voluntariness discussed above).
246. The idea that political obligation may be based on having received the benefits of
living in a society is of classical derivation, having been expressed by Socrates in the Crito.
See Plato, The Crito,reprintedin SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supranote 242, at
46, 55-56. More recently, the idea has been developed by John Rawls as an implication of
justice as fairness. See RAWLS, supra note 44, at 110-12. Rawls explains the point as
follows:
[A] person is required to do his part as defined by the rules of an institution
when two conditions are met: first, the institution is just (or fair), that is, it
satisfies the two principles of justice; and second, one has voluntarily accepted
the benefits of the arrangement or taken advantage of the opportunities it offers
to further one's interests. The main idea is that when a number of persons
engage in a mutually advantageous cooperative venture according to rules, and
thus restrict their liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages for all, those who
have submitted to these restrictions have a right to a similar acquiescence on the
part of those who have benefited from their submission.
Id. at 111-12. For this latter insight, Rawls credits H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural
Rights?, 64 PHIL. REv. 175, 185 (1955). See RAWLS, supra note 44, at 112 n.27. Not
everyone agrees that having accepted the benefits of a society creates a correlative
obligation to that society: Noted Libertarian Robert Nozick has criticized the idea. See
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 90-95 (1974). Nozick would "[a]t the
very least ... wantj- to build into the principle of fairness the condition that the benefits
to a person from the actions of the others are greater than the costs to him of doing his
share," but even "[i]f the principle of fairness were modified so as to contain this very
strong condition, it still would be objectionable." Id. at 94. Nozick concludes that
the fact that we partially are "social products" in that we benefit from current
patterns and forms created by the multitudinous actions of a long string of long-
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thought of as the absolute minimum component of a citizen's duty to
her society. 247

Related to this point is one based on the underlying norms or
values of contract law, as opposed to public, statutory law. These

norms point in different directions and are effectuated by a different
relationship between the individual and her society. 4

Thus, the

underlying norms of contract law are autonomy and individualism:
"[T]he contract paradigm expresses the basic norm that individuals
should be able to agree between and among themselves how to
Absent unusual circumstances, society,
allocate resources. '" 9
through the auspices of the courts, will not even enter into the

relationship, at least not so far as judging the fairness of the terms of
the contract or whether parties should or should not engage in the

underlying terms of exchange.' In contrast, the underlying norm of
regulation is that of social obligation and responsibility, and the
forgotten people, forms which include institutions, ways of doing things, and
language ...does not create in us a general floating debt which the current
society can collect and use as it will.
Id. at 95. Rather, Nozick would seek to ground political obligation on "persons'
consentingto cooperate and limit their own activities." Id.
For an interesting third path grounding the duty to comply with law neither on the
benefits received, as Rawls did, nor on consent, as Nozick did, but on reason, see SOPER,
supra note 43, at 76-90. Soper suggests that the following conditions are sufficient to
establish political obligation:
(1) the fact that the enterprise of law in general-including the particular
system, defective though it may be, that confronts an individual-is better than
no law at all; and (2) a good faith effort by those in charge to govern in the
interests of the entire community, including the dissenting individual.
Id. at 80.
247. For example, see Lon Fuller's discussion of the distinction between the duty of
obligation (including following the law) and the duty of aspiration (pursuing excellence
and virtue). See FULLER, supra note 44, at 5. A similar idea is found in Rawls's
discussion of duties and obligations, as distinct from goodness. See RAWLS, supra note 44,
at 210; see also Stone, supra note 38, at 559 (positing that being responsible requires more
than just being law-abiding, but involves being morally reflective as well).
248. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389 (Cal. 1988) ("The
distinction between tort and contract is well grounded in common law, and divergent
objectives underlie the remedies created in the two areas. Whereas contract actions are
created to enforce the intentions of the parties to the agreement, tort law is primarily
designed to vindicate 'social policy.'" (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 613 (4th ed. 1971))).
249. William Powers, Jr., Border Wars, 72 TEx. L. REV.1209, 1211 (1994).
250. Of course there are limits on this statement, such as if one party brings a claim of
overreaching, or duress, or claims that the contract was void as against public policy, for
instance, but the statement is generally true. See Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev.,
Inc., 204 Cal. Rptr. 86, 91 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding a settlement agreement unenforceable
when it resulted from duress); Ekl v. Knecht, 585 N.E.2d 156, 163 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(holding a contract unenforceable when it resulted from duress).
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process is one of society, through the legislature and administrative
agencies, setting out what constitutes minimally acceptable
behavior." There is no obvious reason why conclusions from a
paradigm that effectuates individual freedom should apply at all to a
paradigm that effectuates the processes of social control-control
that is necessary, given the size of the population, in order to
maintain any realm of individual freedom. z2
Yet another distinction is that parties to a contract can be
presumed to know their rights, to know when the contract has been
breached (or when at least one party thinks it has been breached),
and to be able to insist on compensation as defined in the contract.
Even the most ardent advocates of the theory of efficient breach of
contract recognize that actual compensation is required, or the goal
of the theory (efficiency) will not be well-served. Thus, Judge Posner
has relied upon this point in ruling on efficient breach, stating that
"efficiency is promoted by allowing him to break his promise,
provided he makes good the promisee's actual losses."'z53 The same
cannot be said about breach of public law: Affected individuals may
not know of their rights or that their rights have been infringed upon;
or there may be strong disincentives to insisting on one's rights based
on the nature of the relationship (for example, employer/employee or
landlord/tenant); or public enforcement agencies may not know of
law violations, since violators will have every incentive to hide their
conduct; or compensation (paying the penalties) may not occur for
many reasons unrelated to the underlying conduct, such as the
difficulty and expense of enforcing one's rights in court, relative to
the amount of money at issue. Even when compensation does occur,
the costs associated with asserting one's rights, particularly if
attorneys' fees are not recoverable, may lead to net economic losses.
So, taking the parameters of efficient breach of contract as a model, if
the goal of "efficient breach of public law" is efficiency, it will not be
well-served by behavior that merely risks paying penalties, rather
than actually paying them.
But, given the significant differences between "efficient breach
of contract" and "efficient breach of public law," society is still the
251. See Powers, supra note 249, at 1212.
252 See SOPER, supra note 43, at 81 ("It is, after all, hard to find a genuine anarchist
among contemporary political theorists. Even those most critical of state intrusions on
individual liberty remain persuaded of the legitimacy of the state, however
'ultraminimal.' ").
253. Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasis
added).
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net loser under the Easterbrook/Fischel view of the law even if there
is compensation, given the nature of many of the types of harm
caused by failing to comply with one's statutory and regulatory
obligations. Since the harm caused by breach of contract is primarily
economic, it can often be fully compensated by monetary damages.
Significantly, when money damages will not equally compensate a
promisee, the courts demand specific performance. 4 In the realm of
public law, specific performance of statutory obligations is always far
superior to having putative defendants paying penalties when the
harm to be avoided is not primarily economic. Even in those
instances in which the harm to be avoided by a particular statute is
purely economic, statutory compliance will usually be preferable. A
number of examples can best illustrate these points.
1. Violations of Laws Regulating Economic Harm
The overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act65
("FLSA") establish the general rule that employees must be
compensated at not less than one and one-half times their regular
rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a single
work week.26
These overtime provisions do not apply to
professional, managerial, or administrative employees, as those terms
are defined in regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor. 7
Recently, the Employer Policy Foundation, which is an employersponsored policy institute in Washington, D.C., issued a report
estimating that employees would be paid an additional $19 billion a
year if violations of these overtime rules were not so common.28
254. See Vincent v. Vits, 566 N.E.2d 818, 819-20 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991) (holding that
specific performance is permitted in real estate, given the unique nature of real estate); cf.
Klein v. PepsiCo, Inc., 845 F.2d 76, 80 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that specific performance
was not appropriate when damages would fully compensate injured party for defendant's
failure to sell corporate jet as promised); Van Wagner Adver. Corp. v. S & M Enters., 492
N.E.2d 756, 759-60 (1986) (holding that specific performance of contract to lease
"unique" billboard space was properly denied when damages were adequate remedy).
For an argument that courts should more uniformly award specific performance instead of
expectation damages for remedy of contract breach, see Thomas S.Ulen, The Efficiency
of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L.
REv. 341 (1984).
255. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994).
256. See id. § 207(a)(1).

257. See id. § 213(a)(1).
258. See G. Pascal Zachary, Shortchanged: Many Firms Refuse to Pay for Overtime,
Employees Complain,WALL ST. J., June 24, 1996, at Al. Violations occur in a number of
ways, as described in the Wall Street Journalarticle:
[M]any employers may deliberately evade federal rules by ...arbitrarily
exempting workers from overtime pay. In other cases, workplace changes, due
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While the U.S. Department of Labor initiates 20,000 cases a year
challenging overtime violations and wins settlements for employees
in ninety percent of them, s9 the extent of the problem
clearly
26
overwhelms the Department's enforcement capabilities.
A number of points can be made about this example, which is an
instance in which the harm to be avoided is purely economic. First,
employers are not "efficiently" breaching the law and paying the
penalties. They are violating the law and not paying either the
penalties or overtime legitimately owed to their employees absent
enforcement actions. 26 1 This should more properly be called stealing
or cheating, rather than "efficient breach of law." Moreover, it
cannot be argued that this is a law that, through the processes of
desuetude, has become "not law." Society has established a labor
standard and, through the auspices of the Department of Labor, is
attempting to enforce it; in setting that standard the economic
interests of employers were no doubt well represented and seriously
considered. Certainly the extent of Labor Department enforcement
is constrained by the number of investigators. Yet it would be quite a
cynical argument to suggest that the low level of investigators is
indicative of an underlying lack of seriousness about enforcement of
this law that borders on desuetude. Rather, there is a limit to how
many resources our society can spend to enforce any of its laws, given
all the other competing priorities for the use of funds. To a very
to corporate downsizing and pushing authority down through the ranks, makes it
harder for employers to know which jobs are or aren't exempt.

Id.

Some employers cut through the confusion by ignoring overtime rules.
Many small companies, to avoid getting caught, don't keep time records, concoct
phony ones or hire the same person under several names, federal inspectors
say....
Larger companies are more likely to take a see-no-evil approach. They
issue guidelines making overtime pay mandatory, punish employees who work
extra hours without permission and yet raise productivity targets. When
employees work off the clock to meet those targets, supervisors look the other
way ...

259. See id.
260. In 1996, the Department of Labor had only 800 investigators, and they also
investigated and prosecuted violations of minimum wage laws, child labor laws, and other
workplace rules. See id.
261. As may be expected, certain industries are violating these statutory provisions
and administrative regulations more than others: The Wall Street Journalanalyzed 74,514
cases brought by the Department of Labor from 1991 through 1995, and found that "some
industries, such as railroad and tobacco, had almost no violations, while industries such as
construction and apparel were cited for illegally denying overtime to one out of every 50
workers during the period." Id.
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great extent, society needs to rely upon a reservoir of law-abidingness
as an "enforcement" tool. To the extent that the efficient breach
theory undermines that reservoir and legitimizes violations of law, it

is to be condemned.
In their defense, some employers contend that the requirements
are uncertain, and, indeed, there are conflicts in the circuits about
key provisions in the rules. 262 Doubtless there are numerous
instances in which well-meaning employers are unable to determine

if a particular employee performs administrative, managerial, or
executive functions, as defined in the regulations, and so is exempt
from overtime. Yet the fact that ninety percent of cases are settled
favorably to employees seems to belie the contention that what is

required is uncertain. Rather, in many instances, there is a clear
economic incentive for employers to violate the law, since the

damages are usually money owed for the prior two years' overtime
(or three years for a willful violation) and the delays in getting a
judgment can be considerable (which, given the time value of money,
operates to the employer's benefit).' In most instances, employers
can violate these laws with impunity, notwithstanding the social
consensus, as expressed in the statute, that non-professional
employees ought not to be required to work overtime without

appropriate compensation.2 4 Since most employers who violate
these laws are merely risking paying penalties, not actually paying
them, the ultimate effect of this "efficient breach of law" is
wrongfully to redistribute $19 billion per year from workers (who are

262. For instance, different circuits have adopted different tests to determine whether
an employee is a managerial employee, and therefore exempt from receiving overtime.
Compare Hays v. City of Pauls Valley, 74 F.3d 1002, 1007 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that in
evaluating whether employee's primary duties are managerial, more than 50% of time
must be spent on managerial activities), with Bankston v. Illinois, 60 F.3d 1249, 1252 (7th
Cir. 1995) (holding that in evaluating primary duties, at least 80% of primary duties must
be managerial).
263. See MATrHEW W. FINKIN ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL
EMPLOYEE 238-39 (2d ed. 1996). Double damages are possible, although discretionary:
The trial court has the authority to reduce the double-damage aspect if it finds that the
employer acted in good faith. See 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1994).
264. There are a number of factors that make these kinds of violations particularly
difficult for aggrieved individuals to police. Many people may not know of their legal
rights or may be hesitant to insist upon them even if they know about the law. Employers
in most instances wield more power than employees, particularly in the current economic
environment of downsizing, outsourcing, and relocating production to foreign countries.
Employers may fail to keep the records required by FLSA; absent those records, these
cases are difficult to prove, particularly since co-workers may be unwilling to testify
against their employers.
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also consumers) to employers.265 These kinds of uncompensated
distributions from employee to employer ought not be dignified
under the rubric of increasing efficiency.
2. Violations of Laws Regulating Non-Economic Harm
In many (and perhaps most) instances the harm to be prevented
by a statute or regulatory enactment is not purely economic; in such
cases "specific performance" is even more obviously superior to the
risk of paying penalties, or even paying the penalties. Speed limits
are one such type of law. Pepper's writing would suggest that speed
limits are the essence of a malum prohibitum law, firmly located in
the realm of law-as-price. 266 In contrast, in commentary to section
2.01 the ALI stated that it would not be permissible for the relevant
decision-maker at a trucking firm to instruct its drivers to exceed the
speed limit by twenty miles per hour in order to save $400,000500,000 per year (although that message of section 2.01 was
significantly qualified, as discussed above).267 In other words,
according to the ALI the penalties for violating speed limits are not
to be treated as simply another cost of doing business. When the
underlying policy goals animating speed limits are examined,28it is
evident that the unqbalified ALI exhortatory position is correct.
Thus, setting speed limits is not simply an economic decision or a
revenue-generating device for local taxing authorities, although
economics plays a part and speed limits can seem to be a revenue
265. See Zachary, supra note 258, at Al. Similar dynamics operate in other instances
in which the harm to be avoided is purely economic. For example, the SEC Discretionary
Accounts Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7 (1997), prohibits "churning," which is defined as
excessive trading (either in size of trades or frequency) by a broker who has discretionary
authority over a customer's account. The purpose of churning is to generate commissions
for the broker. This rule may be violated easily. Here again, people often will not know
the law, or will not know that it has been violated, or may be unwilling to bring legal
actions to get reimbursement for commissions extracted in violation of anti-churning laws
until the amount of money at issue becomes significant. A priori there is no obvious
reason why a large distributional effect from shareholders to stockbrokers is a good thing;
and even if it would be a good thing for some reason, there is a directive from the SEC to
the contrary. Other examples from the labor field are, unfortunately, also prevalent, as
Pepper has noted. See Pepper, supra note 9, at 1592 (quoted supra in note 57).
266. See Pepper, supra note 9, at 1561-62; see also Beveridge, supra note 152, at 731
n.9 (suggesting that "[t]he recently repealed 1974 federally mandated 55 mph speed limit
is a particularly poor choice as an example of a law which should command undeviatingly
strict compliance [in § 2.01]," because, according to a Wall Street Journalreport, "the top
speed of 85% of cars on the road is 64.1 mph" (citing Quentin Hardy, Westerners Rev up
to Speed Legally Again, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13,1995, at B1)).
267. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 2.01 cmt. f, illus. 10; see also supra notes
129-82 and accompanying text (discussing how section 2.01 is qualified by other sections).
268. See supra notes 48-67 and accompanying text (discussing the ALI position).
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generating device in certain states on certain holiday weekends. In
setting speed limits, the primary goal is obviously safety: the higher

the speed limit, the higher the fatality rate in serious automobile
accidents. 26 9 A secondary goal is to reduce the environmental impact

of driving: driving fifty-five miles per hour instead of sixty-five
results in reduced gasoline consumption, which in turn reduces air
Reducing air pollution produces corollary health
pollution."
benefits.

1

And during the 1970s, reducing gasoline consumption was

also tied to the policy goal of reducing American dependence on
foreign oil.
Moreover, in setting speed limits, the legislature and various
administrative agencies balance the economic costs of lower speed
limits (including increased transportation time to ship goods) with
the social benefits of safety, health, and environmental protection.272
269. Many of these points were made in congressional testimony in 1995 when
Congress was considering permitting states to raise their speed limits from 55 mph to 65
mph while still retaining eligibility for federal transportation funds. See generally H.R.
REP. No. 104-246, at 134 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 522, 571 (describing
testimony on economic, environmental, and safety effects of higher speed limits);
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Transp. of the
House Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 261 (1995) (statement of Michael F.
Dineen, Vice-President of Kemper National Insurance Co.) ("The physical forces in a
crash double with every 10 mph increment of speed above 50 mph. At 60 mph, a crash is
twice as deadly as at 50 mph, and at 70 mph it is four times as deadly."); Legislation to
Approve the Nat'l Highway Sys. and Ancillary Issues Relating to Highway and Transit
Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportationof the House Comm.
on Transp. and Infrastructure, 104th Cong. 705 (1995) (statement of Stephen Hargarten,
M.D., Interim Chairman for the Department of Emergency Medicine at the Medical
College of Wisconsin) (expressing concern that raising speed limits increases the number
of vehicles driving over 70 mph, at which speed crashes are four times as deadly as at 50
mph; in New Mexico, the first state to raise its speed limit to 65 mph, about 40% of all
cars were exceeding 70 mph, as were 20% of large trucks).
270. See Domestic Petroleum Production and Int'l Supply: HearingBefore the Senate
Comm. on Energy and Nat Resources, 104th Cong. 15 (1995) (statement of William
White, Deputy Secretary of Energy) (discussing increased consumption of gasoline at
increased speed limits).
271. See, e.g., John J. Fialka, Clinton Backs Rules CoveringAir Pollution,WALL ST. J.,
June 26, 1997, at A4; John J. Fialka, EPA Plan to Tighten Pollution Rules Continues to
Divide White House Aides, WALL. ST. J., June 6,1997, at A16.
272. During the Carter administration, efforts began to centralize review of proposed
regulations in the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"). These efforts were
expanded during the Reagan administration, which issued Executive Order No. 12,291, 46
Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). President Reagan's executive order stated, inter alia, that
"[r]egulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society from
the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society"; it developed a specific process for
each agency to develop a Regulatory Impact Analysis to identify and quantify, when
possible, all of the costs and benefits of a proposed regulation, and who is likely to bear
those costs, and it provided for review by OMB. See Executive Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed.
Reg. 13,193 (1981); STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE
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It is reasonable to assume that the economic interests of corporate
entities are well-represented in the legislative and administrativeagency process as a general matter.273 So, for individual corporations
to determine that they will violate the law because the potential costs
to them of compliance are outweighed by the potential costs and
benefits of violation creates a "double-counting" problem: the
legislature has already considered the costs to industry of regulatory
compliance in making its determination. In a democracy, if the
corporation disagrees with the legislature, there are ways to seek to
change that determination short of economic vigilantism. 274 Because

general compliance with the law will promote the legislative goals of
safety, health, and environmental protection, general compliance is
far superior to general non-compliance coupled with some
percentage of people paying traffic tickets to various local
authorities.27 5
The argument that compliance is socially preferable to paying
penalties is even stronger with respect to statutes and regulations that
seek to prevent harms that are primarily non-economic, such as
276
health or safety statutes (the Occupational Safety and Health Act
7
2
being a prime example), environmental statutes (the Clean Air Act
or the Clean Water Act,278 for instance) or civil rights statutes (such
as the Americans with Disabilities Act27 9 or the Civil Rights Act20 ).

LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 108-09 (3d ed. 1992) (citing Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46
Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981)). President Clinton has continued the approach of having OMB
review individual agency proposals, while making clear that non-economic costs and
benefits must also be included in the cost/benefit analysis. See id.
273. See, e.g., Legislation to Approve the Nat'l Highway Sys. and Ancillary Issues
Relating to Highway and Transit Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Surface
Transportationof the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 104th Cong. 791-94
(1995) (statement of Scott Wexler, on behalf of the National Licensed Beverage
Association) (articulating support for the elimination of speed limits and other changes in
highway safety laws).
274. This argument does not even address the considerable difficulties with the
efficient breach view of law from the perspective of political obligation.
275. One response from the law-as-price advocate could be that it is rhetorical
"stacking the deck" to posit such widespread disobedience to speed limits such that the
disobedience could have a demonstrable effect on the goals of safety, health, and
environmental protection. That response is unpersuasive, since it suggests an approach to
law for oneself, or within one's industry, that one recognizes would undermine the
substantive goals of a particular law if adopted as a general matter. Certainly a theory
about law, and about political obligation, that is possible only so long as a minority of
people adopt the theory is suspect.
276. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1994).
277. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1994).
278. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
279. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).

1998]

CORPORATE COMPLIANCE

1339

The purposes of these statutes are to promote health, safety, dignity,
equality, and environmental protection; they are not simply
alternative types of revenue-raising devices. Compensation ex post
for an arm lost or a daughter killed in an industrial accident or a
water table that is lethal or a human spirit that is heavy with being
judged as a type and not as an individual is better than no
compensation at all, but it is a distinct second-best alternative to
being the beneficiary of good faith efforts to comply fully with the
protective goals of the law ex ante.2 1 While the costs of these
"intangible" harms can be given an economic value for purposes of
compensation ex post, to confuse the economic value of after-the-fact
compensation with the actual human (and environmental) costs of
non-economic harm is like an occupant of Plato's cave confusing the
shadows of reality for the real thing.
Even if the analogy between breaching a contract and breaching
a public law were a good one-and it is not, for the reasons identified
above-"specific performance" of statutory obligations is always
superior to risking penalties, even when the underlying statute aims
at preventing economic harm (because of distributional effects), but
in particular when the underlying statute seeks to prevent various
kinds of non-economic harm that are badly compensated, if at all, in
money. Taking this "moralistic approach to the meaning of ...
law, '' m must one then argue that every law is equally important? On
one interpretation, what the "law-as-prohibition" versus "law-ascost" approach seems to be getting at is the obviously correct idea
that some laws are more important than other laws. So, are OSHA
regulations requiring posting of inspection information, or a
Delaware statute requiring corporations to keep a list of their current
shareholders available in Delaware for shareholders to inspect and
copy, as important as FAA regulations governing commercial airline
maintenance and equipment requirements? And are each of these
laws as important as laws prohibiting murder? Of course not. It is
not a necessary corollary to an argument that the penalties for
violations of the law cannot be treated as a price tag for the right to
280. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
281. The point that many harms are badly compensated in money is, of course, wellrecognized in law and economics. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND

ECONOMICs 306 (2d ed. 1997) ("Compensatory damages are intended to 'make the victim
whole.' In some circumstances, this is impossible. For example, when a child is killed in a

tortious accident damages cannot be computed on the formula, 'Find a sum of money
such that the parents are indifferent between having the money and a dead child, and not
having the money and having their child alive.' ").

282. Engel, supra note 4, at 45.
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violate the law that one assume every law is equally important. The
importance of a law is determined by its purposes and the harm it
seeks to prevent or ameliorate. 3 A law seeking to prevent an
immediate death is obviously of paramount importance because of
the irrevocability of the harm. Laws such as airline maintenance
requirements seeking to prevent a very small possibility of death or
serious injury are somewhat less important (although still extremely
important), since some huge proportion of individuals will "beat the
odds" no matter how bad airline maintenance becomes.2 4 The law
on corporate shareholders' lists is less important still (except perhaps
to shareholders and institutions ready and willing to engage in proxy
contests), and the OSHA posting requirements are less important
than each of the others, since failure to post required information is
not, in itself, likely to result in an injury or illness.
And yet to recognize that there is a range of importance of law
does not mean that there is a range of permissible fidelity to the law
that goes to zero, simply because one is willing to risk the imposition
of a penalty. Unless a law explicitly and clearly imposes a tax or
tariff on behavior, even the most objectively unimportant, purely
administrative law with no distributive, health, safety, environmental,
or existential implications (hereinafter "unimportant law")
establishes a minimum standard of behavior that may not be
overcome by a corporate or individual actor's private economic
benefit (assuming the underlying political system is worthy of
fidelity). 5 That is the ideal.26 The vagaries and imperfections of
283. Soper suggests that the importance of a law can affect the weight of the obligation
to obey, such that the moral culpability of not fulfilling the obligation to obey is directly
proportional to the seriousness with which those who would demand others' compliance
with a particular law would view disobedience. See SOPER, supra note 43, at 87. The
insight that there is a range of weight to the prima facie obligation to comply with law is
an important one, since it comports with our collective sense that some laws are more
important than others and that the moral wrong of a failure to comply will also vary with
the importance of law. But Soper does not suggest that at some point the obligation to
comply disappears, except in the case of desuetude: "[A] law that nobody cares about
anymore simply does not obligate, legally or otherwise." Id.
284. In 1991, Eastern Air Lines, Inc., pled guilty to criminal charges arising out of a
pattern of falsifying maintenance records by stating that required maintenance
procedures had been performed when they had not. See United States v. Upton, 856 F.
Supp. 727, 733 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). Those charges arose out of Eastern's falsifying
maintenance records beginning in 1985 "to, on or about February 1989," and, according
to the FAA, flying aircraft that were "not in an airworthy condition." NADER & SMITH,
supra note 209, at 325. Fortunately, no Eastern Air Line airplanes crashed during that
period of time. See id. at 353-54 app.
285. See SOPER, supra note 43, at 87. Indeed, where a law is unimportant in the sense
this Article has defined (protects neither health, safety, dignity, environmental
cleanliness, nor economic rights), the fact of compliance as an act of political faith or
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human beings being what they are, the ideal will never be fully
realized. And yet we ought not to sully our ideals about law by
undermining the meaning of law ab initio, turning it into a price tag,
available to be risked by anyone who can afford it, and then, further
to undermine the ideal, dignify that erosion by calling disobedience
"efficient" and suggesting that it is to society's benefit.
The one qualification I would add here is to acknowledge that
many theories of law have recognized a right of the individual to
refuse to comply with a law that is fundamentally morally abhorrent
John
to that individual-that is, the right of civil disobedience.'
Rawls defines the issue as that of conflicting duties: "At what point
does the duty to comply with laws enacted by a legislative majority
(or with executive acts supported by such a majority) cease to be
binding in view of the right to defend one's liberties and the duty to
oppose injustice?"' But Rawls's definition of civil disobedience-as
a public, conscientious political act contrary to law, usually done to
bring about a change in the law-shows that there are determinative
differences between civil disobedience and the so-called efficient
breach of law. 9 Thus, civil disobedience presupposes an open
violation of law with the expectation and goal that sanctions will be
imposed. And, as traditionally understood, it is motivated by deeply
held moral views about the injustice of a particular law or legal
structure and is based upon a theory of public benefits from changing
the law, with no expectation of personal profit. This motivation is
quite different than that of a secret violation of law-hoping to
escape sanctions, based upon a calculation of private economic
benefits to a particular corporation, the purpose of which is selfresponsibility or even maturity may be more important than any other positive social
benefits from compliance.
286. This is not a surprising assertion, although in the context of today's processdominated, Holmesian, law-and-economics-influenced, positivist view of law, it may
sound quite naive, even quaint. Yet arguments against the concept of political obligation
to law are a relatively new phenomenon. As Philip Soper has put the point,
"Philosophers, after all, have only recently begun to argue against the existence of a
[prima facie obligation to comply with the law]; most moral philosophers who have
shaped Western consciousness, from Plato to Kant, seem to have assumed or explicitly
argued for [such an obligation]." SOPER, supra note 43, at 94. Soper points to M.B.E.
Smith and Joseph Raz as among the political philosophers who have begun to question
the notion of a prima facie obligation to obey the law. See JOSEPH RAZ, The Obligation
to Obey the Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 233
(1979); Joseph Raz, Authority and Consent, 67 VA. L. REV. 103 (1981); Smith, supra note
43.
287. See RAWLS, supra note 44, at 363.

288. Id.
289. See id
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interested profit-making.
One possible rejoinder is to suggest that personal autonomy is
being actuated by the law-as-price view, and that vindicating this sort
of personal autonomy is the equivalent of vindicating a deeply felt,
2
conscientious moral objection in the theory of civil disobedience. 1
Yet it is an odd sort of autonomy-interest to posit, since a
majoritarian moral consensus can override it, as can the moral views
of an individual lawyer counseling her clients. Thus, Easterbrook
and Fischel recognize that the autonomy interest leading to violations
of law can be overridden by "laws concerning violence or other acts
thought to be malum in se," thus giving substantial play to the
dominant moral consensus about what is and is not malum in se.29 1
And Pepper advocates not giving information to clients that could
facilitate violating the law when, in a particularlawyer's view, the
underlying conduct is "really wrongful" as opposed to being "merely
penalized" with the cost of damages.29 So, in Pepper's theory, the
client's autonomy is substantially limited by the lawyer's moral views.
Neither concept of autonomy is especially robust, particularly when
contrasted with the sine qua non of civil disobedience as traditionally
understood: assertion of an individual's conscientious moral views
against the moral or political views of the majority. The asserted
autonomy-interest of law-as-price theories is more properly
understood as self-interest, and, "it goes without saying that civil
disobedience cannot be grounded solely on group or self-interest. '2 3
Taken as a whole, therefore, the case for efficient breach of
public law is wholly underwhelming. As will be demonstrated below,
the case for efficient investment in compliance is not much stronger.
V. A DEVELOPING JURISPRUDENCE II: EFFICIENT INVESTMENT IN
COMPLIANCE

As defined in this Article, the efficient compliance view of
corporate law compliance suggests that the penalty levels for
violations of a particular law determine the maximum amount of
money that a corporation should spend on compliance efforts (since
it would be inefficient to spend more on compliance than one risks in
fines), and, significantly, that the penalty levels signal how important
290. This argument was quite thoughtfully made by Jamie G. Heller. See Heller, supra
note 18, at 2505.
291. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 1168 n.36 (emphasis added).
292. See Pepper, supra note 9, at 1579.
293. RAWVLS, supranote 44, at 365.
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a law is and whether it should be taken seriously. Penalty levels are
obviously central to rational-choice theories of law compliance as
well, since a central premise of the rational-choice theory of law is
that in conforming their conduct to law, people and corporations rely
upon the severity of potential penalties in deciding whether to obey
the law (or how much money to invest in law compliance). Because
the expected penalty is the foundation of the cost end of the
cost/benefit equation (weighing the potential corporate benefits of
non-compliance against the potential corporate costs of liability),
embracing this view of the law, one could argue that fairness requires
that one have a settled expectation of a given penalty level for a given
level of violation. The Supreme Court was recently presented with a
case that tests that proposition, and its decision is an indication of the
extent to which rational-choice theories of law compliance have
affected our thinking about law.
A.

Landgraf v. USI Film Products

The Supreme Court was cleanly presented with the question of
whether one does have such a settled expectation in Landgrafv. USI
Film Products94 when it was asked to consider whether certain
amendments to Title VII promulgated in section 102 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991295 ("the Act" or "the Civil Rights Act") would be
applied in cases that were pending when the Act was passed. Section
102 did not change the substantive standards of the law; that is, the
conduct necessary to conform to Title VII (which prohibits
discrimination in employment) was not changed. Rather, section 102
added compensatory and punitive damages to the pre-existing
equitable remedies of reinstatement and two years' back pay for
intentional employment discrimination in violation of Title VII
(subject to fairly restrictive caps) 296 and also provided for jury trials.297
294. 511 U.S. 244 (1994). This author was associated with the law firm of Cravath,
Swaine & Moore ("Cravath"), which, together with the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights ("Lawyers' Committee"), represented petitioner Barbara Landgraf before the
Supreme Court, and was an author, although not a principal author, of petitioner's briefs.
The principal authors were Julie North, Paul Saunders, and Suja Thomas of Cravath, and
Richard Seymour of the Lawyers' Committee.
295. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1072 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(a)(1) (1994)). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 made a number of changes in Title
VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, including "overruling" two Supreme Court cases of the late
1980s that had narrowed civil rights protection: Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164 (1989), and Wards Cove PackingCo. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
296. The nonpecuniary compensatory damages plus punitive damages cannot exceed
$50,000 per claimant for an employer with 15 to 100 employees; $100,000 per claimant for
an employer with 101 to 200 employees; $200,000 per claimant for an employer with 201
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Using the jurisprudential construct of law as price, section 102 simply

made violations more expensive.
The lower courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, interpreted
the language of the Act and the intent of Congress to be unclear
concerning retroactivity (defined here as permitting plaintiffs to seek
the expanded damages in cases that were already in court when the
Act was passed).2 98 According to the Supreme Court's precedent at
the time (at least where a statute is unclear concerning retroactivity),
Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 99 whether the expanded
damages could be sought in cases already in court therefore turned
on whether permitting such expanded damages would work a
"manifest injustice" by undermining the parties' "vested rights. '30

to 500 employees; and $300,000 per claimant for an employer with more than 500
employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). One reason Congress added these damages
provisions is well-illustrated by the facts of the Landgrafcase itself. As the Fifth Circuit
stated:
It is uncontested that Barbara Landgraf suffered significant sexual harassment at
the hands of John Williams during her employment with USI. This harassment
was sufficiently severe to support a hostile work environment claim under Title
VII.... She reported this harassment to her employer through supervisor Bobby
Martin on several occasions and no corrective action was timely taken.
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427,429 (5th Cir. 1992), affd, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
After over a year of such treatment, Ms. Landgraf left voluntarily (she was not fired), and
the district court found that she was not constructively discharged; that finding was
upheld by the Fifth Circuit. See id. at 430. Absent constructive discharge, which would
have permitted Ms. Landgraf to be compensated with the equitable remedies of
reinstatement and two years' back pay, Ms. Landgraf was entitled, under the pre-1991
version of Title VII, to no compensation for the severe, hostile-environment, sexual
harassment to which she was subjected. See id. at 433. After passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, a plaintiff in Ms. Landgraf's position could receive compensation for the
effects of such sexual harassment, even if the harassment did not ultimately lead to a
constructive discharge. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. 1981a(b)(3)
(1994).
297. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c).
298. See, e.g., Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 263 (holding that the language of the Act was
unclear concerning retroactivity); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363, 1372 (5th
Cir. 1992) (same); Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370, 1377 (8th Cir. 1992)
(same); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 1992) (same). The
question of the retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 generated an enormous
number of published and unpublished opinions in a short amount of time. The Act
became law on November 21, 1991, and by October 28, 1992, when the petition for writ of
certiorari was filed on behalf of Barbara Landgraf, there had been 263 district and circuit
cases addressing the issue. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, 10 n.3, Landgraf (No.
92-757). The above discussion does not purport to describe that case law in any detail at
all. Rather, it only discusses illustrative cases that explicitly develop the law-as-price
theory inherent in the issue.
299. 416 U.S. 696,711-15 (1974).
300. See id. at 711,720-21. The Bradley Court had unanimously held that "a court is to
apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in
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Changes in the law can be of many sorts, of course, from changing the

standards of behavior necessary to conform to law (which would
presumably never be fair to change retroactively), to changes in

litigation procedures (lengthening or shortening the statute of
limitations or changing jurisdictional provisions) or trial procedures
(hearing before a judge or jury), or remedies (adding or subtracting

remedies for pre-existing causes of action). 30 1 In essence, then, the

"manifest injustice" exception to Bradley's presumption that a court

manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary." Id
at 711 (citing Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1969); United States v.
Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801)). In explaining the manifest injustice
exception, the Bradley Court stated that "[t]he concerns ...relative to the possible
working of an injustice center upon (a) the nature and identity of the parties, (b) the
nature of their rights, and (c) the nature of the impact of the change in law upon those
rights." Id.at 717. According to the Bradley Court, the third aspect of this inquiry (upon
which the Landgraf decision and many of its antecedents turned) "has to do with the
nature of the impact of the change in law upon existing rights, or, to state it another way,
stems from the possibility that new and unanticipatedobligationsmay be imposed upon a
party without notice or an opportunity to be heard." Id. at 720 (emphasis added). Thus,
in Bradley the Court found that imposing attorneys' fees based on new statutory
authorization for attorneys' fees in school desegregation litigation was fair because it "did
not alter the Board's constitutional responsibility for providing pupils with a
nondiscriminatory education. Also, there was no change in the substantive obligation of
the parties." Id. at 721. As this Article argues below, Bradley, properly understood, was
primarily concerned with new substantive obligations-that is, new standards of
conduct-not being imposed retroactively.
301. The Supreme Court has struggled for some time to develop the proper analysis
for determining the retroactivity of civil statutes, since, unlike in the criminal context,
there is no ex post facto clause generally prohibiting retroactivity. See Harold J.Krent,
The PuzzlingBoundary Between Criminaland Civil RetroactiveLawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J.
2143, 2145-46 (1996). Yet the results of that struggle have not been an unmitigated
success. See Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An EquilibriumApproach, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1058 (1997) ("The Court has addressed retroactivity questions on at
least seven occasions in the past five years, but its decisions, rife with separate opinions,
reflect a variety of conflicting and confusing approaches."). In contrast to Bradley's
presumption that a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders a decision,
absent a statutory directive requiring prospectivity or manifest injustice, in Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988), the Court, in dicta, articulated an
opposite presumption, stating that "congressional enactments and administrative rules
will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result."
Id. at 208. Thus, stated as abstract propositions, Bradley and Bowen seemingly pointed in
different directions when Congress was silent about when a statute would go into effect.
Yet, when applied to specific facts, those cases yield similar results. For instance, the
"manifest injustice" principle of Bradley would preclude retroactive application of the
statute at issue in Bowen, a statute that altered federal reimbursement rates for medical
care that had already been provided. See id.at 208-09. The decision in Landgrafwas not
only important for its holding that section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 would not
be applied retroactively, but also for the opportunity it gave the Court (albeit unrealized)
to clarify its analysis of the proper framework for deciding issues involving potentially
retroactive legislation more generally. See Fisch, supra,at 1071 & n.103.
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will apply the law in effect at the time of a decision 3°2 is an inquiry
into the fundamental fairness of applying a change in the law to the
particular case, based on an analysis of the type of change wrought by
the law, and the type of effect that change would have upon vested
rights or settled expectations, if any, of the parties.
In undertaking the manifest injustice analysis with respect to
section 102 of the Civil Rights Act-which provides for expanded
damages-the lower courts had sharply disagreed on the Holmesian
"bad man" view of the law implicit in a finding that one could have a
vested right to a civil penalty level, given that the underlying conduct
necessary to conform to the law was unchanged by section 102.303 In
both the lower courts addressing the retroactivity of section 102 and
the Supreme Court in Landgraf,the issue turned on whether it would
be fundamentally unfair to "up the ante" after the violation had
occurred, either because employers should be held to have a right to
rely on the limited damages provisions of the pre-existing law, and a
settled expectation of the amount of money risked for violating the
law, or because the amount of money an employer put into
compliance efforts would be geared toward the penalties for
violations, and if the penalties were increased the employer should
have an opportunity to increase the vigor with which they sought
compliance. In essence, then, Landgraf tests what we think of as
important about law: Is it the substantive standards of conduct that
the law sets forth that demand our attention, or is it the penalties
assessed for behavior that fails to meet those standards of conduct, or
is it some combination of the two? While every court recognized that
it would be fundamentally unfair to permit retroactivity if what was
once lawful became unlawful,33 4 there was less unanimity that
fundamental fairness would be undermined when what was already
unlawful merely became more expensive.

302. See Bradley, 416 U.S. at 717.
303. See infra text accompanying notes 306-26 (discussing the split among the lower
courts).
304. See, e.g., Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, 975 F.2d 886, 898-99 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(holding that changes in law that define standards of behavior may not be applied
retroactively); Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929, 939 (7th
Cir. 1992) ("[Courts should not retroactively apply statutory provisions that define the
scope of a party's substantive rights and obligations at any stage of the proceedings. The
rationale behind this conclusion is that it is unfair to make persons accountable for acts
that did not violate statutory laws when they were performed."); Lockley v. Chao, 1993
WL 33381 (D.D.C. 1993) (following Gersman).

305. See infra notes 306-26 and accompanying text.
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1. Section 102 in the Lower Courts
The leading proponent of the view that an employer should have
a settled expectation of the amount of money risked by unlawful
behavior was the Seventh Circuit in Luddington v. Indiana Bell
Telephone Co.,36 in an opinion written by Judge Richard Posner.

Judge Posner first sketched out a presumption of legislative
prospectivity based on the "rule of law" and institutional
considerations derived from the enormous power of legislatures "to
redistribute wealth and otherwise disturb settled expectations ...
uncabined by a professional tradition of modesty" as found in the
judiciary. 3°7 His description of the "rule of law" is quite interesting,
for it is founded on the traditional, pre-law-as-price view that what is
important to a just system of law is that one be given notice of the
substantive conduct necessary to conform to law, not that one be able
precisely to calibrate the cost of liability should one choose not to so
conform.0 8

Given the emphasis on conduct-regulating aspects of law in this

concept of the "rule of law," retroactive application of section 102
should have been perfectly acceptable, because Judge Posner

recognized that section 102 had not changed the conduct necessary to

306. 966 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1992). The potential for increased damages in Luddington

did not come about by an application of section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
added compensatory and punitive damages. Luddington involved claims of racial
discrimination under Title VII and under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by the plaintiff, an AfricanAmerican male employee of Indiana Bell Telephone Company, who was denied
numerous promotions for which he had applied. A violation of section 1981 can give rise
to compensatory and punitive damages of the sort added to claims under Title VII in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, although not limited by caps on damages as are similar damages
under the Civil Rights Act. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 had "overruled" Pattersonv.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), which had interpreted § 1981 to be
inapplicable to claims based on a refusal to promote an employee, unless the promotion
could be said to create a new employment relation. See id. at 185-89. So, in Luddington,
if the Civil Rights Act were held not to be retroactive, then Pattersonwould apply, Mr.
Luddington would not have a claim under § 1981, and he would be limited to pre-Act
Title VII equitable remedies (here two years' back pay). Retroactive application of the
Civil Rights Act would render Pattersonnugatory, and would mean that the promotion
decisions Mr. Luddington challenged could give rise to potential liability under § 1981,
and so the employer potentially could be liable for increased damages (common-law
compensatory and punitive damages).
307. Luddington, 966 F.2d at 228.
308. See id. at 227-28 ("The idea that the law should confine its prohibitions and
regulations to future conduct, so that the persons subject to the law can conform their
conduct to it and thus avoid being punished, whether criminally or civilly, for conduct that
they had no reason to think unlawful, is a component of the traditional conception of the
'rule of law.' ").
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conform to law.? 9 Yet, Judge Posner went beyond the "traditional
conception of the rule of law," even as he had defined it, and
articulated a post-traditional, rational-choice influenced conception
of the rule of law.3 10 Thus, he asked if there was any reason that the
presumption of prospectivity should be overcome in the case of the
Civil Rights Act:
If the Civil Rights Act of 1991 made merely technical
changes to the statute the presumption of prospective
application would be rebutted. It does more. True, it does
not prohibit any conduct not already prohibited by Title VII
.... It makes changes in remedies, procedures,

and

evidence. But such changes can have as profound an impact
on behavior outside the courtroom as avowedly substantive
changes.... The new statute brings [ordinary promotion

decisions] under section 1981 and thus subjects employers to
greater liabilities.
It could be argued that since the underlying norm of
nondiscrimination was not new, employers should not be
heard to complain that the norm has now been given teeth.
But many of us would squawk very loudly indeed if people
with unpaid parking tickets were made retroactively liable
to life imprisonment; and in fact such a change although
purely remedial would violate the ex post facto clause....
The amount of care that individuals and firms take to avoid
subjecting themselves to liability whether civil or criminal is
a function of the severity of the sanction, and when the
severity is increased they are entitled to an opportunity to
readjust their level of care in light of the new environment
31
created by the change. '
Given this rationale, the court held that the Civil Rights Act was
applicable only to "conduct engaged in after the effective dates
(plural because several sections carry different effective dates) in the
309. See id. at 229.
310. See id
311. Id. at 228-29 (citations omitted). Without undertaking a criticism of its central
rational-choice premise here, see infra text accompanying notes 378-99, a number of quick
observations are in order. First, the language that Judge Posner uses quite understates
the source of the employer's obligation:
although the underlying norm of
nondiscrimination is in play, so is an actual law prohibiting discrimination. Second, it
betrays a rather casual attitude about racial and/or sexual equality to analogize liability
for discrimination to an unpaid parking ticket. On one interpretation this is quite a telling
analogy, though: liability for two years' back pay, given many employees' wages, is not a
lot of money, and the possibility of such liability may have had the same effect upon many
corporate employers, if using a law-as-price view of the law, as an unpaid parking ticket
would have had upon an individual.

1998]
act." '

CORPORATE COMPLIANCE

1349

As will be seen below, Judge Posner's rationale defined the

central point of dispute in many other courts' manifest injustice
inquiry, and ultimately in the Supreme Court: is it true with respect
to statutes (or regulations) that
[t]he amount of care that individuals and firms take to avoid
subjecting themselves to liability whether civil or criminal is

a function of the severity of the sanction, and when the
severity is increased they are entitled to an opportunity to

readjust their level of care in light of the new environment
created by the change[?]313

The Fifth Circuit answered that question in the affirmative in
Landgraf itself,314 in an opinion written by Judge Patrick
Higginbotham. As set out above, plaintiff Barbara Landgraf had
been found to have been subjected to severe hostile-environment
sexual harassment, but was left without compensation because she

was also found not to have been constructively discharged.3 15 Prior to
her appeal, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991,316 and so

one issue in the Fifth Circuit was whether the expanded damages
provisions of section 102 should apply to her case on appeal.3 17 Like
312. Luddington, 960 F.2d at 229. Judge Posner recognized that the employer in
Luddington actually had no reliance interest in limited damages because Patterson was
decided three years after the last act for which Luddington sought to hold Indiana Bell
liable, and thus, "the change brought about by the new statute is a change back to the
legal regime that existed when the defendant committed the acts for which it is being
sued." Id. In other words, at the time of the conduct at issue in Luddington, § 1981 was
interpreted to apply to promotion decisions, and so an employer was potentially subject to
compensatory and punitive damages under § 1981. Thus, by Judge Posner's own
rationale, Indiana Bell should have taken the possibility of compensatory and punitive
damages into account in determining the amount of care it would take to ensure that its
employees did not make racially discriminatory employment decisions. Notwithstanding
this non-existent reliance interest in the actual case before the court, Judge Posner was
willing to allow a windfall to the employer (continuing Patterson'svitality by refusing to
apply the Civil Rights Act) for two reasons: First, he held that the pre-Pattersonlegal
regime interpreting § 1981 was "merely a set of lower-court decisions, constituting a stab
in the dark concerning issues on which the Supreme Court had not yet ruled," a "tentative
regime, which Patterson swept away," i.; and second, Judge Posner found the
administrative difficulties of separating cases with a true reliance interest from those
without to be insuperable, see id. at 229-30. In other words, he was content to vindicate
the rational-choice theory of decision-making about law compliance notwithstanding facts
indicating that theory was clearly inapplicable in the case before him.
313. Id. at 229.
314. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427,433 (5th Cir. 1992), affd, 511 U.S.
244 (1994).
315. See supra note 296 (discussing facts of Landgraf).
316. Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1072 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)
(1994)).
317. See Landgraf,968 F.2d at 433.
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the Supreme Court's ultimate decision in Landgraf, the Fifth
Circuit's analysis turned on the "manifest injustice" exception to
Bradley's presumption that a court should apply the law in effect at
the time it renders a decision. Judge Higginbotham found such a
manifest injustice, however, by virtue of the effect of the expanded
damages provisions of section 102 on employers' "settled
expectations":
The addition of compensatory and punitive damages to the
remedies available to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff does
not change the scope of the statute's coverage. That does
not mean, however, that these are inconsequential changes
in the Act. As Judge Posner notes in Luddington, "such
changes can have as profound an impact on behavior
outside the courtroom as avowedly substantive changes."
...[T]he amended damage provisions of the Act are a
seachange in employer liability for Title VII violations. For
large employers, the total of compensatory and punitive
damage which they are potentially liable can reach $300,000
per claim.
...It would be an injustice within the meaning of
Bradley to charge individual employers with anticipating
31 8
this change in damages available under Title VII.
It is interesting to focus on how the Fifth Circuit defined the
manifest injustice of permitting expanded damages: that it would be
an injustice within the meaning of Bradley "to charge individual
employers with anticipating this change in damages available under
Title VII. ' ' 319 So, if employers, acting as "rational actors," calculated
the amount of money they risked with respect to sexual harassment
liability, and determined the seriousness of their compliance activities
based upon those calculations, according to the Fifth Circuit it would
be unfair for courts to "charge" employers with thinking about the
fact that their calculation might be upset by a change in the statutory
basis for damages. It is only by permitting employers to orient their
actions according to the severity of the penalty (and, in fact,
according to their valuation of the severity of the penalty in the
context of their firm's economic activities, since that valuation will
change from employer to employer), and not according to the
substantive standards of the law, that there can be any claim of unfair

318. Id. (quoting Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225, 229 (7th Cir.

1992)).
319. Id.
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surprise-a claim the Fifth Circuit wholly embraces.32
In contrast, a number of courts took issue with the view that
employers could have a legitimate reliance interest in the amount of
liability for intentional misconduct, that compliance with the law
should be subject to a cost-benefit analysis, or that the amount of a
penalty risked by non-compliance with the law should be interpreted
as a substantive aspect of the law. So, for instance, Judge Sporkin of
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
identified the underlying rational-choice premise of the issue and
then rejected it, holding that "[t]he law has never countenanced that
an employer may weigh the legal consequences of his discrimination
That rationale is
and choose to continue his unlawful conduct."'
echoed in an opinion by Judge Fuste of the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico:
While an individual may predicate his decision to park
illegally upon a cost/benefit analysis, this does not make that
behavior any less illegal. If the fine were to suddenly
increase ten-fold, he would have to accept that the illegal
behavior was going to cost more than he had planned.3'
One quite thoughtful analysis was undertaken by Judge Thomas
Ellis of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia. As in many of the decisions concerning section 102, the
outcome ultimately turned on the manifest injustice inquiry. Judge
Ellis found no such injustice because section 102 did "not implicate
Applying the three-factor
substantive rights and liabilities.' 1
"manifest injustice" test of Bradley, 24 the court found that the most
320. See id. Other courts that interpreted the possibility of substantially increased
damages as a manifest injustice if retroactively applied include the United States District
Courts for the Districts of Delaware and New Jersey. See Crumley v. Delaware State
College, 797 F. Supp. 341, 351-52 (D. Del. 1992) ("[While] it is difficult to accept the
proposition that a defendant who knew its actions were illegal at the time it acted can
successfully claim 'manifest injustice' ... [b]ecause of the potential for lawsuits, decisions
to downsize or to terminate employees often include a calculus of exposure to damages
from civil suits" and "it can be persuasively argued that it is unreasonable to expect
defendants to pay damages that were not calculated into their decisions."); Thomas v.
Frank, 791 F. Supp. 470, 476 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that, while not creating a new cause
of action, the damages provision of the 1991 Act created a new source of liability for
substantial monetary damages, and, as such, was substantive rather than procedural in
nature).
321. Robinson v. Davis Mem'l Goodwill Indus., 790 F. Supp. 325, 332 (D.D.C. 1992),
rev'd mem., 36 F.3d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (unpublished disposition available at 1994 WL
499164 (July 1, 1994)) (reversal based on Supreme Court's opinion in Landgrafl.
322. Bonilla v. Liquilux Gas Corp., 812 F. Supp. 286,291-92 (D.P.R. 1993).
323. Jaekel v. Equifax Mktg. Decision Sys., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 486,492 (E.D. Va. 1992).
324. See supra notes 300-03 (discussing the three-factor test).
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significant factor was that there were no "new and unanticipated
obligations" being imposed on the defendant, as the phrase "new and
unanticipated obligations" was defined in Bradley. Judge Ellis wrote:
Nothing in § 102 of the 1991 Act, providing for jury trials
and expanded remedies, changes the definition or nature of
the conduct proscribed by the Act.
Intentional
discrimination was unlawful at the time of the alleged
harassing conduct, and defendant had an absolute obligation
at that time to refrain from perpetrating, or permitting its
employees to perpetrate, such conduct.
What is
indisputably affected is the potential amount defendants
may have to pay if found liable for intentional
discrimination. The ante has been, in the vernacular,
"upped." But this increased economic risk does not mean
that the actual harm resulting from unlawful intentional
discrimination has changed. Rather, an "artificial ceiling"
has been lifted. As a result, defendant, if liable for
intentional discrimination, is required to bear more
accurately the full cost of the injury inflicted, or, in other
words, to make plaintiffs more nearly whole.3z
In adopting this rationale, Judge Ellis directly responded to
Judge Posner's analysis in Luddington, stating that the difficulty with
Judge Posner's argument that the severity of a penalty affects how
much care an individual or corporation takes to avoid subjecting
themselves to liability is that
Title VII ...

propounds an intentional discrimination

standard of liability, not a negligence standard. Judge
Posner's view seems valid in the context of negligent
conduct, but not in the context of intentional conduct.
Congress surely did not intend for employers to perform a
cost-benefit analysis to decide whether to engage in or
permit illegal discriminatory conduct. Rather, Congress
plainly meant that no cost-benefit ratio could justify
unlawful discrimination.2
2. The Supreme Court Litigation
Like the lower courts, the litigants before the Supreme Court in
Landgrafframed the question of the retroactivity of section 102 in
part as an argument over the law-as-price view of law (particularly
since that had been the basis for the Fifth Circuit's decision being
325. Jaekel,797 F. Supp. at 492-93 (citations omitted).
326. Id. at 493 n.14.
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appealed). 327 Petitioner argued that applying the damages provisions
of section 102 would neither alter vested rights nor upset reasonable
expectations, since section 102 did not change the substantive
conduct necessary for employers to conform their conduct to the
law.3
Indeed, petitioner asserted that it would be deeply
problematic for the Supreme Court to uphold the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning that section 102 imposes "additional or unforeseeable
obligations," because it would result in adopting "a particularly
extreme version of the 'bad man' theory of the law-that because
there was no damages remedy, respondents had a legitimate or
settled expectation that they could violate Title VII with impunity
and without adverse consequences."32 9 Moreover, petitioner took
direct issue with the view of law that Judge Posner had articulated in
Luddington:
This argument[, that the amount of care one takes to avoid
liability is a function of the severity of the sanction,]
proceeds upon two premises: (1) in deciding whether to
follow the law, people weigh the potential costs of liability
against the benefits to be gained from not following the law;
and (2) when a person decides not to follow the law, that
person's expectations about the potential liability he or she
risks are "settled expectations" that the law should
recognize as valid, and protect.
The first premise may be correct as a descriptive
matter-certainly one reason for increasing the costs of
non-compliance with a law is precisely to encourage greater
compliance with that law. The second premise is incorrect
as a normative matter. Only a person's settled expectations
about compliance with the law are entitled to recognition;
indeed, that is one basis for the manifest injustice exception
of Bradley. If one's substantive behavior conforms to the
law in effect at the time of the behavior, that gives rise to an
expectation of non-liability that the law must recognize as
327. Petitioner Barbara Landgraf had primarily argued to the Supreme Court that the
plain language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 required that section 102 be applied to
pending cases, but that if the Court disagreed, there would be no manifest injustice
inherent in following the Bradley presumption that a court is to apply the law in effect at
the time it renders a decision. See Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (No. 92-757).
328. See id. at 29-31.
329. Id. at 31 (citing Holmes, supra note 22, at 461-62). This point by petitioner
echoes the point developed supra in footnote 223: that Holmes's "bad man" analysis
should be understood as a descriptive statement of the approach to law of some people,
but that it should not be understood as a description of the proper understanding of the
normativity of law.

1354

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

valid. The converse is not true. We assert that this Court
should not protect as "settled" a person's expectations
about the consequences of deliberate non-compliance with
the law. 3 0
Not surprisingly, the respondents, USI Film Products, Bonar
Packaging, Inc., and Quantum Chemical Corporation, took issue with
these arguments, asserting that the new damages provisions of
section 102 increased respondents' substantive liabilities and that
retroactive imposition of these expanded damages would therefore
be manifest injustice under the Bradley standard.33 1 Relying upon
Judge Posner's opinion in Luddington and Judge Higgenbotham's
opinion for the Fifth Circuit in Landgraf, respondents made a
number of "efficient compliance" arguments, including the following:
[Posner's argument about the level of care an individual or
corporation takes to comply with the law being a function of
the sanction] is especially true where the human conduct
being regulated occurs at many levels of the respondent
employer's operation.... The theory of substantive liability
for the harassment that Petitioner espouses against
Respondents is thus derivative and based on respondeat
superior.
Such a claim of vicarious liability makes all the more
important that employers have the opportunity to train and
counsel their supervision and plant management in how to
respond. That effort, and the resources committed to it, is
affected by the source and degree of liability involved. For
Respondents to be subjected retroactively to materially
increased exposure for human conduct it did not commit
patently increases its substantive liabilities. 3
Respondents also relied upon Holmes's "bad man" to argue that
people ought to be able to predict the precise economic
consequences of different courses of action, and without that
predictive capacity the possibility of liability cannot play its proper
deterrent function:
Deterrence of human conduct by avoidance of risk and
liability is Holmes' method of the law, "to advise people in
such a way as to keep them out of court." He is four-square
with the principle against retroactive application of laws
regulating human conduct: What has already occurred
330. Brief for Petitioner at 31-32, Landgraf(No. 92-757).
331. See Brief for Respondents at 25,28, Landgraf(No. 92-757).
332. Id at 27 (citations omitted).
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cannot be deterred, and liability inflicted beyond that
forewarned by law when the conduct occurs is not only
unjust but inhibits people's
acceptance and use of the law as
333
a deterring prophecy.
The deterrent function of law also figured prominently in
respondents' argument that retroactive application of section 102
would be manifestly unjust as defined in Bradley:
[T]he employers involved would have had no opportunity to
measure the risk of their conduct. A potential $300,000
swing in exposure will have a deterrent effect....
The corollary of deterrence is an opportunity to avoid
the penalty imposed for the violation. For employers such
as Respondents here to be subjected to the penalty without
3 4
the opportunity to avoid it would be manifestly unjust.

In reply, the petitioner responded at length to this law-as-price
understanding of law, directly challenging the Supreme Court to hold
that this is an incorrect understanding of law and of citizens'
obligations under law:
The sections of the Act that affect petitioner, those
regarding damages and jury trial, do not "regulate human
conduct" nor do they create a new cause of action or create
"substantive liabilities." They simply increase the remedy
for conduct that has been unlawful for almost thirty years
and they also require a new decision-making mechanism....
Respondents have no "settled right" to disobey the law nor
do they have a right to decide whether to obey the law if the
cost of compliance would be greater than the cost of
violation. The notion, which finds mistaken support in
Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., that citizens should
have the right to make an economic cost-benefit analysis
before deciding whether to obey a given law is not only
destructive of the civil rights laws, but is also ultimately
destructive of all law .... 335
In one sense, the arguments of petitioner and respondents do not
fully meet each other, although they come close. Petitioner's
arguments primarily criticize the notion of deliberate violations of
law when the costs of compliance are higher than the potential
penalties and do not as fully and explicitly address the arguments of
333. Id. at 27 n.12 (citations omitted) (quoting Holmes, supra note 22, at 460-61).
334. Id. at 34.
335. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 10-11, Landgraf (No. 92-757) (quoting Brief for
Respondents at 21,25-36, Landgraf(No. 92-757)) (citations omitted).
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efficient compliance made by respondents and by Judge Posner in
Luddington.336 In contrast, many of respondents' arguments relied
upon the counterfactual premise that section 102 of the Civil Rights
Act changed the conduct necessary to conform to law, 337 and do not
directly address the seemingly more difficult point that since the
conduct required to conform to law was not changed, the "rule of
law" is not offended by applying the new damages remedies. In any
case, the litigants did pose the more general question to the Court,
albeit imperfectly: What aspects of law should guide corporations'
behavior, the standards of conduct set by the law, or the level of the
338
penalties?

3. The Court's Decision
In response, the Supreme Court agreed with respondents that
the level of the penalties for violations of law would have a
determinative effect on a corporation's compliance efforts, so that
increasing the amount of liability for prior conduct, by permitting
section 102 to be applied retroactively, would be manifestly unjust.
The Court recognized that section 102 "does not make unlawful
conduct that was lawful when it occurred" and "only reaches
discriminatory conduct already prohibited by Title VII."' 9 Yet, in an
opinion authored by Justice Stevens, the Court held that the
possibility of expanded damages was "the type of legal change that
would have an impact on private parties' planning"" ° and would
"give managers an added incentive to take preventive measures to
ward off discriminatory conduct by subordinates before it occurs.13 41
Because section 102 attaches "an important new legal burden" to
336. Even though the actions giving rise to the sexual harassment were intentional,
which is the point petitioner emphasized, they were intentional actions of company
employees, so the important questions were the ones posed by Judge Posner: whether the
time and money the company puts into efforts to encourage compliance with the civil
rights laws (among others) would be limited given the limited penalties for violations, and
whether fundamental fairness requires the company to be given an opportunity to
increase the seriousness of its compliance efforts if the penalties increased. The line
between intentional actions and efficient investment can blur, however, since the decision
to put "X" amount into compliance is obviously an intentional decision.
337. Brief for Respondents at 25-31, Landgraf(No. 92-757).
338. Brief for Respondents at 34, Landgraf (No. 92-757); Reply Brief for Petitioners at
9-11, Landgraf(No. 92-757).
339. Landgraf,511 U.S. at 281-82.
340. Id. at 282. Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion for Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg. Justice Scalia wrote an opinion
concurring in the judgment in which Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined. Justice
Blackmun dissented. See id. at 245.
341. Id.at 282 n.35.
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conduct occurring before the statute was enacted, the Court held that
it is the kind of provision that "does not apply to events antedating its
enactment in the absence of clear congressional intent." 2 In so
holding, the LandgrafCourt squarely agreed with respondents and
with Judge Posner in Luddington, in essence validating the "efficient
investment in compliance" view of law that suggests that the amount
of money a firm should invest in law compliance will be determined
by the maximum penalties for violations, rather than the substantive
standards for conduct that the law sets forth. What determines the
importance of law, then, is the price of a violation: it is the expected
penalties of Kohlberg's pre-conventional child that motivates the
LandgrafCourt's corporation. 3
Like Luddington, the LandgrafCourt premised its decision on a
theory about the "rule of law" that would, in fact, be utterly
undisturbed by retroactive application of section 102. The Court
stated that "[e]lementary considerations of fairness dictate that
individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and
to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not
be lightly disrupted." 34 Yet there was nothing in section 102 that
changed what conduct was required to conform to law (which had
been required for thirty years), and so any individual or corporation
was in a position to "know what the law is and to conform their
The Court recognized this point.M6
conduct accordingly."' 5
Moreover, any individual or corporation would have been able to
have "confidence about the legal consequences of their actions,"
notwithstanding section 102, and would have been able to predict
whether their actions could potentially lead to liability or not. 7 So it
was only by adding a rational-choice gloss on the rule of law, even as
the Court itself articulated it, that there could be any claim of
unfairness.
Given the Supreme Court's rationale, it is not enough that one
know what conduct is required by law; surely employers knew that
sexual discrimination was prohibited by Title VII. And it is not
enough that one know generally whether one risks liability or not;
342. Id. at 283.
343. See KOHLBERG, supra note 76, at 17 (positing that the pre-conventional child is
primarily concerned with expected punishments when deciding how to act).
344. Landgraf,511 U.S. at 265.
345. Id
346. See id. at 281-82 (stating that section 102 "does not make unlawful conduct that
was lawful when it occurred" and "only reaches discriminatory conduct already
prohibited by Title VII").
347. See id. at 266.
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surely employers knew that they risked liability for violations.
Rather, one needs to be able to predict the precise amount of
liability, if one's conduct risks putting one in the "realm of liability."
Indeed, the Court explicitly recognized that it is not enough to know
whether one's conduct risks liability or not, but one must also know
"[tihe extent of ...liability."'
This is because the amount of
potential liability will "have an impact on private parties' planning"
and "give managers an added incentive to take preventive measures
' 9 What the Court has told us,
to ward off discriminatory conduct. 'M
then, is that we cannot expect corporations (or even individuals,
presumably) to follow the law simply because it is the law. Rather,
this Court agreed that the law has to carry a big enough stick before
corporations can be expected to take it seriously.
The Court did seek to blur the law-as-price underpinnings of its
decision, though, since a decision for USI Film Products on fairness
grounds suggests a rather problematic view of the normativity of law,
particularly given the way the litigants had framed the issue. The
Court suggested that, in reality, section 102 "can be seen as creating a
new cause of action," because it "confers a new right to monetary
relief on persons like petitioner who were victims of a hostile work
environment but were not constructively discharged, and the novel
prospect of damages liability for their employers."350 This is such a
cynical argument-that employers could have previously permitted
sexual harassment to go on unabated so long as it did not rise to the
level of a constructive discharge, and so would have had a settled
expectation of non-liability-that the Court immediately refrained its
position: "Because Title VII previously authorized recovery of
backpay in some cases, and because compensatory damages under
§ 102(a) are in addition to any backpay recoverable, the new
provision also resembles a statute increasing the amount of damages
available under a preestablished cause of action. '35 1 Permitting such
an increase retroactively would be unfair, according to the Court,
because "[t]he extent of ... liability" is an "important legal

consequence that cannot be ignored. 352 So, rather rapidly, the Court
was right back to the law-as-price view of law.
The Court's other attempt to soften the implications of its
decision rested on a misstatement of facts (and shared the above
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

Id. at 283.
Id. at 282 & n.35.
IdId. at 281.
Id. at 283-84.
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cynical argument). Thus, in a footnote, the Court stated that:
As petitioner and amici suggest, concerns of unfair surprise
and upsetting expectations are attenuated in the case of
intentional employment discrimination, which has been
unlawful for more than a generation. However, fairness
concerns would not be entirely absent if the damages
provisions of § 102 were to apply to events preceding its
enactment, as the facts of this case illustrate. Respondent
USI's management, when apprised of the wrongful conduct
of petitioner's coworker, took timely action to remedy the
problem. The law then in effect imposed no liability on an
employer who corrected discriminatory work conditions
before the conditions became so severe as to result in the
victim's constructive discharge. Assessing damages against
respondents on a theory of respondeatsuperior would thus
entail an element of surprise. 3
Yet, the facts established in the record showed that the actions
taken were neither timely nor fully remedial. Barbara Landgraf's
supervisor had done nothing about her complaints, and she
ultimately had to go above her supervisor-action that is usually not
a
well-received in corporate environments-to file a complaint with354
human resources officer, who did take successful remedial action.
USI Film Products also conceded that her supervisor's actions were
unsuccessful in keeping the harassing individual away from Barbara
Landgraf.35 So, given the actual facts of the case, Landgrafdid not
present a situation of unfair surprise being visited upon a company
that had fully complied with the law. Rather, the core of the Court's
decision vindicates the law-as-price view of law: A company that
may have ignored the law or treated it as relatively unimportant,
because the penalties were unimpressive, or may have "risked close
passage," should not have to pay higher penalties than it anticipated.
Justice Blackmun stood alone in dissent. He would have applied
the statute retroactively, both because he found that its language
compelled that result and because he rejected the penalty-driven
view of law compliance relied upon by the majority. He wrote:
Section 102 of the Act expands the remedies available for
acts of intentional discrimination, but does not alter the
scope of the employee's basic right to be free from
discrimination or the employer's corresponding legal duty.
353. Id. at 282 n.35.
354. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 429 (5th Cir. 1992), affd, 511 U.S.
244 (1994).

355. See id.
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There is nothing unjust about holding an employer
responsible for injuries caused by conduct that has been
illegal for almost 30 years. 6
The majority and dissent articulate very different views of law.
To the majority, the amount of money risked for violations of law
(the precise extent of liability, not just the possibility of liability) is an
important factor in a corporation's planning with respect to law
compliance, at least as important as the substantive standards the law
sets forth.
To the dissent, the law commands conformity
notwithstanding penalties that are low. As developed below, the
dissent's argument provides a much surer basis on which to ground
political obligation and by which to structure social, political, and
economic interactions. But prior to turning to that point, it is
important to appreciate the break with the past that Landgraf
represents.
4. LandgrafCompared to Prior Cases
In Landgraf, the Court determined that new compensatory
damages provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 would not be
available in a case that was in court when the Act became law,
because to permit the plaintiff to seek those damages retroactively
would be "manifestly unjust," as that term was understood in Bradley
v. School Board of Richmond.3 7 Bradley sought to protect parties
from changes in the law that undermined their "vested rights";
permitting such changes retroactively would be manifest injustice,
and consequently impermissible.35 8 The expansion of the "manifest
injustice" limitation from Bradley to Landgrafis therefore central to
understanding why, on one interpretation, Landgrafis evidence of an
important change in our way of thinking about the law.359
356. Landgraf,511 U.S. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
357. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
358. See id. at 711-12.
359. The actual Landgrafholding was that in the absence of congressional direction
about the temporal reach of a statute, a court must determine "whether the new statute
would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when
he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to
transactions already completed," Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, in which case the statute
would only apply prospectively, see id. With one important exception, Landgraf is
nothing more than an application-or misapplication-of Bradley, because the instances
the Court describes as having "retroactive effect" are essentially those in which the
Bradley "manifest injustice" principle would preclude applying a change in the law
retroactively. The one part of the test that is not derived from Bradley, though, is the
Court's statement that increased liabilities for past conduct can give rise to a problematic
"retroactive effect." See id. at 281. Here, the Court relies on precedents from criminal
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In Bradley, the Court was concerned with the unfairness of
applying new standards of conduct to judge prior behavior-to

impose "new and unanticipated obligations," or "additional or
unforeseeable obligation[s]," after the fact. 60 While the notion of
expanded damages fits comfortably within the language of
"unforeseeable obligations" or "unanticipated obligations," because
a finding of liability would give rise to an obligation to pay money,
the Supreme Court in Bradley was referring to an entirely different
concept: new behavioral obligations. Thus, the Bradley Court cited
Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham,3 6' pointing out that
retroactivity was proper in Thorpe (with respect to a statute that

promulgated notice and hearing regulations prior to eviction of
public housing tenants) because the statute did not change the

conduct required by landlords or tenants to conform with the terms
of their lease agreements.3 6 In Bradley itself, the Court found that
imposing attorneys' fees in school desegregation litigation, based on
new statutory provisions permitting such fees, "did not alter the
Board's constitutional responsibility for providing pupils with a
nondiscriminatory education. Also, there was no change in the
substantive obligation of the parties. ' 36 3 What the Bradley Court was

concerned with, then, would be the obvious unfairness of
retroactively altering the substantive rules by which conduct would
be judged to have conformed to law.

This interpretation of Bradley is consistent with the other
modern Supreme Court cases inwhich the Court examined legislative

retroactivity. Thus, in Bennett v. New Jersey,31 the Court held that a
federal statute redefining eligibility standards for state education

expenditures would not be used to determine if prior expenditures
law for the proposition that a statute that increases a party's liability for past conduct
must be applied prospectively only, yet in the criminal context the Ex Post Facto Clause
specifically requires that result. See id. at 269 n.23 (citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,
429 (1987)). While at some point the Due Process Clause may operate to preclude
liability-enhancement in the civil context, see Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976), no one, including the respondents in Landgraf,had argued that this
point had been reached here. The actual effect of the Landgrafholding is opaque at best.
See Fisch, supra note 301, at 1110 ("Although the Landgraf default rule has initial appeal
because of its apparent clarity, it does not withstand scrutiny.... [T]he Landgraf rule
requires an initial judgment by the courts as to whether a new rule is sufficiently
retroactive to trigger the presumption of non-retroactivity. The circularity in this process
is apparent.").
360. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 720-21; see also supra note 300 (discussing Bradley).
361. 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
362. See Bradley, 416 U.S. at 720-21.
363. Id. at 721.
364. 470 U.S. 632 (1985).
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had been proper because "statutes affecting substantive rights and
liabilities are presumed to have only prospective effect. ' 365 The
Bennett Court stated that its rationale was in accord with Bradley, so
that if new legislation would undermine the substantive standards
and obligations upon which parties had relied under an old law, the
presumption against retroactivity, rather than the Bradley rule, would
apply.3" Similarly, in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,367
the Court refused to permit the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to promulgate retroactive rules concerning how hospitals
could calculate reimbursable Medicare costs when health care
providers had already been reimbursed in reliance on the prior
standards and would be required to return funds in excess of the
retroactive limits. 36s
Thus, in prior cases in which the Supreme Court refused to apply
a law retroactively (when Congress had not clearly indicated the
temporal reach of a statute), it was because the law would
retroactively change the conduct necessary to conform to law, or
change the substantive standards by which prior actions would be
judged. 369
These instances of non-retroactivity are readily
distinguishable from Landgraf,in which section 102 did not affect the
conduct necessary to conform to law, but merely increased the cost of
liability when the possibility of liability existed under prior law,370 and
may even have been risked by the employer.
Indeed, the extent to which Landgraf represents a shift toward
rational-choice theories of law compliance can be seen by contrasting
it with another Supreme Court opinion of twenty years earlier, Usery
v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,37 decided in 1976, before law and
economics took hold of American legal theory. In Usery, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of federal legislation that required coal
mine operators to compensate certain miners, former miners, and
their survivors for death or total disability due to black lung
disease.
The coal mine operators had argued that "to impose
365. Id. at 639.
366. See id. at 639-40.
367. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
368. See id. at 208-09.
369. In Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990), the
Court declined to apply amended post-judgment interest rates retroactively because it
concluded that there was clear direction from Congress that the amendments be
prospective only. See id. at 837-38.
370. See supra notes 339-56 and accompanying text (discussing Landgraf).
371. 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
372. See id. at 5-6.
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liability upon them for former employees' disabilities is
impermissibly to charge them with an unexpected liability for past,

completed acts that were legally proper and, at least in part, unknown
to be dangerous at the time."'373 The Court rejected this argument,

holding that the imposition of liability for the effects of disabilities
bred in the past was "justified as a rational measure to spread the
costs of the employees' disabilities to those who have profited from
' 4 In
the fruits of their labor-the operators and the coal consumers."37
so holding, the Court stated:
To be sure, insofar as the Act requires compensation for
disabilities bred during employment terminated before the
date of enactment, the Act has some retrospective effect
....And it may be that the liability imposed by the Act for

disabilities

suffered

by former

employees

was

not

anticipated at the time of actual employment. But our cases
are clear that legislation readjusting rights and burdens is
not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled
expectations. This is true even though the effect of the
legislation is to impose a new duty or liability based on past
acts.37 5

In Usery, then, the Court permitted the legislature to increase
the cost of legal activities (mining coal) retroactively on the basis of a
compensatory rationale; in Landgraf the Court refused to increase
the

costs

of

illegal activities

(employment

discrimination)

rationale.3 76

retroactively on a similar compensatory
This contrast is
best explained as an indication of the extent to which our concept of
law, and underlying intuitions about fairness, have incorporated a
373. Id. at 15.
374. Id. at 18.
375. Id at 15-16 (citations and footnote omitted).
376. The Court in Usery stated that:
While the Operators have clearly been aware of the danger of pneumoconiosis
for at least 20 years, and while they have not specifically pressed the contention
that they would have taken steps to reduce or eliminate the incidence of
pneumoconiosis had the law imposed liability upon them, we would nevertheless
hesitate to approve the retrospective imposition of liability on any theory of
deterrence or blameworthiness.
Id. at 17 (citations and footnote omitted). The Court then went on to develop its
rationale, upholding the legislation based on a compensatory theory of liability. See id. at
17-20. Similarly, in Landgraf the Court rejected the idea that the punitive damages
provisions of section 102(b)(1) could be applied retroactively. See Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 281 ("Retroactive imposition of punitive damages would raise a
serious constitutional question." (citing Usery, 428 U.S. at 17)). The Landgraf analysis
discussed above was with respect to the new compensatory damages provisions of section
102(a)(1).
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rational-choice, penalty-driven view of motivation towards law. Why
else would it be important that the penalty was increased, given that
the behavior required by law was not changed and the employer had
thirty years' notice of that required behavior? The Court also agreed
that the amount of money invested in law compliance activities will
be a function of the level of the penalties, since it reasoned that
increasing the penalties vill give corporations added incentives to
"take preventive measures to ward off discriminatory conduct by
subordinates before it occurs. '3 77 So if the penalties are low, the
employer will take less care than in situations in which the penalties
are high and will invest less in compliance. While both of these
aspects of the Court's rationale follow logically from rational-choice
thinking about law, there are practical and conceptual difficulties
with this theory of "efficient compliance."
B. PracticalDifficulties with the Landgraf Theory of Efficient
Compliance
First, there are numerous instances one can think of in which full
compliance with a law would be far more expensive than the
penalties risked for non-compliance: Was the Court really saying
that a corporation can choose one or the other, or that the
corporation's efforts towards compliance should be "capped" at the
levels of the potential penalties? While the Court has not stated that
a corporation has the right to choose to violate the law, the Court did
hold that it will recognize and protect a reliance interest in the
amount of damages risked for violations of law and recognizes that a
corporation will be guided in its compliance efforts by the amount of
potential penalties.37 Recall the labor law examples earlier in this
Article of overtime violations under the FLSA or of deliberate
violations of employees' federally-protected organizing rights.7 9 In
both instances, it is potentially far more expensive for an employer to
obey the law today than to risk the discounted value of potential
penalties for violations tomorrow, given the time value of money. Is
the Court suggesting that it is sensible, then, for the corporation to
make only minimal efforts to encourage compliance with these laws
because the penalties are low? Presumably under a Landgraf
analysis, if the penalties were raised, the Court would not permit
377. Landgraf,511 U.S. at 282 n.35.
378. See supra notes 339-56 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing violations of organizing
rights); supra notes 255-65 and accompanying text (discussing overtime violations).
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them to be applied retroactively, because the corporation should

have the opportunity to increase its compliance efforts to match the
increased penalties.

So why, under the Court's analysis, should a

corporation take seriously the standards of the law today when
penalties are low, if its only concern is the low amount of money
risked in penalties under current law?
Or consider a corporation's environmental compliance
obligations to meet air quality standards or water quality standards,
in a situation where it would require investment in new technology
that is far more expensive than the corporation risks in penalties to
comply with the law. If one cares about the environment, one wants
the corporation to make the necessary technological investment even
though it is more expensive than the potential penalties. But what
incentive does the Court's opinion create towards that end? The
Court's rationale instead suggests that law violators should have a
settled expectation of penalties, and need not worry about future
enhancements, and that it is reasonable for corporations to orient
their compliance efforts by the penalties for non-compliance rather
than the substantive standards of behavior.

If corporate officers

share the diminished sense of civic obligation inherent in the Court's
view, there will be large realms of positive law that can be all but
ignored.
Second, in many instances penalties will be low precisely because
of the involvement of corporate lobbyists in the legislative process,

and because of the involvement of corporate contributions in the
campaign finance process.31 If corporate compliance efforts are
380. See generally ELIZABETH DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NEW ROAD TO
CORRUPTION (1983) (describing the effects of campaign contributions on policy); RALPH
CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE
NADER & WESLEY J. SMTrH, No CONTEST:
PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 256-319 (1996) (describing the involvement of
attorneys representing private corporations in the legislative drafting process). Part of
those efforts would be to lobby to reduce penalties for violations and to reduce funds for
enforcement of existing law, so one cannot assume ab initio that the levels of penalties are
a good indication of either social costs or an "objective" social consensus about how
important a law is. See, e.g., Christopher Drew, In the Productivity Push, How Much Is
Too Much?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1995, at C1 ("One of the goals of U.P.S. is to slash
OSHA's budget and shift some of its focus from fining companies for safety problems to
merely advising them. U.P.S. is also a key player in a 300-company coalition that seems
on the verge of killing a proposed Federal rule meant to limit injuries from heavy lifting
and repetitive job motions."). Indeed, corporations may be required by the wealthmaximization norm to try to shape laws and regulations in their favor. Jim Shultz makes
this point in The Initiative Cookbook, when he discusses a 1990 initiative in California that
would have raised taxes on the alcohol industry (including the economically important
wine sector); estimates suggested that the tax would have raised $760 million in the first
year alone. Alcohol producers successfully spent $27 million for advertising to defeat the
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"capped" by the maximum penalties that are risked by violations, and
if the penalties are too low, there may well be insufficient corporate
resources spent to comply with the standards of the law, leading both
to increased numbers of violations, some proportion of which will
never be redressed, 38 ' and excess social costs imposed by the
corporation on society. While one response to this problem may be
simply to raise the penalties so that compliance efforts will be
similarly augmented, there are well-documented limits to the
effectiveness of increasing deterrence of corporate malefaction by
be
increasing penalties, and limits beyond which penalties3 cannot
2
raised because of due process and other fairness concerns
Third, penalties may bear an indirect relationship, at best, to the
actual social costs of the harms imposed by violating laws subject to
penalty provisions. For instance, the maximum penalty plus
compensatory award per violation of Title VII for a large employer is
$300,000.11 Yet a 1988 study of the costs of sexual harassment
(which is one type of discrimination reached by Title VII) to large
Fortune 500 firms (averaging 23,750 employees) found that the
average annual costs were $6.7 million per company, including
increased absenteeism, increased incidence of stress-related disease,
higher employee turnover, and decreased productivity, but not
including the costs of litigation.3 4 So in that instance, the penalty for
one violation is less than five percent of the total actual costs of
sexual harassment (although the firm itself bears many of the
ifnitiative. Shultz points out that this 28:1 return on investment was a much higher return
on investment than other business uses of the funds, such as building new breweries or
changing production techniques. JIM SHULTZ, THE INITIATIVE COOKBOOK 8 (1996).
381. This assumes that money spent on compliance efforts is usually successful in
reducing the number of violations.
382. See, e.g., Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 17, at 273 ("[T]he legal regime cannot
always set penalties high enough to eliminate underdeterrence. If the frequency of
detection and punishment is low, it may be impossible to raise sanctions sufficiently to
deter all undesirable conduct. Or the level of sanctions required to eliminate
underdeterrence may be disproportionate, unfair, cruel, beyond individual actors' wealth
(so that increasing sanctions yields no additional deterrent benefit), or, in the case of
extensive incarceration, too costly to administer."); John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to
Damn: No Body to Kick": An UnscandalizedInquiry into the Problem of Corporate
Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 390 (1981) (positing that "the maximum meaningful
fine that can be levied against any corporate offender is necessarily bounded by its
wealth," so, using a pure rational actor model, "our ability to deter the corporation may
be confounded by our inability to set an adequate punishment cost which does not exceed
the corporation's resources").
383. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994).
384. See Susan Crawford, A Wink Here, A Leer There: It's Costly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
28, 1993, at F17, cited in Beverley H. Earle & Gerald A. Madek, An International
Perspectiveon Sexual HarassmentLaw, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 43,44 (1993).
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quantifiable costs of the harassment). It is a foundational premise of
"efficient sanctioning" that penalties ought to equal and/or do equal
the social costs of law violations so that corporations properly
internalize the costs of such harm in their decision-making-by
making the correct investment in compliance.38 5 Yet, there is little
evidence that legislatures write penalty provisions utilizing the
assumptions of efficient sanctioning. Do we really think that sexual
harassment in a small corporation, which can engender compensatory
and punitive damages of up to $50,000 per claim, harms the target
individual one-sixth as much as the target of sexual harassment in a
large company, where the same damages are capped at $300,000 per
claim? Do we really think that when Congress set those penalties it
had a study quantifying the social costs of harassment indicating that
harassment in large companies imposed per claim social costs that

were six times that of harassment in small companies? This scenario
seems highly improbable, at best.

6

Indeed, even some of the most

ardent proponents of "efficient sanctioning" and rational-actor
modeling have come to recognize that statutory penalty provisions
may have little relationship, if any, to the social costs of harm
imposed by violations of those same statutes.3" So, again, use of the
penalty levels as an indication of how much money to invest in law
compliance, when the penalties bear no real relationship to the social
costs of harm (particularly if there are no estimates of how many
violations per company per year to expect), will often lead to the
wrong amount of money being invested in law compliance.
Fourth, while the amount of "the penalty" sounds like an
objective standard by which to determine the proper amount of
corporate investment in law compliance, on further examination "the
penalty" provides a wholly illusory benchmark. In most cases, the
same conduct can give rise to differing penalties of different amounts

under parallel federal and state statutes or common-law precedent.3 "
385. See Engel, supra note 4, at 37-38; Fischel, supra note 45, at 1271.
386. The far more likely explanation for this range of penalties is that it represents a
political compromise protecting small business and was driven by Congress's view of the
ability of violators to pay, not its view of the social costs of harm from harassment.
387. See Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, CorporateCrime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319,
322-23 (1996) ("[T]he criminal justice system rarely makes any attempt to set the penalty
equal to the social harm caused by the crime, a policy that may make sense in setting the
level of sanctions against individual criminals. But sanctions uncalibrated to the level of
harm can have quite a pernicious effect when the target of a sanction is a corporation.").
388. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1983) (holding that
states may require firms engaged in the nuclear power industry to pay punitive damages
for violating state law that is duplicative of federal law, even when federal law sets a cap
on monetary damages); NAACP v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287,295 (7th
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If punitive damages are permitted, the "amount of the penalty" is an

inherently indeterminate construct." 9 Moreover, an increasing
number of civil violations can give rise to potential criminal liability
as well, particularly in the regulatory arena.39 The follow-on effects
of criminal liability can be profound, as Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Kidder Peabody, Archers Daniels Midland, Caremark, and E.F.
Hutton, among others, have found. In the securities or other highly
regulated industries, a criminal indictment may cause a firm to go out
of business, as did Drexel and E.F. Hutton. Or, if they stay in

business, the firm may lose key employees and customers, see its
bond ratings downgraded, and see its cost of credit rise, among other
effects; it may be subject to onerous injunctions or be precluded from
contracting with the U.S. government or state or municipal
governments; and institutional investors may disinvest.391 None of
Cir. 1992) (holding that parallel and duplicative remedies of the Federal Fair Housing Act
and the Wisconsin fair housing law were permissible so long as state law provisions do not
conflict with federal because "duplication is not conflict").
389. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993)
(upholding as constitutional a $10 million punitive award when compensatory damages
were $19,000). Indeed, the argument has been made that it is important to allow
significant leeway to juries in awarding punitive damages precisely to prevent
corporations from being able to predict potential penalties in order to treat them as a cost
of doing business. This argument was rejected by Justice O'Connor in dissent in Pacific
MutualLife Insurance Co. v. Haslip,499 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
390. See Coffee, Paradigms Lost, supra note 7, at 1880-81 ("It has become the
common statutory pattern in the United States for a statute establishing an administrative
agency to provide that any willful violation of the rules adopted by the agency constitutes
a federal felony. As a direct result, one estimate places the number of federal regulations
currently punishable by criminal penalties at over 300,000.").
391. Each of these problems was demonstrated in the highly publicized Salomon
Brothers scandal in 1991, for which one trader, Paul M. Mozer, was primarily responsible.
(Mozer falsely used customers' names to bid in seven Treasury auctions to obtain
government securities in excess of applicable Treasury Department regulations.) The
scandal broke in early August of 1991. By late September major corporate and
government customers suspended or reduced their business with Salomon pending
resolution of the matter, including: the World Bank; the state pension funds of Texas,
Wisconsin, Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Colorado; and
AT&T, Cigna, U.S. Steel, and J.P. Morgan. See Randall Smith & Michael Siconolfi,
Salomon Is Scolded by AT&T Chairman, Who Calls Bid Scandal 'Unforgivable,' WALL
ST. J., Sept. 24, 1991, at C23. (Rule 2a-7 promulgated under the Investment Company
Act of 1940 limits the ability of money market funds to invest in commercial paper rated
below A-1 or P-1, so adverse actions by Moody's or Standard & Poor's commercial paper
rating services in light of well-publicized wrongdoing by even one or two rogue
employees, as in the Salomon example, can have serious consequences.) The Federal
Reserve suspended Salomon's right to submit bids in Treasury auctions on behalf of
customers. Salomon's underwriting business plummeted because one important role of
the underwriter is as reputational intermediary. See Michael Siconolfi & William Power,
UnderwritingFees Headed for a Record, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1992, at C1 (reporting
record profits from underwritings for investment banks other than Salomon). Business
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these effects are subject to accurate specification, let alone
quantification, ex ante, although they represent very real costs ex
post. Moreover, the serious reputational harm that can be done to a
firm by criminal liability or well-publicized civil liability (as in the
recent discrimination settlement at Texaco3' 9 ) likewise imposes real
costs on a firm that are virtually impossible to quantify ex ante, or, if
quantified, are likely to be underestimated due to widely shared
cognitive biases.3 93 Finally, in any of the above scenarios, to truly
figure out the potential penalties from corporate wrongdoing, one
would need to include the costs of litigation, including the
opportunity costs of having the firm's executives spending their time
working with litigators rather than working against competitors.
Again, these are virtually impossible to quantify ex ante. These
difficulties in prediction suggest that determining how much money
to invest in law compliance by determining the amounts of potential
"penalties" is likely to be impossible in all but the most schematic
sense.
A much clearer standard is simply to invest the amount of
money necessary to try, in good faith, fully to meet the standards of
the law. In some instances, such as in the environmental area, that
amount may end up being more money than the potential penalties
because it may require investment in new technologies. In other
instances, it may require far less money than the potential penalties.
Consider sexual harassment for a moment (as in Landgraf):
Although the parties and some courts were concerned that the
Week reported that Salomon's market share of equity underwritings went from over 8%
in the period August 1, 1990 to July 31, 1991, to under 3% in the period August 1, 1991 to
January 31, 1992, and its market share of debt underwritings went from over 10% to
approximately 7% for the same periods. See Leah Nathans Spiro & Richard A. Belcher,
Rescuing Salomon Was One Thing, but Running It..., Bus. WK., Feb. 17, 1992, at 120,

121. After the scandal, Salomon's employee turnover surged, particularly among highly
compensated employees. See Douglas Feiden et al., A HiringFrenzy, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus.,
Jan. 20-26, 1992, 6, 6 ("[Tlhough they don't like to admit it on the record, headhunters are
benefiting from the troubles of Salomon Brothers Inc. They report a surge of business
from U.S. and foreign investment and commercial banks and other financial service
companies seeking to lure away the best and the brightest at Salomon."); Philip Maher &
Jessica Sommar, Salomon Exodus Continues As Rival Banks Swoop in, INV. DEALERS'
DIG., Jan. 20,1992, at 6.
392. See Anne Reifenberg, Texaco Settlement in Racial-Bias Case Endorsed by Judge,

WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1997, at B15 (describing $176 settlement of race discrimination
class action lawsuit against Texaco, Inc.).
393. See Donald C. Langevoort, Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior: The
Epistemological Dilemma of the Corporate-Securities Lawyer, 50 STAN. L. REV.

(forthcoming 1998) (noting that among typical cognitive biases seen in an organizational
setting is optimism, which will cause employees within the organization to underestimate
the importance of negative information).
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amount of the penalty would affect the efforts put into compliance,
how expensive can those efforts really be? A company needs to
develop a sexual harassment policy, which will require managerial
time, effort, and consideration; fully publicize that policy within the
firm with the proper degree of seriousness and educate employees
about sexual harassment; and create a grievance mechanism that is
also well-publicized. There will need to be occasional reminders of
the policy, when problems are brought to a supervisor's attention;
and grievance committees will need to meet. In some cases, adverse
personnel actions will need to be taken. The costs of these actions
are minuscule, though, compared to either the penalties for sexual
harassment or the costs of sexual harassment to the firm."' In any
case, the standards of statutes and regulations are likely to provide a
far clearer account of what efforts are necessary than is "the
penalty."
C. ConceptualDifficulties with the Landgraf Theory of Efficient
Compliance

Those practical difficulties in determining the amount of "the
penalty," buttressed by social science research questioning the
rational-choice view of law,3 95 as well as by casual empiricism,396
394. See supra note 384 and accompanying text (discussing study of costs of sexual
harassment to large firms).
395. One descriptive assumption underlying rational-choice accounts of law
compliance is that obeying the law is based on a "rational actor's" comparison of the
potential costs of compliance with the benefits of non-compliance. See Ulen, supra note
23, at 442. In fact, that descriptive assumption has not been fully borne out in empirical
research. Rather, obeying the law is responsive to and dependent on a much richer
calculus, including that of a general sense of moral and civic obligation and of fairness.
See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 178 (1990). In empirical studies of law
compliance, the author found that reasons why people obey the law include an
individual's social relationships and the potential influence of others' judgments, as well
as that person's sense of internal obligation to obey the law because of a felt obligation to
behave morally, or because of a view of legal authorities as having a legitimate right to
dictate their behavior. See id.; see also CHARLES R. TITLE, SANCTIONS AND SOCIAL
DEVIANCE: THE QUESTION OF DETERRENCE 170-78 (1980) (finding that, in addition to
the fear of sanctions, people comply with laws based upon their degree of moral
commitment to norms, the degree they feel integrated into the community, and whether
the social system has deprived them of opportunity or alienated them); John Braithwaite
& Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence, 25 L. &
Soc'y REV. 7, 7, 24-36 (1991) (studying 410 chief executives of nursing homes and their
compliance with regulatory standards, and finding partial support for the theory that the
certainty of detection affects compliance with law but no support for the theory that
either certainty or severity of penalties had a bearing on compliance with law); Irving
Piliavin et al., Crime, Deterrence, and Rational Choice, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 101, 101-19
(1986) (studying serious and high risk criminal offenders, and finding no evidence that the
expected severity of sanctions has a bearing on the decision to violate the law); Sunstein,
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suggest a more fundamental problem with the Court's analysis in
Landgrafi it may be based on a theory about how decisions about

law compliance are made that is wrong.

Judges Posner and

Higginbotham, as well as the Landgraf respondents' counsel, seized

upon the notion that it would be unfair to "up the ante" since a
corporation would have "relied upon" the amount of the potential

penalty in determining how much care to take to avoid liability. In so
doing, they deployed the rational-choice model of law compliance.
But what if corporate decision-makers do not actually think this way?
What if many attorneys advising many corporations are conservative,
that is, they want to keep their employer or client out of trouble, and

think that the substantive standards the law sets forth are important
simply because they are law (although they may certainly disagree

with a legislature's policy choices with respect to any individual law)?
These attitudes would suggest that in giving advice about investing in
compliance programs, attorneys are more likely to be concerned with
balancing the cost of the program against the probability of
violation-a completely different focus, and one that ultimately seeks

compliance with the law.
On one level, then, the Court has simply made a mistake: it
relied upon a theory of decision-making that is incomplete at best.
But it is the particular nature of the mistake that is important. While

rational-choice theory was originally proposed as a theoretical (and
necessarily simplified) model of how to think about decisionmaking
generally, and was then applied to thinking about law and
deterrence,397 the Court's analysis treats the model as if it were a true
description of the underlying reality of decision-making about law
supra note 23, at 903 (positing an interaction between laws and norms as shaping
behavior, so that changes in social norms can alter the reputational incentives and
consequences of complying with the law).
396. My observations as a practicing attorney, as well as conversations I have had with
other attorneys both before and after I began working on this Article, lead me to believe
that many corporations make serious efforts to comply with the requirements of law
irrespective of the levels of penalties, particularly since many firms recognize that the
reputational effects of law violations can be seriously damaging and are of far more
serious concern to the firms than are the statutory penalties. In determining the level of
investment in law compliance programs, companies are more likely to weigh the cost of a
compliance program against the probability of a violation than they are to weigh the
benefits of deliberate breach of a statutory obligation against the potential costs of
breach. Factors affecting the probability of violations include the nature of the industry
and types of statutes and regulations applicable to it, the compensation structure of the
firm and its organization, including its supervisory and accounting structure, and its
relationships with suppliers, producers, and customers. (I particularly appreciate the
insights of my colleague Professor Phil McConnaughay on this point.)
397. See Becker, supra note 74, at 170; Ulen, supra note 23, at 436.
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compliance. In so doing, the Court's analysis has potentially affected
that underlying reality. By endorsing the view that compliance with
the law is properly shaped by whether the penalties are financially
significant (or at least understandablyshaped by that factor), and by
holding that it is unfair to impose expanded penalties when managers
had "relied upon" lower penalties and had thus developed an
expectation that the Court treats as settled, the Court seemingly
endorses the rational-choice theory of law compliance, both as a
descriptive matter and as a normative matter. In so doing, the Court
serves to undermine the normative significance of law, particularly
when penalties are insignificant (as to a large corporation), which
may ultimately have an impact on law compliance such that future
corporate decision-makers will consider the size of penalties as
determinative in orienting their law-compliance activities, even if
they would not have done so previously.
But even if the efficient investment paradigm does accurately
describe how corporate managers, prior to Landgraf,typically think
about developing a law-compliance program, we are then back to the
more fundamental question: Why should the penalty level have
mattered at all? If the law made clear what substantive behavior was
required to conform to law, why should it matter that a civil violation
became more expensive? What has the Supreme Court told us about
its concept of law in Landgraf?
Unfortunately, what it has told us is that its concept of law is
penalty-driven and thin. The Court could have articulated a view of
law much closer to that of Judge (now Justice) Breyer in Capuano:
An entity's "obligation, under the law, is to refrain from those
activities that call for a sanction, whether that sanction is strict or
lenient, and whether the agency [charged with enforcement] devotes
many, or few, staff resources to the business of catching violators. 398
It could have upheld the view of law of those courts that rejected
Luddington's law-as-price view and that instead focused on whether
the substantive standards of behavior necessary to conform to the law
had been changed by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 311 Instead, the
Supreme Court focused on the level of the penalty as a determinative
factor affecting corporate compliance with the law.
In adopting this penalty-driven approach to law, the Court gives
credence to a view that makes it impossible to structure social and
legal interactions with any degree of confidence. Each corporation or
398. Capuano v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 843 F.2d 56,58 (1st Cir. 1988).
399. See supra text accompanying notes 321-26 (discussing these decisions).
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individual will value penalties, and therefore laws, differently,
depending on their profit levels, their tolerance for financial risk, the
structure of their industry, and their competitive position in that
industry. These different values will affect the efforts put into law
compliance, on the Court's view, and thus will affect the extent to
which the law is implemented in that firm. While this patchwork
quality is undoubtedly a true description of the way law is
implemented across firms, it is unfortunate to accept this description
as a perfectly plausible account of the most we can expect from firms,
as the Court did in Landgraf. And having accepted that account, the
Court's logic can produce a self-fulfilling prophecy, as described
above.
Ultimately, the most problematic aspect of the Landgraf
decision is what it says about the Court's view of political obligation.
Perhaps enhanced penalties will have an impact on private parties'
planning, and perhaps enhanced penalties will give added incentives
to corporate managers to invest more in law compliance programs.
But why should we not assume that there is a prima facie obligation
to comply with the law even without those added incentives? Was
the "price" of potential violations so low that the Court thinks it
reasonable that USI Film Products would just not be very concerned
with compliance? Why should we adopt that as a perfectly plausible
theory of political obligation? For the reasons discussed above, we
should not.
VI. THE CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY DEBATE
To this point, this Article has argued that the law-as-price theory
of law is an incorrect understanding of the meaning of law in a
democracy. As applied to the corporation, moreover, it is also
premised upon an incorrect understanding of the corporation and its
obligations as a citizen and social actor. This Article will conclude by
briefly sketching out this 'argument, while recognizing that its full
development could entail a separate article.
Recently, in both academic publications' 0 and the popular

400. See, e.g., PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 79; MARK J. ROE, STRONG
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1994); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to ProfessorGreen, 50 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1423 (1993) [hereinafter Bainbridge, In Defense]; Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 971 (1992)
[hereinafter Bainbridge, Interpreting]; William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic
Theory of the Firm: CriticalPerspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989);
George Djurasovic, The Regulation of Socially Responsible Mutual Funds, 22 J. CORP. L.
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press,4 1 the question of the proper relationship of the corporation to
society has again begun to surface as a matter of some concern. This
question was posed in modem times by Merrick Dodd and Adolf
Berle in the 1930s as follows: To whom do corporate managers have
fiduciary obligations-shareholders only, or other constituents as
well-and what is the nature of those obligations-to maximize
shareholder wealth, or to maximize social welfare, or some
combination of the two?4" This "corporate purpose" debate between
Dodd and Berle has remained largely unresolved in the modern
shareholder/stakeholder debate between progressive corporate law
257 (1997); Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporationsin the Protectionof Human Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 153 (1997);
Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Environmental Law and the Ethical
Investor, 22 J. CORP. L. 465 (1997); Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders:
Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1409 (1993);
Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's
Box: ManagerialDiscretion and the Problem of CorporatePhilanthropy, 44 UCLA L.
REv. 579 (1997); Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradoxof CorporateGiving: Tax Expenditures,
the Nature of the Corporation,and the Social Constructionof Charity,44 DEPAUL L. REV.
1 (1994); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperationand Constraint in the Modern Corporation:
An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEX. L. REv. 477 (1995);
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425 (1993);
Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to
FacilitateLabor-ManagementCooperation,78 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1993).
401. See, e.g., Wendy Bounds, Critics Confront a CEO Dedicated to Human Rights,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1997, at B1; James Cramer, Let Them Eat Stocks, NEW REPUBLIC,
Apr. 29, 1996, at 24; Richard B. Freeman, Toward an Apartheid Economy?, HARV. BUS.
REV., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 114; Carey Goldberg, A Promise Is Kept, Mill Reopens, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, at A14; Steven Greenhouse, Accord to Combat Sweatshop LabOr
Faces Obstacles,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1997, at Al; Bob Herbert, SeparationAnxiety, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 1996, at A29; Michael Lerner, Social Responsibility Amendment and
Initiative, TIKKUN, July 1997, at 33, 33-34; Alison Mitchell, Republicans and Democrats
Jumping on Issue of CorporateResponsibility, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1996, at B15; Steven
Pearlstein, No More Mr. Nice Guy, WASH. POST (Weekly Ed.), Dec. 18-24, 1995, at 10;
Robert B. Reich, How to Avoid These Layoffs?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1996, at A21; Hanna
Rosin, The Evil Empire: The Scoop on Ben & Jerry's Crunchy Capitalism, NEW
REPUBLIC, Sept. 11, 1995, at 22; Shareholder Values, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 15;
Stakeholder Capitalism, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 23; Michael Winerip, Where the
Loss ofJobs Means GrowingAnger, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,1996, at A16; see also President
Clinton's Conference on Corporate Citizenship (May 16, 1996) (transcript available from
the Office of the Press Secretary of the White House) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (discussing corporate responsibility and highlighting actions of corporations
that have been financially successful and also concerned with employee and community
needs).
402- See Berle, supra note 79, at 1368; Dodd, supra note 79, at 1162. As Professor
Steve Bainbridge has pointed out, the corporate responsibility debate predates the 1930s,
so it is more accurate to suggest that the modern corporate social responsibility debate
began with Dodd and Berle's exchange. See Bainbridge, Interpreting,supra note 400, at
971.
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scholars and contractarians. 0 3 But Dodd and Berle also disagreed
whether the
upon a more fundamental, underlying question:
corporation should be understood as purely private property, as
Berle argued, or as quasi-public property, as Dodd asserted. 4 °
Following that line of argument may ultimately be more fruitful.40 5
In the work of both the ALI Corporate Governance Project and
of the ABA Committee on Corporate Law Revisions to the Model
Business Corporations Act, we can see evidence of the views of
leading academics and practitioners on the obligations of the
corporation as a citizen and social actor, as exemplified by the
seriousness with which those bodies treat the obligation of corporate
boards and officers to ensure obeyance with the law. One of the
striking aspects of the ALI and ABA views on the importance of law
compliance is that certain types of law violations are treated as
relatively unimportant and of limited concern in structuring
corporate governance systems-civil law violations, even if
intentional, according to the ABA, or non-culpable law violations,
either civil or criminal, according to the ALl Principles.4°6 Both the
ALI Principles,particularly in later years, and the ABA Committee
on Corporate Laws have been shaped by the perceived interests of
large corporate clients, as communicated by large law firm lawyers,
and by the law and economics approach to corporate law. 407 The
former, for obvious reasons, perceive their interests to be furthered
by provisions limiting potential board liability to shareholders and to
the corporation, because that will reduce the potential for expensive
derivative litigation and will increase the certainty of boards' and
.officers' predictions of the liability consequences of corporate
decision-making. 4°s The latter have conceptualized the firm as a
403. One reason this debate may still be largely unresolved is that it is ultimately a
political debate, but is rarely recognized as such. If so, then Steve Bainbridge's recent
critique of Progressive Corporate Law in the Cornell Law Review at least serves the
admirable purpose of bringing the underlying political disagreements to the fore. See
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative ContractarianCritique

of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 858 (1997)
(reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 59) ("Although most corporate

law scholars, including most in the law and economics camp, purport to embrace an
apolitical objectivity, my disagreement with progressive corporate law scholars is
explicitly political. This Essay continues and refines our on-going dialogue by candidly
articulating a conservative version of the law and economics account of corporate law.").
404. See infra text accompanying notes 416-20.
405. Larry Mitchell has taken this approach to the corporate purpose debate recently.
See Mitchell, supra note 14, at 877.
406. See supra text accompanying notes 149-94.
407. See Branson, supranote 14, at 281-84; Seligman, supra note 64, at 342-44.
408. These concerns, along with a concern for creating conditions that allow the
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"nexus of contracts," both implicit and explicit, among equity
investors, bondholders, employees, managers, creditors, and
consumers, and have elaborated upon the relationships among these
entities as a sub-species of contract law. 49 There may well be a
tension between these "camps" on some issues, such as
management's duties when presented with a hostile takeover
attempt, 410 but under both views corporate law is predominantly a

type of private law, and the relationship of the board to the
shareholders, among other relationships, is of private concern, for the
most part, and is subject to "voluntary" agreement in the certificate
of incorporation. 411 Thus, if the shareholders "agree" that the board
ought not be liable to the corporation for intentional violations of
civil law, or for "non-culpable" violations of any law, because that
structure of exculpation is thought to advance the corporation's
interests, then that private agreement suffices to take the issue of law
compliance off the table as a subject for corporate governance
412
concern under both views.

maximum flexibility for economic risk-taking in corporate decision-making, are dominant
themes in the Business Roundtable's criticisms of the First Draft of the ALI Principles.
See generally BuSINESs ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT, supra note 64 (arguing that the
ALI's proposed Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure would impede
corporate flexibility by over-emphasizing litigation).
409. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 85, at 12. Easterbrook and Fischel
argue that a contractual approach does not draw a sharp distinction between suppliers of
financial capital (shareholders, bondholders, and creditors) and suppliers of human
capital (employees), yet for employees and constituents other than shareholders (such as
community members), enforcement of the corporate contract means enforcing the
"explicit, negotiated contract," id. at 37, while shareholders as "residual claimants" get
the benefit of favorable implicit contract terms, such as shareholder profit-maximizing as
the sole legitimate object of corporate endeavor, see id. at 38. In contrast, other writers
have suggested that there could be favorable implicit contracts between a corporation and
its employees. See, e.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation'sNexus of
Contracts: Recognizing a FiduciaryDuty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV.
1189, 1203-07, 1252-53 (1991) (stating that employees develop long-term attachments to
companies under implicit contracts in which employees accept lower wages in return for a
degree of job security; based on these implicit contracts, directors should have fiduciary
duties to mitigate the effects of layoffs and plant closings upon displaced workers). So
while a private-law vision of corporate law has been the usual implication drawn from the
nexus-of-contracts view of the corporation, that implication is not inevitable.
410. On this issue, corporate lawyers tend to be more sympathetic to the concerns of
management, particularly if they have represented takeover targets, while academics of
the law and economics school are concerned with maximizing shareholder wealth (which,
for target shareholders, usually involves being acquired) and effectuating the discipline of
the market for corporate control to dislodge entrenched management.
411. Neither the ALI nor the ABA think that these questions are purely of private
concern, though, as is evidenced by the limitations both groups placed on the
corporation's ability to exculpate its board. See supra text accompanying notes 163-82.
412. One should be cautious in interpreting shareholders' "voluntary agreement" for a
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The ALl Principlesand the ABA revisions on exculpation, then,

are an indication of the ascendancy of a private-law vision of
corporate law within the corporate bar, and with it a constrained

theory of corporate social responsibility.413 The nexus-of-contracts
view of the corporation that so influenced the ALl Principles and
ABA revisions not only explicitly relies on a metaphor of private
ordering (that of contract law) to describe the corporation, but
suggests that any argument of public responsibilities for such private

entities is just wrong. As Fischel has put the point:
Those who argue that corporations have a social
responsibility and, therefore, that managers have the right,
and perhaps the duty, to consider the impact of their

decisions on the public interest assume that corporations are
capable of having social or moral obligations. This is a
fundamental error. A corporation ... is nothing more than

a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a mass of contracts
which various individuals have voluntarily entered into for
their mutual benefit. Since it is a legal fiction, a corporation
is incapable of having social or moral obligations much in
the same way that inanimate objects are incapable of having
these obligations.414

Moreover, an extreme variant of a private-law vision is inherent
in the efficient breach view of public law, since it posits that the
private wealth-maximizing behavior of individual corporations can

number of reasons. First, some shareholders will have purchased shares after exculpatory
amendments to the articles of incorporation limiting board liability were enacted
(although the price of the shares may have been discounted somewhat to reflect the
increased risks to shareholders from the liability limitations, and so by purchasing at a
discount those shareholders could be argued to have consented to and have been
compensated for increased risks of directors' misconduct). See Michael Bradley & Cindy
A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75
IOWA L. REv. 1, 64 (1989) (reporting that firms electing to adopt exculpation provisions
experienced a statistically significant drop in share price). Second, management typically
owns or controls a majority of shares, and so is in a position to cause "the shareholders"
to consent to limitations on management's liability.
413. See Branson, supra note 14, at 281-84; Seligman, supra note 64, at 342-44.
414. Fischel, supra note 45, at 1273. On this view, rather than being more than the
sum of its asserted parts, for instance by organizing, coordinating, and prioritizing this
web of explicit and implicit contracts, the corporation is somehow only the sum of its
parts. Even so, if we are not to ascribe moral responsibility for the effects of corporate
action to the corporation as the organizing and coordinating collective entity, then the
moral responsibility must remain with the individuals who comprise the corporation, who
make the decisions, and who participate in the contracts. Moreover, one of the most
important implicit contracts is with society, through the auspices of the state, and so it is
entirely consistent with a nexus-of-contracts view to examine what the terms of this
particular implicit contract are.
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overcome the substantive standards set by laws of otherwise general
applicability.4 15 Easterbrook and Fischel's theory of a private right to
violate public law when it is profitable presumes, one must conclude,
that if each corporation maximizes its profits by non-morally
repugnant violations of law when the potential profits outweigh the
potential penalties, that is, pursues its self-interest more or less
untrammeled, then social wealth will be advanced. If the ALI
Principlesand the ABA Committee's views on exculpation represent
a partial ascendency of a private-law vision of the corporation,
Easterbrook and Fischel's theory represents the total ascendency of
such a private-law vision.
And yet that vision of the corporation and the corporate social
relationship is neither uncontested nor incontestable. Merrick Dodd
initiated the modern corporate social responsibility debate in 1932
precisely by arguing that modern corporations ought not to be
considered purely private entities because they form the backbone of
the economic organization of society, and that concomitant with this
position and concentration of economic power are certain public
responsibilities.416 Dodd argued that "business is permitted and
encouraged by the law primarily because it is of service to the
community rather than because it is a source of profit to its
'
owners."417
Indeed, he argued that the corporation is an institution
that is greater than a simple aggregation of shareholders (contrary to
how it is now understood by nexus-of-contracts devotees) and one
that is central to the economic and now political organization of
society.418 Moreover, he asserted, managers of large corporations
must be understood to be fiduciaries for the institution, and not for
its constituent shareholders. 9
This reconceptualization is
415. Private wealth-maximizing operates in two ways in the Easterbrook/Fischel
theory to mediate the relationship between the corporation and society. First, society
sends price signals to firms in the penalties it sets, and firms respond by efficient
investment in compliance or by varying their demand for law violations in order to
maximize profits. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 1157. Second, the dictates
of private wealth-maximizing operate as a trump to overcome the substantive standards
set by the law. See id. at 1177 n.57.
416. See Dodd, supra note 79, at 1149. Dodd pointed to the regulation of certain
industries that are imbued with important "public" responsibilities, such as railroads, gas,
electric service, and telephones, as evidence of limitations on the extent to which
businesses can be considered purely private property, and also pointed to the then-newly
developing regulations promoting employee health and safety and economic security as
further evidence of that point. See id. at 1149-51.
417. Id. at 1149.
418. See icL at 1162-63.
419. See id.
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unimportant if the purpose of the institution is simply profitmaximizing, but Dodd was unwilling to agree to that narrow
definition of the corporate purpose, because he lived during the
Depression (given the obvious defects in the social results the private
wealth-maximizing view had seemingly produced in that era) and
because of his view that with increasing corporate power came

increasing social responsibility.420

This more public-law vision of corporate power and
responsibility continues to compete with the private-law vision in the
work of some corporate law scholars today, and possibly in the ALl
Principles themselves, given the inconsistent signals on the
importance of public-law ordering in corporate regulation contained
therein.4"' Most of the essays contributed to Progressive Corporate

Law are written by corporate-law scholars who reject a purely
private-law understanding of the corporation.4'

Another recent

420. See id. at 1157 ("Modern large-scale industry has given to the managers of our
principal corporations enormous power over the welfare of wage earners and consumers,
particularly the former. Power over the lives of others tends to create on the part of those
most worthy to exercise it a sense of responsibility."). Dodd's claims were disputed, in
part, by Adolph Berle in the same issue of the HarvardLaw Review, which gave rise to
the modern corporate-purpose debate. See Berle, supra note 79. Berle did not disagree
with Dodd's analysis of the growing power of corporations; in fact, he was more explicit
about the fact that, given the degree of financial concentration and coordination exercised
by corporations, private corporate enterprises were undertaking essentially quasigovernmental roles of industrial planning and development. See id. at 1366. Yet Berle
was ultimately concerned with the problem that still vexes corporate thinkers who see the
social problems caused by unmitigated shareholder profit-maximizing:
Once you
abandon the shareholder as the central focus of fiduciary concern, asserted
responsibilities to other constituents-employees, consumers, or the community---can
often mask management self-interest or entrenchment. See id. at 1367-68.
421. Professor Larry Mitchell has argued that during the time the ALl Principleswere
being developed, "the corporate law debate, paralleling similar debates in political and
moral philosophy, sociology, and economics, began to revolve around the fundamental
issue of whether the social institution that has become the publicly held corporation was
the private domain of the stockholders or the subject of broader public concern."
Mitchell, supra note 14, at 872. Mitchell's thesis is that the drafters of the ALI Principles
failed "to address and resolve the great unanswered question in corporate law: What is
the nature and purpose of the corporation," and whether "the modern corporation is
essentially a matter of public or of private concern." Id. at 875-76. From that failure, he
suggests, derives the ironic fact that the ALl Principles fails to satisfy either the "free
market" camp of corporate law scholars or the "regulatory" camp. See id.
422. See PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supranote 79. ProgressiveCorporateLaw,
as the name suggests, is a collection of essays that sets out a self-described progressive,
and in many cases communitarian, understanding of the corporation. It includes
contributions by Professors Douglas Branson, William Bratton, Lynne Dallas, Theresa
Gabaldon, Gregory Mark, David Millon, Lawrence Mitchell, Marleen O'Connor, Eric
Orts, Joel Seligman, and Lewis Solomon. Communitarian corporate law, as described by
David Millon, focuses "on the sociological and moral phenomenon of the corporation as
community, in contrast to the individualistic, self-reliant, contractarian stance that
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collection of essays on the corporate social relationship, Corporations
and Society: Power and Responsibility, includes the work of
additional scholars who challenge a purely private-law understanding
of the corporation.4" Even some scholars typically not associated
with the progressive "camp" of corporate law scholars have
developed a much more nuanced understanding of the corporation as
involving public responsibilities, or at the least as being a proper
subject for public concern and regulation, than the views of the most
ardent nexus-of-contracts private-law devotees.424 While it is too
ambitious at this stage of this Article to set out a full justification for
a richer concept of the corporation as a public actor, with fully
developed public responsibilities, a few points on the subject are in
order.
First, the purely private-law vision invariably puts central
emphasis on shareholder wealth-maximizing as the important focus
of the corporate manager's activities, and often imbues shareholder
wealth-maximizing with strong moral overtones.4'
And yet the
actions permitted or required by shareholder wealth-maximizing are
dominates

current

academic

discourse

in

corporate

law."

David

Millon,

Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 79, at 1, 1. The importance (or uniqueness)

of this book is such that it inspired not one, but two, book reviews in the Cornell Law
Review alone (reaching diametrically different conclusions). Compare Bainbridge, supra
note 403, at 858 (criticizing communitarian corporate law, finding it an unpersuasive
critique of contractarianism), with Deborah A. DeMott, Trust and Tension Within
Corporations,81 CORNELL L. REV. 1308, 1310, 1315 (1996) (stating that the introduction
of communitarian and international perspectives into corporate law debates has
"invigorated discussion and deepened analysis").
423. See CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY (Warren J.
Samuels & Arthur S. Miller eds., 1987) (including contributions by Professors Walter
Adams and James Brock, Michael Barzelay and Rogers Smith, Martin Benjamin and
Daniel Bronstein, John Flynn, Morton Horwitz, Samuel Loescher, David Dale Martin,
Arthur Miller, Warren Samuels, Martin Sklar, Aviam Soifer, and William Lovett).
424. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations,Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L.

REV. 1931, 1971-73 (1991) (proposing a socio-historical account of Paramount
Communications,Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989), that stresses a legitimate

role for state power to curb the excesses of "market driven, self-seeking, laissez-faire

individualism"); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1555 (1989) [hereinafter Gordon, Mandatory Structure] (arguing

for an important role for mandatory fiduciary duty provisions of state corporate law as
against the contractarian claim that since all corporate law is really a species of contract
law, the corporation should be presented with few mandatory fiduciary duties under state
law, and should be able to contract around laws that primarily set out default positions).
425. See, e.g., Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 400, at 1427-28 ("In economic life, as
in religious life, no one can serve two masters at the same time. Directors thus cannot be
loyal to both shareholders and nonshareholder constituencies. Rather, their role as
stewards requires them to prefer the interests of their shareholder masters.").
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actions that many people (and perhaps most people) find ethically
problematic at best, or simply wrong at worst. So, for instance,
cigarette companies are required by wealth-maximizing aggressively
to market cigarettes to teenagers to maintain their market, since
eighty-two percent of long-term smokers make the decision to start
smoking before age eighteen.426 In fact, "among smokers aged 12-17
years, 70 percent already regret their decision to smoke and 66
percent state that they want to quit. 42 7 As might be expected, the
companies' marketing campaigns use themes of particular relevance
establishing independence, rejecting parental
to adolescents:
authority, and being adult.42s So, in order to maximize profits,
cigarette companies study the particular vulnerabilities of non-adults
and use those vulnerabilities in marketing a lethal product, with the
result of initiating the process of addiction in thousands of teenagers
a week. "'If an adolescent's tobacco use continues for a lifetime,
there is a fifty-percent chance that the person will die prematurely as
a direct result of smoking.' "429 Private wealth-maximizing is the
conduct, but it surely
reason for this conduct, and in fact requiresthis
430
it.
for
justification
ethical
inadequate
offers an
426. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarette and Smokeless
Tobacco Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,314
(1995) (reporting findings of fact of the FDA upon issuing regulations to restrict
advertising, promotional activities, and sales of cigarettes to minors).
427. Id
428. See id. at 41,329 (reporting findings of fact of the FDA). The report states that
[o]ne Canadian tobacco company described its "masculine" targeting in
these words: "since 1971, [the company's] marketing strategy has been to
position [a cigarette brand] as a 'masculine trademark for young males.' It
has been our belief that lifestyle imagery conveying a feeling of
independence/freedom should be used to trigger the desire for individuality
usually felt by maturing young males." Advertising for cigarette brands
targeted to women have proven successful in attracting young female
smokers.... Some of these campaigns utilized themes thought to be
appealing to women (e.g. liberation and feminism, images of slimness and
sophistication). The advertising campaigns preceded a rapid increase in
smoking initiation rates among girls under 18 ....
Id. (quoting an Imperial Tobacco Company marketing report).
429. Id. at 41,318 (quoting PETO, ET AL., MORTALITY FROM SMOKING IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1950-2000, at A10 (1994)).
430. The moral dilemma is particularly acute if one tends towards either deontological
or consent-based moral justifications for human action. Both approaches emphasize the
importance of human rationality, broadly construed, and thus the importance of engaging
another person's well-informed rationality, their consent, to action. Cigarette companies
are encouraging teenagers and children to make these decisions before their rationality is
fully developed, and indeed before the teenagers are permitted to offer legal consent, an
arguably less onerous standard than that either Kant or Rawls might impose on the
concept of consent.
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The justification of private wealth-maximizing also permits many
actions that are ethically or politically problematic. Corporate
involvement in the democratic political process in this country is
pervasive, from funding candidates to lobbying legislators and
regulators to actually writing legislation.4 31 This involvement has
changed the relationship of the individual to her government, and has
arguably undermined Americans' confidence in the institutions of
government. And yet this involvement is permitted by wealthmaximizing (and may even be required).432 Other types of corporate
action, from investing in infrastructure with repressive or corrupt
foreign governments,4 33 to employing people in other countries at
prevailing wages under forty cents per hour without basic labor,
health, or safety protections required in this country are, again,
perfectly permissible using the wealth-maximizing standard. 43 4
431. See DREW, supranote 380 (analyzing corporate campaign contributions); NADER
& SMrrH, supra note 380, at 256-319 (analyzing corporate involvement in lobbying and
writing legislation).
432. See supra note 380 (discussing return on investment from corporate lobbying
efforts).
433. A key economic development project in Burma (Myanmar) involves an offshore
gas deposit being mined in part by Unocal (28% ownership interest), and in part by the
Burmese government, which is a military government. In order to extract this natural
resource, a new $1 billion electricity plant was required, as was a 32-mile on-shore section
of pipeline. The U.S. State Department has claimed that these infrastructure projects
have relied upon "[c]itizens, including women and children ...forced to labor under
harsh working conditions," and human rights groups claim that the projects also forcibly
resettled villages during the construction. See U.S. Department of State, Burma Report
on Human Rights Practicesfor 1996, (visited Feb. 5, 1998) <http://www.usis.usemb.se
/human/burma.html>.
434. See, e.g., Rebecca Blumestein & Dianna Solis, GM's Mexican Houses on Shaky
Ground: Workers' ProgramLeads to Criticismfor Low Wage Rate, WALL ST. J., June 20,
1997, at A15 (describing how a GM program to help its Mexican workers buy a house
came under attack by activist shareholders who contend that while GM wages of $.90 per
hour are in line with the local wage structure, they are still too low to provide a decent
living, including decent housing, for the majority of GM workers); Raymond Bonner &
Christopher Drew, Cigarette Makers Are Seen as Aiding Rise in Smuggling, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 1997, at Al (reporting that law enforcement officials think tobacco companies
are selling billions of dollars of cigarettes to black market dealers who have lucrative
businesses in Canada, Italy, and China); Wendy Bounds, Labor: Critics Confront a CEO
Dedicated to Human Rights, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1997, at Bi (detailing criticism of
Phillips-Van Heusen Corp. by international human rights activists for paying wages in
Guatemala below poverty levels, hiring contractors that use child labor, and intimidating
union organizers); Clare Collins, A "Family" and Town Battle the Shock of a Plant's
Closing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1989, at CN2 (examining the effect on a neighborhood in
Stonington, Connecticut, where a company plant that had been a major employer in the
community was finally closed, after two leveraged buy-outs of the company, which was in
turn sold by, inter alia, Michael Milken and Ivan Boesky); Alix M. Freedman, Juiced up:
How a Tobacco GiantDoctors Snuff Brands to Boost Their 'Kick,' WALL ST. J., Oct. 26,
1994, at Al (looking at new assertions by former U.S. Tobacco chemists, who say
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In point of fact, while private wealth-maximizing is the
explanation for why these actions are taken, it is not a persuasive

justification that they should be taken or that they can be called
"right." A more public-regarding theory, one that focuses on the
underlying ethical quality of corporate action and the effects of that

action on other people, or compares the way corporations treat
American citizens with the way they treat other countries' citizens,

offers a more persuasive ethical lens through which to evaluate
corporate action than does private wealth-maximizing. While such a
public-regarding theory certainly needs to include the legitimate
claims of shareholders, it ought not assume that an ethical analysis of
corporate action begins and ends with private shareholder wealthmaximizing.

435

Second, it is beyond argument that modem, international

corporations exercise enormous power in society, including social
power, political power, and economic power. Seventy-two percent of
all assets of active corporations (worth over $6165 trillion) are owned

companies, despite constant denials, have purposely increased the amount of nicotine
users absorb); Kelly Green & Rick Brooks, Winston-Salem Relapses into White-Collar
Funk, WALL ST. J., June 18, 1997, at S2 (spotlighting the troubles of a North Carolina
city, which has lost several thousand jobs due to corporate relocation, restructuring, and
downsizing); Harry M. Markowitz, Markets and Morality, or Arbitragers Get No Respect,
WALL ST. J., May 14, 1991, at A22 (reporting an examination by the author, who shared
the 1990 Nobel Prize for Economics, of "right and wrong, especially as applied to
participants in financial markets"); Betsy Morris & Michael J. McCarthy, RJR, in LongAwaited Move, to Dismiss About 12 Percent of Workers at Tobacco Unit, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 11, 1989, at A3 (highlighting some of the first victims of the leveraged buy-out of
RJR Nabisco, Inc., by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.-1640 employees); Peter
Schmeisser, Pushing Cigarettes Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1988, at F16 (chronicling
the moral debate in the United States concerning how, faced with anti-smoking activists
and stricter regulations on advertising, cigarette manufacturers are harvesting huge
financial gains abroad).
435. This may be a subset of the point that utilitarian theories generally cannot explain
the developed moral intuitions of persons steeped in either American constitutionalism
(which stresses the rights of the individual) or Kantian or Rawlsian views of the
individual. Each of these non-utilitarian theories stresses certain aspects of individual
rights that cannot be overcome by social utility, and that cannot be explained by reference
to social utility. Judge Posner even recognizes the point that a wealth-maximizing theory
cannot explain our commitment to rights, that on a wealth-maximizing justification it
would be perfectly permissible to encourage slavery or persecute religious minorities, for
instance. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 375-82 (1990).
Yet he ultimately gives up trying to provide a moral justification for wealth-maximizing as
a theory of social organization, simply asserting that it works and that it can be defended
on pragmatic grounds. See id. at 382. In contrast, I would argue that the fact that many
corporate actions that can be justified by reference to wealth-maximizing do not comport
with our moral intuitions about how people ought to be treated suggests that the wealthmaximizing framework is wrong or, at best, seriously incomplete.
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by 0.1% of corporations (3100 corporations), 436 while the largest 200
corporations account for sixty percent of total U.S. industrial
assets. 437 Many of the largest mega-corporations, such as the Exxon
Corporation, General Motors, and IBM, have annual revenues far
above most individual states within the United States, and their
"value product exceeds that of most nations of the world. '438 Large
mega-corporations exercise quasi-governmental powers, including
economic planning powers (control of the supply of products, of the
demand for labor and products, and of the provision of capital, for
instance) and influence over government policy making.4 39 It is a
truism that the exercise of power entails responsibility, and yet the
private-law vision of the corporation ignores this power and decries
any claims of corporate social responsibility: "A corporation is
incapable of having social or moral obligations much in the same way
that inanimate objects are incapable of having these obligations."' 0
Third, corporate power is exercised with increasing freedom
from state control, as both labor and capital become more global and
mobile (and thus corporations are able to engage in "regulatory
arbitrage" with respect to financial regulations, and "regulatory
avoidance" with respect to safety, health, environmental, and labor
regulations in the United States). 441 Moreover, corporations have
always operated free of the constitutional controls that constrain the
state-the other powerful collective entity in modern society.' 2
436. See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 149, at 58 (citing STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 523 (1985)). The most recent statistics place 83% of
all assets of active corporations (worth over $19 trillion) in the possession of 0.2% of
corporations (7043 corporations). See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 1994 STATISTICS OF
INCOME, CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS 39-40 (1997).
437. See Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Bigness and Social Efficiency: A Case
Study of the U.S. Auto Industry, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 423, at 219, 219.
43& Id.
439. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 74, 76 (2d ed.
1971).
440. Fischel, supranote 45, at 1273.
441. See WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE VORLD, READY OR NOT 33 (1997). This is merely
an acceleration of a trend observable since the late 1800s of loosening state control over
the corporation, begun with the collapse of the grant or concession theory of the
corporation, under which individual states granted corporations power for limited
purposes and limited durations "to aid the provision of public services." See Gordon,
Mandatory Structure, supranote 424, at 1551.
442. See Arthur S. Miller, Corporations and Our Two Constitutions, in
CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY,

supra note

423, at 241,

242. While contractarians target government power for fear and loathing, decrying "the
nanny state" and "faceless bureaucrats," they have, on the whole, remained remarkably
sanguine about corporate power, notwithstanding the greater constraints on the former
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Again, it is a truism that freedom entails responsibility, but again, the
private-law vision emphasizes corporate freedom without a
concomitant recognition of responsibility.
Indeed, the only public-regarding constraints on the otherwise
untrammeled freedom of corporations are, precisely, the laws and
regulations that the law-as-price theory would serve to undermine.
So, ultimately, the problem with the law-as-price view of law is the
same problem inherent in the law-as-price view of the corporation
and its social obligations: neither view contains a properly developed
understanding of the importance of the concept of public power,
public obligation, or public responsibility.
VII. CONCLUSION

The law-as-price theory is grossly reductionist, distilling all that
is important about law and political obligation into economic terms,
evaporating the moral component of law and leaving a thin distillate
that does not suffice to nurture social and political relationships.
Law, in a democracy, is more than a price tag. It is a command in
which we participate, a limit on unacceptable behavior, and an
architecture for social, political, and economic interaction. As such,
law implies obligation, even when the "price" of violations is
affordable.
The law-as-price jurisprudential construct posit that citizens,
including corporate citizens, have a choice when confronted with law,
particularly civil, regulatory law: to obey the law or deliberately to
disobey it and risk paying penalties. Either choice is thought an
acceptable vindication of a citizen's political obligations. The Court
in Landgraf, while not endorsing this view explicitly, articulated a
rationale that implicitly rests upon a similar, penalty-driven view of
law. 443 In a democracy, citizens have, in fact, a quite different choice:
to make serious efforts to obey the law, even when penalties are low,
or to work to change the law." It would have greatly behooved our
highest court to have adopted that theory of political obligation as
well, instead of endorsing even a weak version of the view that
suggests what really matters about law, ultimately, is the price.

than the latter. See Bainbridge, supra note 403, at 893.
443. See supra notes 378-380 and accompanying text.
444. Civil disobedience can be understood as being within the category of "working to
change the law." See supra notes 287-93 and accompanying text.

